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# THE CHINA QUARTERLY

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Jan - Dec. 1961

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**Diplomacy and Revolution :  
The Dialectics of a Dispute**

Richard Lowenthal

**The 1960 Moscow Statement**

Document

**The Chinese in Latin America**

Victor Alba

**The U.S. and Diplomatic Recognition :**

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## CHINA, RUSSIA AND ASIA

**The Chinese Communist Line on Neutrality** A. M. Halpern

**Soviet Agriculture as a Model for Asian Countries** W. K.

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Shen-yu Dai

**Ten Years of Storm** (extracts)

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January-March 1961

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
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## All's Well That Ends Well ?



This picture of the leaders of the Soviet and Chinese delegations to the Moscow "Summit" conference at a post-conference party appeared in a six-page picture feature devoted to Sino-Soviet friendship in the Chinese *Jen-min Hwa-pao* (No. 1, 1961). No such display of amiability by Mr. Khrushchev towards the Chinese delegates was shown in the Soviet press. The men are: Anasias Mikoyan (First Deputy Premier), Liu Shao-ch'i, Mr. Khrushchev, Teng Hsiao-p'eng (CP secretary-general), Frol Kozlov and Mikhail Suslov (CP secretaries), and Peng Chen (Politburo member and Mayor of Peking).



## RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

### *Diplomacy and Revolution: The Dialectics of a Dispute*

By RICHARD LOWENTHAL

THE policy declaration and the appeal to the peoples of the world adopted last December by the Moscow conference of eighty-one Communist parties mark the end of one phase in the dispute between the leaderships of the ruling parties of China and the Soviet Union—the phase in which the followers of Mao for the first time openly challenged the standing of the Soviet Communists as the fountain-head of ideological orthodoxy for the world movement. But the “ideological dispute” which began in April was neither a sudden nor a self-contained development: it grew out of acute differences between the two Communist Great Powers over concrete diplomatic issues, and it took its course in constant interaction with the changes in Soviet diplomatic tactics. Hence the total impact of that phase on Soviet foreign policy on one side, and on the ideology, organisation and strategy of international Communism on the other, cannot be evaluated from an interpretation of the Moscow documents alone, but only from a study of the process as a whole, as it developed during the past year on both planes.<sup>1</sup>

To say that the 1960 Chinese challenge to Soviet ideological authority grew out of pragmatic disagreements over foreign policy is not to take the view that the varieties of Communist ideology are a mere cloak for

<sup>1</sup> I have not attempted here to deal with the impact of the dispute on Chinese foreign policy, as distinct from Chinese ideology. Owing to the absence of diplomatic relations with the main enemy, the scope for Chinese diplomacy outside the *bloc* is somewhat limited. As experts on the subject have suggested in past issues of this review, the chief effect of the dispute in this field seems to have been to make the Chinese leaders try to mend some of their national quarrels with neutral Asian states, notably Burma, Nepal and Indonesia, and to reduce the temperature of their conflict with India: apparently they realised at some point that the multiplication of these quarrels made them needlessly vulnerable to Soviet criticism of their general views on war and peaceful co-existence—views that had, after all, been formulated primarily with an eye to relations with the “imperialist” West, and above all with the United States. On the main issue, the repetition of the proposal for an atom-free zone in the Pacific on August 1 may have been intended to stake out a Chinese negotiating position in case of Soviet-American agreement on a permanent ban on nuclear tests—a price to be exacted for agreement to be kept out of the nuclear club.

conflicts of national interest. The profound differences in the history of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties, both in the strategy by which they conquered power and in the methods they used afterwards for transforming society, have clearly produced a different ideological climate, different forms of inner-party life and a different "style of work"; and the fact that Mao Tse-tung could only win control of the Chinese party and lead it to victory by repeatedly defying Stalin's advice has contributed to the formation of a Chinese Communist leadership which is highly conscious of those differences.

This is not the place either to discuss the origin and nature of the distinctive ideological climate of Chinese Communism in detail, or to trace its various manifestations from Mao's first "rectification" movement of 1941 to the methods adopted after his victory for the "re-education" of hostile classes, or from the reaction to Soviet "de-stalinisation" and the subsequent crisis in the Soviet *bloc* to the "Hundred Flowers" campaign and to the creation of the communes. Suffice it to say that while some of these manifestations of Chinese originality took an apparently "liberal" and others an apparently "extremist" form, their common characteristic is a historically conditioned tendency to believe that almost anything is possible to a revolutionary party armed with the right consciousness—an exaltation of faith and will over all "objective conditions" of the productive forces and all given class structures which exceeds that shown by the Bolshevik model, and is even more remote from the original Marxian doctrine than the latter.

A party leadership conditioned by this ideological climate will obviously perceive both the internal problems and the national interests of the state it governs in a peculiar way; to that extent, the ideological difference constitutes a kind of permanent potential for rivalry between the two Communist Great Powers. Yet it does not by itself explain the timing and content of any particular dispute between them. For given the manifestly overriding importance of their common interests, the potential rivalry can only become actual when concrete policy disagreements arise which cannot be settled by the ordinary means of intra-*bloc* diplomacy, and which the weaker and dependent ally regards as sufficiently vital to take recourse to the public use of the ideological weapon. This was done by China in muted hints during the 1958 disagreements, and much more openly in 1960.

#### THE CHINESE VIEW

In both cases, Chinese misgivings seem to have been based on a sense of insufficient Soviet diplomatic and military support in their long-standing conflict with the United States, and to have been acutely aggravated by Mr. Khrushchev's efforts to achieve a Soviet-American *détente*

—by his repeated bids for a “summit conference” without Communist China, and by his visit to the U.S. in September 1959. The Chinese leaders apparently feared, probably not without reason, that such a *détente* would further diminish Soviet interest in taking serious risks on their behalf, and increase Soviet interest in preventing them from taking any such risks themselves. Above all, Soviet willingness to make disarmament one of the main items on any summit agenda, combined with the agreed temporary ban on nuclear test explosions and the continued negotiations for a permanent ban, must have given rise to Chinese anxiety lest the Russians might be willing on certain conditions to enter a commitment to close the “nuclear club.” The mere fact of negotiation on that subject apparently precluded them from receiving Soviet aid in developing nuclear weapons of their own, and thus helped to delay their becoming a world power of the first rank; an actual Soviet commitment would have faced them with the choice of either accepting permanent inferiority in this field, or—if they went ahead successfully in developing and testing the weapon themselves—of defying an agreement of the world’s leading powers in isolation.

Whatever the Chinese may have said in their private representations to Moscow, they did not think it advisable to spell out these fears in public. But during the winter of 1959–60—roughly from Khrushchev’s visit to Peking, on his return from his talks with Eisenhower, at the beginning of October to the Moscow conference of the Warsaw Pact states in early February—they openly attacked the assumptions on which the effort to achieve a Soviet-American *détente* was officially based.<sup>2</sup> The core of their argument was that the policy of American “imperialism” and of Eisenhower, its “chieftain,” could not change in substance even if it was temporarily disguised by peace-loving phrases; hence nothing could be gained by seeking an understanding with the U.S. in an atmosphere of *détente*, only by isolating this “main enemy” and putting maximum pressure on him. A period of quite visible, concrete disagreement on policy towards the Eisenhower administration thus preceded the Chinese Communists’ generalised, ideological attack on Soviet authority.

The most striking characteristic of that period is the apparent unconcern with which the Soviet leaders pursued their preparations for a “summit conference,” despite the increasingly outspoken Chinese protests. The impression that Mao Tse-tung had refused to approve the concept of a *détente* based on “mutual concessions” as advanced by Khrushchev was confirmed when the latter, addressing the Supreme Soviet

<sup>2</sup> For a full study of the development of the Chinese arguments during that phase, see A. M. Halpern, “Communist China and Peaceful Coexistence,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 3, p. 16.

on his return to Moscow, coupled his advocacy of that concept with blunt warnings against the "Trotskyite adventurism" of a policy of "neither peace nor war,"<sup>3</sup> and when the theoretical organ of the Chinese Communists developed an analysis of American foreign policy directly opposed to Khrushchev's optimism in the following months.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, Khrushchev announced to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960 a substantial reduction of Soviet conventional forces and military expenditures as his advance contribution to the ten-power disarmament negotiations, and also indicated willingness to help overcome the deadlock in the negotiations on an inspection system for a permanent ban on nuclear test explosions—a most sensitive issue from the Chinese point of view.

Within a week, the standing committee of the Chinese National People's Congress, in a resolution formally approving the Soviet disarmament proposals, solemnly announced to the world that China would not be bound by any agreements to which she was not a party; but when this stand, together with warnings against illusions about a change in the character of American policy, was repeated at the conference of Warsaw Treaty ministers in early February by the—possibly uninvited—Chinese observer, his speech was not published in any European member state of the Soviet *bloc*, and the declaration adopted by the conference showed virtually no concessions to his point of view.<sup>5</sup> To cap it all, Khrushchev spent most of the remainder of February, including the tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet alliance, in India and Indonesia, two countries with which China was involved in acute conflicts of national interest, and showed throughout the journey an almost ostentatious detachment from Chinese claims and actions.

All during the winter, the Chinese thus experienced the inherent weakness in the position of a dependent ally who urges the stronger partner to pay more heed to his interests, but is unable to switch sides if the latter turns a deaf ear: none of their objections, raised first in secret and then with increasing publicity, were able to deflect Khrushchev from his course. There remained to them one weapon—to interfere directly not with the Soviet policy of *détente*, but with the *détente* itself—by urging on Communist and revolutionary nationalist movements in the non-Communist world a bolder forward policy than was compatible with the plans of Soviet diplomacy. But this meant that the Chinese Communists must set themselves up as rivals to their Russian comrades in

<sup>3</sup> Moscow Radio, October 31, 1959.

<sup>4</sup> e.g. Yü Chao-li, "The Chinese People's Great Victory in the Fight against Imperialism," *Peking Review*, September 22, 1959, from *Red Flag*, No. 18, 1959; *idem*, "Excellent Situation for the Struggle for Peace," *Peking Review*, January 5, 1960, from *Red Flag*, No. 1, 1960; editorial, *People's Daily*, January 21, 1960.

<sup>5</sup> See the text of both the declaration and K'ang Sheng's speech in *The China Quarterly*, No. 2, pp. 75-89.

advising these movements—in other words, that they must generalise the dispute and raise the question of ideological authority.

During the later part of the winter 1959–60, a number of cases became known where Chinese representatives had opposed Soviet delegates in closed sessions of the directing organs of such international front organisations as the World Peace Council, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the World Federation of Trade Unions, etc. The central issue in these clashes was whether the “peace campaign” was the priority task to which all other forms of revolutionary struggle must be subordinated, as the Russians maintained, or whether it was only one among many forms of the struggle against imperialism, which must in no circumstances be isolated and “set in opposition” to more militant forms of revolutionary action, as the Chinese argued. It was as a platform for these discussions in the international movement that the Chinese Communists published in April their ideological statements on the teachings of Lenin—documents which, despite all later elaborations and modifications, have remained basic for that phase of the dispute.<sup>6</sup>

#### THE QUESTION OF WAR

It has been implied in subsequent Soviet polemics, against “dogmatists and sectarians,” and innumerable times spelt out in Western comment, that the central thesis of those Chinese statements was the continued validity of Lenin’s belief in the inevitability of world war. That is not so. Every one of the Chinese documents in question quoted with approval the sentence in the 1957 Moscow declaration (based in turn on the resolution of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU) that, owing to the growth of the forces of peace, “it is now realistically possible to prevent war.” What none of them approved, however, is the formula of the Twenty-first Congress on the emerging possibility “even before the full victory of Socialism in the world, while capitalism continues to exist in part of the world, to banish world war from the life of human society.” The difference is that, in the Chinese view, the latter phrase implies the disappearance of any serious *danger* of world war while capitalism still exists; the Chinese Communists felt that this presupposed a change in the nature of imperialism—and that they had to deny such a possibility in order to contest the Khrushchevian hope of converting the ruling circles of the U.S. to a genuine acceptance of “peaceful coexistence” from realistic motives.

<sup>6</sup> Yü Chao-li, “On Imperialism as a Source of War in Modern Times,” and “On the Way for all Peoples to struggle for Peace,” NCNA, March 30, 1960, from *Red Flag*, No. 7, 1960; Editorial “Long Live Leninism,” *Peking Review*, April 26, 1960, from *Red Flag*, No. 8, 1960; Editorial, *People’s Daily*, April 22, 1960; Lu Ting-yi, “Get United under Lenin’s Revolutionary Banner,” speech at Lenin commemoration meeting in Peking, April 22, 1960 (NCNA same date).

The picture drawn by the Chinese was that of an unchanged, though weakened, imperialism which would resort to war whenever it could to defend its sphere of exploitation, but might be prevented from doing so in any particular case by the "forces of peace." In practice, they agreed with the Soviets in regarding an all-out attack on the Soviet bloc as unlikely, but argued that inter-imperialist war was still possible, and insisted that colonial wars against national liberation movements were virtually inevitable: the latter could only be "stopped" by vigorous support for the revolutionary movements. But the Communists would fail to give support if they were "afraid" of another world war, if they "begged the imperialists for peace," or if they tolerated or even spread illusions about the warlike nature of imperialism, instead of mobilising the masses everywhere for an all-out struggle against it.

This analysis implied three charges of "muddle-headed concessions to revisionism" against Khrushchev's policy: exaggeration of the dangers of nuclear war, which might paralyse the will to resist imperialism or at any rate lead to excessive caution; illusions about the growth of a "realistic" tendency towards peaceful coexistence among such "chieftains of imperialism" as Eisenhower, which might lead to a relaxation of vigilance among the Communist governments and movements; and as a result, excessive reliance on diplomatic negotiation as a means to avert war, causing a desire to restrain revolutionary movements and "just wars" of liberation, instead of welcoming them as the best means to weaken the imperialists and stop *their* wars. Accordingly, the Chinese ideologists argued that it was all right for a Communist to seek a meeting with Eisenhower, but wrong to say that he believed in the latter's peaceful intentions; all right to propose "general and complete disarmament," but wrong to tell his own followers that there was a real chance of obtaining it; all right to propagate peaceful coexistence, but wrong to advise the Algerian nationalists to try and negotiate a cease-fire with President de Gaulle. They accepted peace *propaganda* as a means of revolutionary struggle against imperialism, but not peace *diplomacy* of a kind which might even temporarily mitigate the forms of that struggle.

#### THE SOVIET REPLY

The Russians, aware that there could be no serious negotiation without an atmosphere of *détente* and at least the pretence of believing in the peaceful intentions of the other side, recognised that this was an attack on their whole coexistence diplomacy; but they had to answer it on the ideological plane. Through the mouth of Otto Kuusinen, a member of the secretariat of the CC CPSU who had begun work in the Comintern

in Lenin's time, they insisted<sup>7</sup> that Lenin had differentiated between militarist diehards and possible partners for peaceful coexistence in the imperialist camp, and had foreseen that changes in military technique might one day make war impossible. They argued that the growing strength of the "Socialist camp" and the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and long-range rockets had in fact provided a realistic basis for a diplomacy based on similar differentiation at the present time, and claimed as telling proof of their thesis the success of Khrushchev's personal diplomacy in general, and of his "historic visit" to the U.S. in particular, in largely dispersing the climate of the Cold War and restoring businesslike relations between the two different social systems. Yet only a few weeks later Khrushchev himself, even while maintaining this position in theory, reversed himself in practice to the extent of wrecking the summit conference on the ground that negotiation with Eisenhower had become impossible after his assumption of responsibility for the U 2 incident.

Western discussion of the causes of this *volte-face* has necessarily remained inconclusive in the absence of direct evidence of the motives of the Russian rulers and the course of their deliberations in the critical period. But a coherent analysis of the Sino-Soviet dispute is impossible without at least venturing a hypothesis. I have elsewhere stated my reasons for rejecting the theory that a decisive weakening of Khrushchev's position by some combination of "neo-Stalinist" or "pro-Chinese" elements in the Soviet leadership took place at that time<sup>8</sup>; indeed, I know of no convincing evidence for the assumption that such a grouping exists at all. On the other hand, Khrushchev's Baku speech of April 25 showed his anxieties, following a number of authorised American policy statements, lest the summit meeting might fail to yield the Western concessions on Berlin which he expected, and his desire to increase the pressure in that direction; and his initial reaction to the U 2 incident is consistent with the assumption that he regarded it not as a reason for evading the summit conference, but as an occasion for making the pressure more effective by driving a wedge between Eisenhower and his "diehard militarist" advisers.<sup>9</sup>

By marking the complete failure of this crude attempt at differentiation, the President's assumption of personal responsibility for the spy-flights, whatever its other merits or demerits, must have been a double blow to Khrushchev: it deprived him of the last hope of obtaining substantial concessions at the summit, and it put him clearly in the wrong

<sup>7</sup> Speech at Lenin commemoration meeting in Moscow, April 22, 1960: *Pravda*, April 23.

<sup>8</sup> "The Nature of Khrushchev's Power," *Problems of Communism*, July/August 1960.

<sup>9</sup> See Khrushchev's speeches to the Supreme Soviet on May 5 and 7, and at the reception of the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow on May 9.

on one important part of his public argument with his Chinese allies. A failure to reach his summit objectives thus became certain at the very moment at which, from the viewpoint of his prestige in the "Socialist camp" and the Communist world movement, he could least afford such a failure: hence it seems natural that, with the full support of his colleagues, he decided rather to wreck the conference in advance unless he could still force a last-minute differentiation by obtaining a public apology from Eisenhower.

Within a few days, Khrushchev demonstrated by his refusal to go ahead with an East German peace treaty pending a possible summit conference with Eisenhower's successor that he had not abandoned the "general line" of his diplomacy but only intended to change the time schedule. But the Chinese Communists not only were not content with that, but felt that now they had been proved right by events, they were in a strong position to force a broad change of policy by pressing home their ideological attack.

#### PEKING PRESSES ITS ATTACK

The attempt was made officially and in fact publicly at the beginning of June at the Peking session of the General Council of the WFTU by the Chinese Vice-President of that body, Liu Chang-sheng, and there is reason to suppose that even more comprehensive and outspoken criticisms of Soviet policy were circulated non-publicly at the same time, at least to selected leaders of the Communist world movement. Liu's speech<sup>10</sup> went beyond the April documents in demanding a "clarification" of the Communist attitude towards war, denouncing "indiscriminate" opposition to war and calling for active support for "just wars" of liberation; in sharply opposing the formulation of the Soviet Twenty-first Congress about "eliminating war forever while imperialism still exists" as "entirely wrong" and leading to "evil consequences of a serious nature which, in fact, we already see at present," though he too admitted the possibility of preventing a new world war; and in condemning any belief that proposals for general and complete disarmament could be accepted, and that the funds formerly earmarked for war purposes could be used for the welfare of the masses and for assisting underdeveloped countries while imperialism still existed as "downright whitewashing and embellishing imperialism" and thus "helping imperialism headed by the U.S. to dupe the people."

Yet the Chinese had misjudged their chances of forcing a change of the Soviet line. At the WFTU session, they found themselves vigorously counter-attacked by both the Russian and the major European movements, and finally isolated with only the Indonesian trade unions on their

<sup>10</sup> NCNA, June 8, 1960.

side. Moreover, this seems to have been the point at which the Soviet leaders decided to give battle in defence of their ideological authority, and first of all to whip into line those European satellite parties which had in the past shown signs of sympathy for Chinese intransigence. They took the initiative in calling a conference of all ruling Communist parties to meet on the occasion of the Rumanian party congress later that month; and in the meantime the Soviet press began to publish warnings against the dangers of "dogmatism" and "sectarianism" in the international movement,<sup>11</sup> while the Italian delegates returning from Peking published the fact that the Chinese had been isolated and defeated in a major international discussion on the problems of the struggle for peace and disarmament.<sup>12</sup>

Now that the issue of authority was out in the open, the field of the dispute kept broadening. Already in April, the speaker at the Peking celebration of Lenin's birthday, Lu Ting-Yi, had claimed for Mao's creation of the communes the succession to Lenin's concept of "uninterrupted revolution," and had attacked people who in Socialist construction "rely only on technique and not on the masses" and deny the need for further revolutionary struggle in the transition to the higher stage of Communism.<sup>13</sup> Now *Pravda* quoted Engels and Lenin for their criticism of the Blanquist wish to "skip all the intermediate stages on the road to Communism" in the illusion that "if power were in their hands, communism could be introduced the day after tomorrow."<sup>14</sup> Yet the original Sino-Soviet disagreement about the communes had been ended in the winter of 1958-59 with the withdrawal of the Chinese claim that this institution constituted a short cut to the Communist stage, and an understanding that the Chinese would go on developing and the Soviets and their European satellites rejecting that institution without further debate. The revival of the issue now only made sense as part of the attempt by each side to throw doubt on the other's ideological orthodoxy.

#### THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE

On the eve of the Bucharest conference, a *Pravda* editorial stated bluntly that "among Socialist countries, there cannot be two opinions on the question of peace or war. Socialists believe that in present conditions there is no necessity for war, that disarmament is not only needed but possible, and that peaceful coexistence between nations is a vital necessity."<sup>15</sup> Coupled with a quote from Khrushchev's December speech to

<sup>11</sup> Articles on the fortieth anniversary of Lenin's "Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder," by D. Shevlyagin in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, June 10, and by "N. Matkovsky" in *Pravda*, June 12, 1960; *Pravda* editorial "Full Support" on the Soviet disarmament proposals, June 13, 1960.

<sup>12</sup> Foa in *Avanti*, June 15; Novella in *Unita*, June 19, 1960.

<sup>13</sup> NCNA, April 22, 1960.

<sup>14</sup> N. Matkovsky on June 12.

<sup>15</sup> June 20, 1960.

the Hungarian party congress about the need for all Communist governments to "synchronise their watches," and his warning that "if the leaders of any one of the Socialist countries would set themselves up to be above the rest, that can only play into the hands of our enemies," this indicated the Soviet leaders' intention to force a clear decision that would be binding on all ruling parties.

But at Bucharest, this intention was at least partly foiled by the Chinese. Khrushchev's public attack<sup>16</sup> on people who quote the words of Lenin without looking at the realities of the present world, and whom Lenin would set right in no uncertain manner if he came back today, was plain enough for all the satellite leaders to understand that the time for manoeuvring between the two colossi was over, and for all but the Albanians to rally round. His account of how Soviet strength and Soviet skill had again and again foiled the war plans of the "imperialists," from Suez in 1956 to the Turkish-Syrian crisis of 1957 and the U.S. landing in the Lebanon after the Iraqi revolution of 1958, if historically dubious, was propagandistically effective as a demonstration of the meaning of his "peace policy" for a Communist audience. But the Chinese delegate P'eng Chen was clearly instructed neither to submit nor to carry the ideological debate to a conclusion at this point: he evaded a decision by a skilful withdrawal to prepared positions.

In public, P'eng Chen appeared as the advocate of Communist unity at almost any price, to be achieved on the basis of the 1957 Moscow declaration to which all but the Yugoslavs had agreed.<sup>17</sup> This committed the Chinese once more to recognition of the possibility of preventing or "checking" imperialist wars—a possibility that, P'eng claimed, could only be fulfilled by the united strength of the "Socialist camp" and the determined mobilisation of mass action against the imperialists. But it was also intended to commit the Russians once again to the 1957 thesis that the aggressive circles of the U.S. were the main enemy of peace and all popular aspirations, and that "revisionism" was the main danger within the ranks of the Communist movement. Having said that much, the Chinese representative spoke no word about *détente*, disarmament or the "elimination of war from the life of mankind" before the disappearance of capitalism.

Behind the scenes, he seems to have argued that the 1957 conference of ruling Communist parties had been called chiefly to settle problems of Communist power and "Socialist construction"; the questions now in dispute, being concerned with world-wide revolutionary strategy, could only be decided by a conference representing the whole Communist movement. Khrushchev might well complain about Chinese "factional"

<sup>16</sup> Speech at the Bucharest Congress on June 21, 1960, as carried by TASS.

<sup>17</sup> Text in NCNA, June 22, 1960.

methods of carrying the quarrel into the ranks of other parties; in the end he had to agree to put up the dispute officially for worldwide inner-party discussion in preparation for a November conference in Moscow, and to content himself with a brief interim communiqué which, while stressing the primary importance of the "peace campaign," did not go beyond the 1957 declaration on any controversial point.

This fell far short of what the Soviet leaders had expected. The decisive showdown was not only postponed for several months, but it would take place before an audience of revolutionary parties many of whose members were less closely tied to Soviet control than the East European satellites, and might well regard the Chinese slogans of unconditional revolutionary solidarity as more attractive than the Soviet readiness to subordinate their struggle to the needs of co-existence diplomacy whenever that seemed expedient. Thus an Algerian Communist might prefer Chinese offers of aid for the F.L.N. to the repeated Russian advice favouring negotiation with de Gaulle; an Iraqi Communist might recall that neither Soviet support for Kassem's régime nor his own party's Soviet-ordered retreat from its earlier offensive policy had obtained for it a legal, let alone a dominating, position under that régime; an Indonesian Communist might resent the manner in which Khrushchev had ignored his party during his official visit, and the general Soviet wooing of the "bourgeois nationalist" régime of Soekarno that limited the democratic rights of the Communists as well as of other parties and favoured a neutralist *bloc* with the "renegade" Tito. And would not the Communists of Latin America be sensitive to the Chinese argument that as Yankee imperialism was the main enemy, any attempts to relax Soviet-American tension were bound to weaken Soviet support for them as well as for China?

Yet without the co-operation of these movements, Khrushchev's co-existence diplomacy could not be carried through: he needed their discipline, and the Chinese had launched their ideological attack on his authority precisely in order to undermine that. Now they had created a situation in which the objects of the struggle, the Communist movements *in partibus infidelium*, were to act to some extent as its arbiters. True, the Russians had still the advantage of the prestige and resources of a world Power as well as of older organisational ties: all the foreign Communists knew that the Soviets *could* help them more—financially, diplomatically, and ultimately militarily—than the Chinese, yet they were less certain that the Soviets *would* always help them to the limits of their ability. Hence Khrushchev seems to have felt that in preparation for the November meeting, not only the circulation of new Soviet documents and the dispatch of new emissaries to the wavering parties were needed, but

above all new proofs of the spirit of revolutionary internationalism animating his foreign policy.

#### SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY HARDENS

The fact that he had already decided to postpone his new summit approach until after the U.S. presidential elections made it easier for him to furnish that proof: for he could now afford to increase rather than relax tension for a time without serious damage to his future diplomatic chances, and perhaps even in the hope to improve them by creating a dark backdrop for the next display of his sunny smile—provided only that he did not allow matters to get really out of hand. The weeks after Bucharest thus offered the strange spectacle of the Soviet leaders conducting themselves on the world stage in the very style which Peking's ideological theses had seemed to demand, while at the same time launching a vigorous campaign against those theses throughout the Communist world movement!

The Bucharest communiqué had not yet been published when Russia demonstratively walked out of the ten-power disarmament talks at Geneva, just before the Western counter-proposals for which she had been calling so insistently were officially submitted. There followed within a few days the shooting down of an American plane over the Arctic, the first Soviet note on the Congo accusing all the Western powers of backing Belgian military intervention as part of a plot to restore colonial rule, and as a climax Khrushchev's personal threat to use inter-continental rockets against the U.S. if the latter should attack Cuba. Yet during the same period, Khrushchev used his visit to Austria to insist again and again on the horrors of nuclear world war and on the need to avoid even local wars because of the risk that they might spread; and even in his most reckless gestures he took care not to do anything irrevocable. The Geneva test negotiations were *not* broken off; the Cuban rocket threat was soon "explained" as symbolic, while in the Congo the Russians refrained from backing their policy with force; and a proposal for taking the disarmament negotiations out of the U.N. and for calling instead for a disarmament conference of "all governments" including China, which the Chinese managed to get adopted by a Stockholm session of the World Peace Council in July, was promptly dropped down the memory hole by Moscow in favour of Khrushchev's suggestion that all heads of government of the member states should personally attend the next U.N. assembly session in order to discuss the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament.

The same contradiction between the desire to keep the lines of negotiation open and the need to pose constantly as an uninhibited revolutionary agitator also dominated Khrushchev's subsequent behaviour at the

U.N. assembly itself. He did not back the neutrals' initiative for a new summit meeting but left the onus of killing it to the West. He depreciated the importance of his own proposals for "general and complete disarmament," for the sake of which so many heads of government had come, by devoting far more energy to his attack on "colonialism" in general and on the U.N. secretariat in particular, and by choosing a language and style of behaviour more apt to inspire revolutionary movements outside than to influence delegates inside the assembly hall. He followed his attack on the secretariat by proposals for a reform of the latter and of the Security Council which appealed to the natural desire of the new African and Asian member states for stronger representation in the leading organs of the U.N., but then suggested that any such changes in the Charter should be postponed until the delegates of the Chinese People's Republic had been seated. These inconsistencies are incomprehensible unless the fact is borne in mind that during all that time Khrushchev was engaged in an effort to prove his revolutionary zeal and international solidarity in preparation for the Moscow conference.

Meanwhile the line for the ideological campaign itself had been laid down by a meeting of the central committee of the CPSU in mid-July, which had approved the conduct of its delegation at Bucharest, led by Khrushchev, oddly enough after a report by secretariat member F. R. Kozlov who had not been there. As developed during late July and August in the Soviet press and the statements of pro-Soviet leaders of foreign Communist parties, the campaign showed some significant changes of emphasis.<sup>18</sup> It was more uncompromising than ever on the need to avoid the horrors of nuclear war, and the rejection of all attempts to belittle them or to regard any kind of international war as desirable. It insisted that good Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries were entitled and indeed obliged to adopt on this matter conclusions different from Lenin, both because of the new techniques of destruction and because of the change in the relation of world forces to the disadvantage of imperialism. It vigorously defended the possibility not only of stopping each particular war, but of altogether "eliminating war from the life of society" with the further growth of the strength of the "Socialist camp," even while capitalism still existed on part of the globe, as the Twenty-first Congress had laid down; and it claimed that the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament was a realistic policy goal that could be achieved, even though this might require time, "mutual concessions" and compromises. Any opposition to this general line of peaceful coexistence

<sup>18</sup> F. Konstantinov and Kh. Momdzhian, "Dialectics and the Present," *Kommunist* No. 10, 1960; *Pravda* editorial, July 20; speech by M. A. Suslov, *Pravda*, July 30; Y. Frantsev, *Pravda*, August 7; B. Ponomarev, *Pravda*, August 12; Togliatti speech to Italian CC, *Pravda*, July 28; T. Zhivkov in August issue of *World Marxist Review*.

was to be eliminated from the Communist movement as "Trotskyite adventurism."

#### MOSCOW AND PEKING SHIFT THEIR GROUND

But the new campaign no longer laid stress on Khrushchev's differentiation between "realistic statesmen" and "diehard militarists" in the enemy camp, and no longer mentioned "relaxation of international tension" as a condition of coexistence diplomacy. Instead, the goals of peace and disarmament were now put forward, in language first used by the Chinese critics, as having to be "imposed" on the imperialists by the strength of the "Socialist camp" and the relentless struggle of the masses. Peaceful coexistence was now described as "the highest form of the class struggle," and justified as leading not to an even temporary weakening, but to an intensification of revolutionary movements everywhere, including civil wars and colonial revolts whenever the imperialists attempted to hold back the rising tide by force. It was only international wars, wars between states, that should be avoided by the policy of peaceful coexistence; and it was explicitly admitted that imperialist intervention against revolutionary movements might lead to "just wars of liberation," and that in that case the duty of the Socialist camp was to support the latter—though not necessarily with troops—and to seek to end the intervention. In short, it was now claimed that there was no contradiction at all between the diplomacy of coexistence and the policy of unconditional revolutionary solidarity: both had become compatible in an age where, owing to the growing strength of the "Socialist camp," the "dictatorship of the proletariat had become an international force" as once predicted by Lenin.

This interpretation of Soviet policy evidently placed its authors in a very strong position to meet the Chinese ideological challenge; yet as the Chinese had intended, and as Khrushchev's simultaneous actions illustrated, it was bound greatly to reduce the credibility and effectiveness of the coexistence campaign in non-Communist eyes. The Soviets could hope to succeed in restoring their international ideological authority to the exact extent to which they were prepared temporarily to weaken the political impact of their diplomacy. It was an expression of that dilemma that when the chief ideological spokesman of Yugoslav Communism, Vice-President Edvard Kardelj, published a pamphlet in defence of coexistence and against the Chinese cult of revolutionary war,<sup>19</sup> *Pravda* immediately turned against him and accused him of all the revisionist sins of which the Chinese had accused the Soviets<sup>20</sup>—not only because he had been so tactless as to name the Chinese as his target,

<sup>19</sup> "Socialism and War," first published in *Borba*, August 12-20, 1960.

<sup>20</sup> A. Arzumanyan and V. Koryonov, *Pravda*, September 2, 1960.

which the Soviets had never done, but because he had taken a consistent position with which they could not afford to identify themselves. For Kardelj had argued that real peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems required that these systems should not become the basis of permanent "ideological blocs" in foreign policy; and this concept was, of course, as incompatible with Soviet practice as with the new definition of coexistence as "the highest form of the class struggle."

During the same period, the Chinese Communists were also shifting their ground. They stopped belittling the horrors of nuclear war and claiming that only cowards could fear them,<sup>21</sup> and repeatedly protested their willingness to fight for peaceful coexistence and the prevention or stopping of wars. But they kept rubbing in the formula of the Moscow declaration of 1957 about the role of the aggressive U.S. circles as the centre of world reaction and the need for vigilance against its war plans camouflaged by peace talk, which they felt had been borne out by Khrushchev's experience with Eisenhower; and they pictured peaceful coexistence and disarmament as goals which could be "imposed" on the enemy only "to some extent" and for limited periods, without the slightest assurance of permanence or completion before the final, worldwide victory of the Communist cause.<sup>22</sup> In other words, they remained adamant in their rejection of the thesis of the Twenty-first Congress about "eliminating war from the life of mankind" before that final victory.

#### THE QUESTION OF ROADS TO POWER

Parallel with that, the Chinese concentrated on extolling the importance of revolutionary violence, including revolutionary war. While the Russians now *admitted* that peaceful coexistence did not *exclude* colonial uprisings and civil wars, and that imperialist intervention in these cases *might lead to* "just wars of liberation," the Chinese stressed revolutionary violence as the normal and classical road for the advance of the Communist cause, and support for just wars as the *criterion* of true internationalism. In fact, they abandoned the safe ground of the 1957 Moscow declaration (on which they were otherwise relying in that phase) to the extent of attacking its thesis, taken over from the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, that the Communist seizure of power might take place in some countries without violent upheaval and civil war, as a peaceful revolution carried out with the help of the legal parliamentary

<sup>21</sup> The last Chinese statement on those lines seems to have been the article on the tenth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War by Gen. Li Chih-min, *People's Daily*, June 25, 1960.

<sup>22</sup> *People's Daily* editorial commenting on Bucharest communiqué, June 29; Liao Ch'eng-chih's speech to Bureau of World Peace Council in Stockholm, July 10; Ch'en Yi's speech in Peking, NCNA, July 15; Li Fu-ch'un's speech to the Vietnamese party congress, NCNA, September 6.

institutions. Ignoring the examples given by the Russians at the time—such as the annexation of Esthonia and the Czechoslovak coup of February 1948—the Chinese now insisted that the bourgeoisie would never and nowhere abandon power without resorting to violence, and that it was “muddle-headed” at best to confuse the peaceful construction of Socialism *after* the seizure of power with the necessarily violent conquest of power itself.<sup>23</sup> To this, the Soviets replied with renewed charges of “Blanquism.”<sup>24</sup>

Of all the differences raised in the 1960 dispute, this argument on the violent and non-violent roads to power was probably the least serious and most purely demagogic one. The Soviets had started talking about the “parliamentary road” in order to ease the tactical position of the Communist parties in the West, and it was the latter who made propagandist use of the formula; at any rate, it contains nothing to which the Chinese could object from the point of view of their interests. But in the weeks before the crucial Moscow meeting, the Chinese effort was chiefly directed at those Communist parties in underdeveloped countries for which the Chinese experience had long been regarded as a natural model—parties which had developed alternately in co-operation or violent conflict with nationalist dictators, but which had certainly no prospect of gaining power by “parliamentary” means. By dragging in the slogan of the “peaceful road” which nobody had thought of applying to those parties, the Chinese were trying to suggest to them that the real motive for the Soviet counsels of restraint occasionally tendered to them (and which were in fact due to the diplomatic expediency of “keeping in” with the nationalist dictators concerned) was a general renunciation of revolution for the sake of “peace”—that the Soviets were passing from the Leninist policy of coexistence between states to the “revisionist” position of peace between classes!

The Soviets replied to this twist by a similar piece of demagoguery—accusing the Chinese of a sectarian refusal to work with broad nationalist movements against imperialism unless these movements subscribed in advance to Communist principles and leadership.<sup>25</sup> As a general charge, this was as untrue as the Chinese attack on the alleged “revisionism” of Moscow’s “peaceful road”; the close contacts maintained by Peking with the Algerian and many African nationalists proved that daily. But Peking’s conflicts with the Indian and Indonesian governments, due in fact not to doctrinaire prejudice but to Chinese chauvinism, and its

<sup>23</sup> In public, this came out most clearly in the last weeks before the Moscow Conference, notably in comments on the publication of the fourth volume of the works of Mao, e.g. *People’s Daily*, October 6, and above all *Red Flag* editorial, November 2. But it is clear from Soviet reaction that the point must have been raised internally before.

<sup>24</sup> A. Belyakov and F. Burlatsky in *Kommunist* No. 13, 1960.

<sup>25</sup> Y. Zhukov in *Pravda*, August 26.

support for leftist malcontents in several Asian Communist parties against Moscow's wooing of nationalist dictators gave to the charge a semblance of substance.

Soviet-Chinese relations seem to have reached their low point in August and early September. It was during that period that an unusually large number of Soviet technicians left China, while many Chinese students returned from Russia: that the organ of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society disappeared from the streets of Moscow; and that the expected Chinese scholars failed to turn up at the Orientalists' Congress there. It was then, too, that a number of Soviet provincial papers printed an article explaining that in contemporary conditions, not even a huge country like China could build Socialism in isolation and without the aid and backing of the Soviet Union,<sup>26</sup> while Peking's theoretical voice published a statement of the need for China to rely chiefly on her own resources for the fulfilment of her plans.<sup>27</sup> We do not know the inside story behind those visible symptoms—whether Moscow really tried to apply economic pressure and failed, or whether Peking made a gratuitous demonstration of her capacity for “going it alone.” Chinese criticism, at any rate, had not been silenced by October 1st, when the Russians used the eleventh birthday of the CPR to make again a show of friendship; on the contrary, some of Peking's most polemical utterances came in the last weeks before the Moscow conference,<sup>28</sup> whereas the Soviet ideological campaign had rather abated since the middle of September. But by then the Soviets could afford to stop arguing in public, for the Chinese had been largely, though not completely, isolated in the international movement: early in September, even the North Vietnamese party fell in line with the Soviet position.<sup>29</sup>

The mere duration of the Moscow conference—almost three weeks of argument behind closed doors—showed that agreement on a new common statement of principles was anything but easy. This time, the Chinese had sent the strongest possible team short of exposing Mao himself to the risk of defeat—a delegation led by Liu Shao-ch'i and the Party secretary Teng Hsiao-p'ing; and reports that he fought for every clause and comma, and finally yielded to the majority view on some crucial points only under the threat of an open ideological breach do not seem implausible. Halfway through the debates, the anniversary of the 1957 declaration was commented on by editorials in Moscow and Peking which

<sup>26</sup> S. Titarenko in *Sovetskaya Latvija*, *Bakunsky Rabochy et al.*, August 16, 1960.

<sup>27</sup> Li Fu-ch'un in *Red Flag*, No. 16, 1960.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. the articles quoted in note 22 above; also Marshal Lo Jui-ch'ing's article for the (North) *Korean People's Forces Journal* on the tenth anniversary of Chinese intervention in Korea, NCNA, October 25, 1960.

<sup>29</sup> See P. J. Honey's analysis of the North Vietnamese Party Congress in *The China Quarterly*, No. 4, p. 66.

still showed a marked difference of emphasis<sup>80</sup> on the primacy of revolutionary struggle in the *People's Daily*, on the "general line" of peaceful coexistence in *Pravda*; while at the same time a Chinese delegate to a session of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee threw off all restraint and claimed publicly that there could be no peaceful coexistence in those countries before the liquidation of colonialism, as the oppressed peoples would never accept "coexistence between the rider and the horse."<sup>81</sup> But it seems established that as the Moscow conclave wore on, the Chinese were only able to retain the support of a few Asian parties that were traditionally dependent on them or largely recruited from the Chinese minorities, of some rather weak Latin American parties, and of the faithful Albanians long tied to them by common enmity against the Yugoslav "revisionists."

#### THE MOSCOW STATEMENT

The long document on the strategy of international Communism that was agreed in the end thus marks a clear Soviet victory on almost all the points that had still been in dispute in the preceding three months. But the Soviet position as defended since the July session of the central committee of the CPSU already contained substantial concessions to the original Chinese criticism of Soviet policy.

The 1960 Moscow declaration starts from the Soviet analysis that Lenin's views are partly outdated because the present epoch is no longer primarily that of imperialism, but of the growing preponderance of the "Socialist world system" over the forces of imperialism. On this basis, it accepts not only the possibility of ending war forever with the worldwide victory of Socialism, but of "freeing mankind from the nightmare of another world war even now"—of "banishing world war from the life of society even while capitalism still exists in part of the world." The thesis of the Twenty-first Congress of the CPSU which the Chinese had fought to the last has thus been reluctantly accepted by them, and so has the full description of the horrors of nuclear war. The declaration also proclaims the possibility not of preventing all local wars, but of "effectively fighting the local wars unleashed by the imperialists" and extinguishing them, and stresses the unanimity of all Communists in their support for "peaceful coexistence" and negotiation as the only alternative to destructive war. Finally, it recognises the "historic" importance which a fulfilment of the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament would have, and states that its achievement, though difficult, may be accomplished in stages if the masses and the governments of the "Socialist camp" resolutely fight for it.

<sup>80</sup> *People's Daily*, November 21; *Pravda*, November 23.

<sup>81</sup> NCNA, November 21.

At the same time, "peaceful coexistence" is described as "a form of the class struggle" (not, as in some Soviet documents, as "the highest form," because in the Chinese party doctrine that rank remains reserved for revolutionary war). The hope of preserving peace is squarely based on the strength of the "Socialist camp," the revolutionary movements and their sympathisers; it is admitted that the latter may be found also in "certain strata of the bourgeoisie of the advanced countries" who realise the new relation of forces and the catastrophic consequences of a world war, but this appears as a marginal factor. Gone are Khrushchev's "realistic statesmen" and his successful goodwill visits; the emphasis is on the fact that the aggressive, warlike nature of imperialism has not changed, and that "American imperialism" as such—not only, as stated in 1957, "the aggressive imperialist circles of the United States"—has become the "main centre of world reaction, the international gendarme, the enemy of the peoples of the whole world." While condemning "the American doctrine of the Cold War," the document thus defines coexistence in rigid Cold War terms.

The declaration allots to the "peace campaign" pride of place as likely to unite the broadest possible fronts under Communist leadership, and rejects the "slander" that the Communists need war for extending their sway or believe in "exporting revolution." But it also calls for the most determined international support, both by the mass movement and by "the power of the Socialist world system," of revolutionary movements anywhere against "the imperialist export of counter-revolution." The statement that "the Socialist states . . . have become an international force exerting a powerful influence on world developments. Hence real possibilities have appeared to settle the major problems of our age in a new manner, in the interest of peace, democracy and Socialism . . ." assumes a special meaning in this context: for the first time since Stalin's victory over Trotsky, active support for international revolution is proclaimed as an obligation of the Soviet Government and all other Communist governments. But the crucial question of whether that obligation includes the risk of war, of whether "peaceful coexistence" or "revolutionary solidarity" is to receive priority in case of conflict, is not settled explicitly—for the possibility of conflict between the two principles is not admitted.

On the question of violent or peaceful roads to power, the view of the Russians and of the 1957 declaration that both may be used according to circumstances is clearly upheld. Equally "broadminded" are the declaration's new directives for the policy of the Communists in underdeveloped countries towards their "national bourgeoisie"—i.e., toward the nationalist, neutralist and non-Communist, though in fact hardly ever bourgeois régimes that have emerged from the struggle for

national independence. The Communists are advised to aim at "national democratic" régimes, defined by their willingness to support the Soviet *bloc* against the "imperialists," to create the preconditions of progressive internal development by land reform, and to grant full freedom for the activity of the Communist Party and of Communist-controlled "mass organisations." They are told that those sections of the "national bourgeoisie" which oppose land reform and suppress the Communists, having taken a reactionary turn at home, will sooner or later also side with imperialism abroad. But again, the crucial question of a nationalist dictatorship that is willing to take Soviet aid and to vote anti-Western in the U.N., but gaois its own Communists, is shirked; nor is there any clear indication of who is to interpret the ambiguous directives in case of conflict.

#### IDEOLOGICAL AUTHORITY

Thus matters come back to the ultimate issue of ideological authority—of the right to interpret ambiguous principles in a changing situation. Here, the Soviets score a clear but very limited victory: they emerge as the most successful, but not as the only orthodox interpreters of the true doctrine. The Soviet Union is hailed as the only country that, having completed "Socialist construction," is engaged in building the "higher stage" of Communism; the Chinese communes are not even mentioned, and the Soviet argument that Communist abundance is not possible short of the highest level of technical productivity, including automation, is hammered home. The CPSU is unanimously declared to be "the universally recognised vanguard of the world Communist movement," and its superior experience in conquering power and transforming society is stated to have fundamental lessons for all parties; the decisions of its Twentieth Congress in particular are said to have opened a new era for the whole international movement. But that new era now turns out to be an era of polycentric autonomy—just as the bolder spirits thought at the time.

For under the new declaration, the spiritual authority of the CPSU is not incarnated in the shape which all doctrinaire authority, and certainly all authority in the Bolshevik tradition, requires by its nature—the shape of hierarchical discipline. It is not only that the declaration repeats the ancient pious formula about the independence and equality of all Communist parties; it is that it fails to establish a visible, single centre for their dependence. It provides for irregular conferences, whether world-wide or regional, for mutual co-ordination, and for bipartite consultations between any two parties in case of differences. This may be intended to rule out the circulation of Chinese attacks on CPSU policy to third parties before they have raised the matter in Moscow directly;

but it does not, on the face of it, prevent them from broadening the discussion again the next time they fail to get satisfaction in their direct contact with the "vanguard of the world movement." Clearly, the primacy of that vanguard is no longer that of an infallible Pope: the rule of *Moscow locuta, causa finita* is valid no more. For the first time in its forty years of history, international Communism is entering a "conciliatory" period.

One phase of open ideological controversy between Moscow and Peking has thus ended. The Chinese have withdrawn their open challenge to the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy of the Soviet Communists, but not before they had extracted from it as much advantage for their foreign policy as they could hope to gain without risking an open breach. The underlying differences of interest and viewpoint remain, though their public expression will now be muted for some time. But the phase that has now closed has not only had a considerable immediate impact on Soviet foreign policy; it is bound to produce lasting changes in the constellation of factors shaping that policy, in Soviet-Chinese relations, and in relations within the Communist world movement.

A measure of the immediate effect is the uncertainty of direction shown by Soviet diplomacy from the wrecking of the summit conference in May to the end of 1960. Having set out to induce the U.S., by a mixture of pressure and courtship, to abandon some exposed positions and allies for the sake of a temporary understanding with their chief antagonist, the Kremlin did not indeed abandon that objective, but wavered visibly between it and the Chinese objective of isolating the U.S. as the one irreconcilable enemy. The oscillations were too fast, the conciliatory gestures too half-hearted, and the brinkmanship too risky to be explained merely as the conscious use of zig-zag tactics to "soften up" the opponent; even if the Soviets intended all the time to reserve the next serious offer of relaxation for the next American President, a cool calculation of diplomatic expediency would hardly have led them to commit themselves in the meantime to the point to which they have gone over, say, Laos or Cuba. By depriving them of the power automatically to subordinate all revolutionary movements everywhere to Soviet diplomatic needs, the Chinese forced Stalin's successors to compete for authority over those movements by playing up to them to some extent; and this meant that, while failing to impose on the Kremlin a policy made in Peking, the Chinese forced it to deviate from its own concepts to a significant extent.

Nor have they lost this power of interference as a result of the Moscow conference. True, they have failed to establish a power of veto over Soviet diplomacy in general and Soviet-American contacts in particular, as would have been the case if the Chinese theses of an unconditional

priority of revolution over peace and of the hopelessness of any serious disarmament agreement with the "imperialists" had been adopted. There is nothing in the Moscow declaration that would make it *impossible* for the Soviets still to agree with the Western powers on a permanent ban on nuclear test explosions with proper guarantees of inspection, hence on an attempt to close the "atomic club." But there is much in it that will enable the Chinese to make it more difficult, and generally to raise suspicion against any direct Russo-American talks, and nothing that specifically endorses Mr. Khrushchev's methods of personal diplomacy, from his pursuit of summit meetings to his proposals for "reforming" the United Nations. In fact, if the text of the declaration is viewed in the context of the events leading up to it, it suggests that the Soviet Communist Party was only able to win on the controversial questions of principle by silently disavowing some of the more spectacular actions of its leader, and that the latter has emerged from the fight with his personal prestige noticeably impaired.

The declaration's approval of the "general line" of peaceful co-existence and of the aim to eliminate world war in our time permits the Soviets to go on pursuing their strategy of using both negotiation and violence short of world war as means to gain their ends; but it is not enough to assure them of tactical freedom to decide, in the light of their own interests alone, when and how far to use one or the other. To regain that freedom of manoeuvre, the Soviets would have either needed a plain and brutal statement that local revolutions may in certain circumstances have to be subordinated to the interest of preserving world peace and thus protecting the achievements of "Socialist construction" against a nuclear holocaust; or they would have required an equally plain recognition of their right to act as the only legitimate interpreters of revolutionary doctrine for the world movement, and to enforce the strategic and tactical consequences of their interpretation by means of centralised discipline. But either way of ensuring Soviet primacy, so natural in the Stalinist age when the Soviet Union alone was "the fatherland of all toilers," proved impossible in the post-Stalinist age of "the Socialist World System" proclaimed by Khrushchev himself.

On one side the doctrine that "the dictatorship of the proletariat has become an international factor," first announced in Russia by M. A. Suslov and now substantially incorporated in the declaration, amounts to a partial repeal of Stalin's "Socialism in a single country": it does not, of course, deny what was achieved under the latter slogan, but it restores, in the new world situation, the idea of a duty of the Communist powers to aid the progress of world revolution for which Trotsky fought. Even if this principle of solidarity is not formulated as an absolute and unlimited obligation, it is enough to expose Soviet diplomacy to

constant pressure to take bolder risks—pressure of the kind which the Chinese mobilised effectively during the past year, and are free to use again.

#### POLYCENTRIC COMMUNISM

On the other hand, the declaration's recognition of the Soviet Communist Party as the "vanguard" of the world movement falls far short of establishing a permanent and unchallengeable doctrinaire authority, let alone a single centre endowed with disciplinary powers. It even falls far short of the position conceded to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party at the time of the 1957 Moscow declaration—on Mao Tse-tung's initiative. Then, the Soviet Union was consistently described as being "at the head of the Socialist camp," and Mao publicly went out of his way to speak of the need for a single leader both among Communist states and parties, and to insist that only the Russians could fill both roles.

Now, the Chinese talk quite openly and naturally about the special responsibilities of "the two great Socialist powers," the Soviet Union and China; and in the declaration itself, the vanguard role of the Soviet party is balanced in part by the recognition of the "enormous influence" exerted by the Chinese revolution on the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America by its encouraging example to all movements of national liberation. In 1957, the failure to found a new formal international organisation only increased the influence of the large international liaison machinery developed within the secretariat of the central committee of the CPSU, compared with which all bilateral and regional contacts were bound to be of subordinate importance. Now, the failure formally to establish a single centre legitimates the *de facto* existence of two centres in Moscow and Peking, both with world-wide links and without any agreed division of labour, which will continue to cooperate on the basis of the declaration but also to give different advice on the questions it has left open and to compete for influence. And if Moscow is still the stronger power and the older authority, Peking is closer in its type of revolutionary experience and the emotional roots of its anti-colonialist ardour to those parts of the world where the chances of Communist revolution are most promising.

In a long-range view, the relative victory of the Soviets in the 1960 phase of the dispute thus appears less important than the fact that this phase has marked a new stage in their abdication of their former position of exclusive leadership. The reports that the Soviets themselves expressed during the Moscow conference a wish that they should no longer be described as being "at the head of the Socialist camp" may well be true: finding themselves unable any longer to exert effective control over the whole world movement, they may have preferred not to

be held responsible for all its actions by their enemies. In a *bloc* containing two great powers, in an international movement based on two great revolutions, such a development was indeed to be expected as soon as important differences appeared between them. But while the two protagonists remain as determined to continue to co-operate as they are unable to settle their disagreements, the result is not a two-headed movement with neatly separated geographic spheres of control, but a truly polycentric one: many Communist parties outside the Soviet *bloc* may in future be able to gain increased tactical independence, based on their freedom of taking aid and advice from both Moscow and Peking, simultaneously or alternately—with all the risks that implies for the future unity of its doctrine and strategy.

The victory of Communism in China, and the subsequent growth of Communist China into a great power, thus appears in retrospect as the beginning of the end of the single-centred Communist movement that Lenin created, and the single-centred Soviet *bloc* that Stalin built. The process took a decisive step forward in 1956, when the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU recognised the existence of a "Socialist world system" and of different roads to power, and when the destruction of the Stalin cult inflicted an irreparable blow on the type of Soviet authority that had depended on the infallibility of the "father of nations." Mao's victory had killed the uniqueness of the Soviet Union; Khrushchev's speech buried the myth built around that uniqueness.

It was at that moment that the spectre of "polycentric Communism" first appeared. But when destalinisation was quickly followed by the crisis of Russia's East European empire, the façade of single-centred unity was restored in the following year with the help of China's prestige and Mao's authority. Now that China herself has brought back the spectre she helped to exorcise three years ago, the process is no longer reversible. This time, polycentric Communism has come to stay.

## The 1960 Moscow Statement

### DOCUMENT

**R**EPRESENTATIVES of the Communist and Workers' Parties have discussed at this Meeting urgent problems of the present international situation and of the further struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.

The Meeting has shown unity of views among the participants on the issues discussed. The Communist and Workers' Parties have unanimously reaffirmed their allegiance to the Declaration and Peace Manifesto adopted in 1957. These programme documents of creative Marxism-Leninism determined the fundamental positions of the international Communist movement on the more important issues of our time and contributed in great measure toward uniting the efforts of the Communist and Workers' Parties in the struggle to achieve common goals. They remain the banner and guide to action for the whole of the international Communist movement.

The course of events in the past three years has demonstrated the correctness of the analysis of the international situation and the outlook for world development as given in the Declaration and Peace Manifesto, and the great scientific force and effective role of creative Marxism-Leninism.

*The chief result of these years is the rapid growth of the might and international influence of the world socialist system, the vigorous process of disintegration of the colonial system under the impact of the national-liberation movement, the intensification of class struggles in the capitalist world, and the continued decline and decay of the world capitalist system. The superiority of the forces of socialism over those of imperialism, of the forces of peace over those of war, is becoming ever more marked in the world arena.*

Nevertheless, imperialism, which is intent on maintaining its positions, sabotages disarmament, seeks to prolong the cold war and aggravate it to the utmost, and persists in preparing a new world war. This situation demands ever closer joint efforts and resolute actions on the part of the socialist countries, the international working class, the national anti-imperialist movement, all peace-loving countries and all peace champions to prevent war and assure a peaceful life for people. It demands the further consolidation of all revolutionary forces in the fight against imperialism, for national independence and for socialism.

### I

Our time, whose main content is the transition from capitalism to socialism initiated by the Great October Socialist Revolution, is a time of struggle between the two opposing social systems, a time of socialist revolutions and national-liberation revolutions, a time of the breakdown of imperialism, of the abolition of the colonial system, a time of transition of more peoples to the socialist path, of the triumph of socialism and communism on a world-wide scale.

*It is the principal characteristic of our time that the world socialist system is becoming the decisive factor in the development of society.*

The strength and invincibility of socialism have been demonstrated in recent decades in titanic battles between the new and old worlds. Attempts by the imperialists and their shock force—fascism—to check the course of historical development by force of arms ended in failure. Imperialism proved powerless to stop the socialist revolutions in Europe and Asia. Socialism became a world system. The imperialists tried to hamper the economic progress of the socialist countries, but their schemes were foiled. The imperialists did all in their power to preserve the system of colonial slavery, but that system is falling apart. As the world socialist system grows stronger, the international situation changes more and more in favour of the peoples fighting for independence, democracy and social progress.

*Today it is the world socialist system and the forces fighting against imperialism, for a socialist transformation of society, that determine the main content, main trend and main features of the historical development of society. Whatever efforts imperialism makes, it cannot stop the advance of history. A reliable basis has been provided for further decisive victories for socialism. The complete triumph of socialism is inevitable.*

The course of social development proves right Lenin's prediction that the countries of victorious socialism would influence the development of world revolution chiefly by their economic construction. Socialism has made unprecedented constructive progress in production, science and technology and in the establishment of a new, free community of people, in which their material and spiritual requirements are increasingly satisfied. The time is not far off when socialism's share of world production will be greater than that of capitalism. Capitalism will be defeated in the decisive sphere of human endeavour, the sphere of material production.

The consolidation and development of the socialist system exert an ever-increasing influence on the struggle of the peoples in the capitalist countries. By the force of its example, the world socialist system is revolutionising the thinking of the working people in the capitalist countries; it is inspiring them to fight against capitalism, and is greatly facilitating that fight. In the capitalist countries the forces fighting for peace and national independence and for the triumph of democracy and the victory of socialism are gaining in numbers and strength.

The world capitalist system is going through an intense process of disintegration and decay. Its contradictions have accelerated the development of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism. By tightening the monopolies' grip on the life of the nation, state-monopoly capitalism closely combines the power of the monopolies with that of the state with the aim of saving the capitalist system and increasing the profits of the imperialist bourgeoisie to the utmost by exploiting the working class and plundering large sections of the population.

But no matter what methods it resorts to the monopoly bourgeoisie cannot rescue capitalism. The interests of a handful of monopolies are in irreconcilable contradiction to the interest of the entire nation. The class and national antagonisms, and the internal and external contradictions of capitalist society, have sharpened greatly. Attempts to prop the decayed pillars of capitalism by militarism are aggravating these contradictions still further.

Never has the conflict between the productive forces and relations of

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production in the capitalist countries been so acute. Capitalism impedes more and more the use of the achievements of modern science and technology in the interests of social progress. It turns the discoveries of human genius against mankind itself by converting them into formidable means of destructive warfare.

The instability of capitalist economy is growing. Although production in some capitalist countries is increasing to some degree or other, the contradictions of capitalism are becoming more acute on a national as well as international scale. Some capitalist countries are faced with the threat of new economic upheavals while still grappling with the consequences of the recent economic crisis. The anarchical nature of capitalist production is becoming more marked. Capitalist concentration is assuming unprecedented dimensions, and monopoly profits and superprofits are growing. Monopoly capital has greatly intensified the exploitation of the working class in new forms, above all through intensification of labour. Automation and "rationalisation" under capitalism bring the working people further calamities. Only by a stubborn struggle has the working class in some countries succeeded in winning a number of its pressing demands. In many capitalist countries, however, the standard of life is still below pre-war. Despite the promises made by the bourgeoisie, full employment was provided only in some of the capitalist countries, and only temporarily. The domination of the monopolies is causing increasing harm to the interests of the broad peasant masses and large sections of the small and middle bourgeoisie. In the capitalist countries, including some of the more developed, economically underdeveloped areas still exist where the poverty of the masses is appalling, and which, moreover, continue to expand.

These facts once again refute the lies which bourgeois ideologists and revisionists spread to the effect that modern capitalism has become "people's capitalism", that it has established a so-called "welfare state" capable of overcoming the anarchy of production and economic crises and assuring well-being for all working people.

The uneven course of development of capitalism is continuously changing the balance of forces between the imperialist countries. The narrower the sphere of imperialist domination, the stronger the antagonisms between the imperialist powers. The problem of markets has become more acute than ever. The new inter-state organisations which are established under the slogan of "integration" actually lead to increased antagonisms and struggle between the imperialist countries. They are new forms of division of the world capitalist market among the biggest capitalist combines, of penetration by stronger imperialist states of the economy of their weaker partners.

The decay of capitalism is particularly marked in the United States of America, the chief imperialist country of today. U.S. monopoly capital is clearly unable to use all the productive forces at its command. The richest of the developed capitalist countries of the world—the United States of America—has become a land of especially big chronic unemployment. Increasing under-capacity operation in industry has become permanent in that country. Despite the enormous increase in military appropriations, which is achieved at the expense of the standard of life of the working people, the rate of growth of production has been declining in the post-war years and has been barely above the growth of population. Over-production crises have become more frequent. The most developed capitalist country has become a country of the most distorted, militarised economy. More than any other

capitalist country, the United States drains Asia, and especially Latin America, of their riches, holding up their progress. U.S. capitalist penetration into Africa is increasing. *U.S. imperialism has become the biggest international exploiter.*

The U.S. imperialists seek to bring many states under their control, by resorting chiefly to the policy of military blocs and economic "aid". They violate the sovereignty of developed capitalist countries as well. The dominant monopoly bourgeoisie in the more developed capitalist countries, which has allied itself with U.S. imperialism, sacrifices the sovereignty of their countries, hoping with support from the U.S. imperialists to crush the revolutionary liberation forces, deprive the working people of democratic freedoms and impede the struggle of the masses for social progress. U.S. imperialism involves those countries in the arms race, in a policy of preparing a new war of aggression and carrying on subversive activities against socialist and neutral countries.

The pillars of the capitalist system have become so decayed that the ruling imperialist bourgeoisie in many countries can no longer resist on its own the forces of democracy and progress which are gaining in scope and strength. The imperialists form military-political alliances under U.S. leadership to fight in common against the socialist camp and to strangle the national-liberation, working-class and socialist movements. *International developments in recent years have furnished many new proofs of the fact that U.S. imperialism is the chief bulwark of world reaction and an international gendarme, that it has become an enemy of the peoples of the whole world.*

The system of military blocs set up by the United States is being weakened both by the struggle going on between their members and as a result of the struggle which the people are waging for the abolition of these blocs. The U.S. imperialists seek to strengthen aggressive blocs, which causes increased resistance on the part of the people. The United States remains the main economic, financial and military force of modern imperialism, although its share in capitalist economy is diminishing. The British and French imperialists are making stubborn efforts to uphold their positions. The monopolies of West Germany and Japan, which have recovered their might and which are closely linked with the U.S. monopolies, are stepping up expansion. The West German monopolies, in pursuing their imperialist policy, seek more and more to exploit the underdeveloped countries.

The peoples are rising with growing determination to fight imperialism. A great struggle is getting under way between the forces of labour and capital, of democracy and reaction, of freedom and colonialism. The victory of the popular revolution in Cuba has become a splendid example for the peoples of Latin America. An anti-colonial movement for freedom and national independence is expanding irresistibly in Africa. The anti-imperialist national uprising in Iraq has been crowned with success. A powerful movement of the people against the Japanese-U.S. military alliance, for peace, democracy and national independence, is under way in Japan. Vigorous actions by the masses in Italy in defence of democracy show the militant resolve of the working people. The struggle for democracy, against the reactionary régime of personal power, is gathering momentum in France. There have been big working-class strikes in the U.S.A., Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, India, Britain, Canada, Belgium and other capitalist countries. The actions of the Negro people in the United States for their fundamental rights are assuming a mass character. There is a growing desire to unite the national forces against the

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fascist dictatorships in Spain and Portugal, and the democratic movement is gaining strength in Greece. Tyrannical military régimes have been overthrown in Colombia and Venezuela, a blow has been dealt to frankly pro-American puppet governments in South Korea and Turkey. A national-democratic movement, directed against the U.S. imperialists and their flunkies, is developing in South Viet-Nam and Laos. The Indonesian people are doing away with the economic positions the imperialists still retain in that country, particularly the positions held by the Dutch colonialists. The mass movement in defence of peace is gaining ground in all continents. All this is graphic evidence that the tide of anti-imperialist, national-liberation, anti-war and class struggles is rising ever higher.

*A new stage has begun in the development of the general crisis of capitalism.* This is shown by the triumph of socialism in a large group of European and Asian countries embracing one-third of mankind, the powerful growth of the forces fighting for socialism throughout the world and the steady weakening of the imperialists' positions in the economic competition with socialism; the tremendous new upsurge of the national-liberation struggle and the mounting disintegration of the colonial system; the growing instability of the entire world economic system of capitalism; the sharpening contradictions of capitalism resulting from the growth of state-monopoly capitalism and militarism; the increasing contradictions between monopolies and the interests of the nation as a whole; the curtailment of bourgeois democracy and the tendency to adopt autocratic and fascist methods of government; and a profound crisis in bourgeois politics and ideology. This stage is distinguished by the fact that it has set in not as a result of the world war, but in the conditions of competition and struggle between the two systems, an increasing change in the balance of forces in favour of socialism, and a marked aggravation of all the contradictions of imperialism. It has taken place at a time when a successful struggle by the peace-loving forces to bring about and promote peaceful coexistence has prevented the imperialists from undermining world peace by their aggressive actions, and in an atmosphere of growing struggle by the broad masses of the people for democracy, national liberation and socialism.

All the revolutionary forces are rallying against imperialist oppression and exploitation. The peoples who are building socialism and communism, the revolutionary movement of the working class in the capitalist countries, the national-liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples and the general democratic movement—these great forces of our time are merging into one powerful current that undermines and destroys the world imperialist system. The central factors of our day are the international working class and its chief creation, the world socialist system. They are an earnest of victory in the struggle for peace, democracy, national liberation, socialism and human progress.

## II

*A new stage has begun in the development of the world socialist system. The Soviet Union is successfully carrying on the full-scale construction of a communist society. Other countries of the socialist camp are successfully laying the foundations of socialism, and some of them have already entered the period of construction of a developed socialist society.*

The socialist system as a whole has scored decisive victories. These victories signify the triumph of Marxism-Leninism; they show clearly to all the

peoples who are under the domination of capital that a society based on this doctrine opens up immense opportunities for the fullest development of economy and culture, for the provision of a high standard of living and a peaceful and happy life for people.

The Soviet people, successfully carrying out the Seven-Year Economic Development Plan, are rapidly building up a material and technical basis for communism. Soviet science has ushered in what is virtually a new era in the development of world civilisation; it has initiated the exploration of outer space, furnishing impressive evidence of the economic and technical might of the socialist camp. The Soviet Union is the first country in history to be blazing a trail to communism for all mankind. It is the most striking example and most powerful bulwark for the people of the world in their struggle for peace, democratic freedoms, national independence and social progress.

The people's revolution in China dealt a crushing blow at the positions of imperialism in Asia and contributed in great measure to the balance of the world forces changing in favour of socialism. By giving a further powerful impetus to the national-liberation movement, it exerted tremendous influence on the peoples, especially those of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The people's democratic republics of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, China, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Roumania and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which, together with the great Soviet Union, form the mighty socialist camp, have within a historically short period made remarkable progress in socialist construction.

People's government in these countries has proved its unshakable solidity. Socialist relations of production predominate in the national economy; the exploitation of man by man has been abolished for ever, or is successfully being liquidated. The success of the policy of socialist industrialisation has led to a great economic upsurge in the socialist countries, which are developing their economy much faster than the capitalist countries. All these countries have established a developed industry; agrarian in the past, they have become, or are becoming, industrial-agrarian countries.

In recent years all the People's Democracies have solved, or have been successfully solving, the most difficult problem of socialist construction, that of transferring the peasantry, on a voluntary basis, from the road of small private farming to the road of large-scale co-operative farming on socialist lines. Lenin's co-operative plan has proved its great vitality both for countries where the peasant's attachment to private land ownership was a long-standing tradition and for countries that have recently put an end to feudal relations. The fraternal alliance of workers and peasants, which is led by the working class, and the maintenance and consolidation of which is, as Lenin taught, a supreme principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has grown stronger. In the course of socialist construction this alliance of two classes of working people, which constitutes the political foundation of the socialist system, develops continuously, and further strengthens people's rule under the leadership of the working class and promotes the socialist reorganisation of agriculture in accordance with the Leninist principle of voluntary co-operation of the peasantry.

Historic changes have taken place in the social structure of society. The classes of landlords and capitalists no longer exist in the People's Democracies. The working class has become the main force of society; its ranks are

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growing; its political consciousness and maturity have increased. Socialism has delivered the peasantry from age-long poverty and has made it an active force in social progress. A new, socialist intelligentsia, flesh of the flesh of the working people, is arising. All citizens have free access to knowledge and culture. Socialism has thus created not only political but material conditions for the cultural development of society, for the all-round and complete development of the gifts and abilities of man. The standard of life of the people is improving steadily thanks to economic progress.

An unbreakable alliance of the working people of all nationalities has formed and has been consolidated in multi-national socialist states. The triumph of Marxist-Leninist national policy in the socialist countries, genuine equality of nationalities, and their economic and cultural progress serve as an inspiring example for the peoples fighting against national oppression.

In the People's Democracies, socialist ideology has achieved notable successes in its struggle against bourgeois ideology. It is a long struggle that will go on until the complete emancipation of the minds of people from the survivals of bourgeois ideology.

The moral and political unity of society, which for the first time in history has come into existence and firmly established itself in the Soviet Union, is growing now in the other socialist countries as well. This makes it possible to use the creative energy of free workers most effectively for promoting the growth of the productive forces and the prosperity of socialist society.

Socialist society is improving steadily and becoming more and more mature; day after day it gives rise to a Communist attitude to labour and other elements of the future Communist society. The methods of socialist economic management and economic planning are steadily improving. Socialist democracy continues to develop; the masses are playing an increasing role in directing economic and cultural development; certain functions of the state are being gradually transferred to public organisations.

*Today the restoration of capitalism has been made socially and economically impossible not only in the Soviet Union, but in the other socialist countries as well. The combined forces of the socialist camp reliably safeguard every socialist country against encroachments by imperialist reaction. Thus the rallying of the socialist states in one camp and the growing unity and steadily increasing strength of this camp ensure complete victory for socialism within the entire system.*

Thanks to the heroic effort of the working class and the peasantry and to the tremendous work of the Communist and Workers' Parties, most favourable objective opportunities have been provided in the past years for the further rapid development of the productive forces, for gaining the maximum time and achieving victory for the socialist countries in peaceful economic competition with capitalism. The Marxist-Leninist Parties heading the socialist countries consider it their duty to make proper use of these opportunities.

Having achieved major victories and withstood serious tests, the Communist Parties have gained ample and varied experience in directing socialist construction. The socialist countries and the socialist camp as a whole owe their achievements to the proper application of the general objective laws governing socialist construction, with due regard to the historical peculiarities of each country and to the interests of the entire socialist system; they owe them to the efforts of the peoples of those countries, to their close fraternal

co-operation and mutual internationalist assistance, and above all, to the fraternal, internationalist assistance from the Soviet Union.

The experience of development of the socialist countries is added evidence that mutual assistance and support, and utilisation of all the advantages of unity and solidarity among the countries of the socialist camp, are a primary international condition for their achievements and successes. Imperialist, renegade and revisionist hopes of a split within the socialist camp are built on sand and doomed to failure. All the socialist countries cherish the unity of the socialist camp like the apple of their eye.

The world economic system of socialism is united by common socialist relations of production and is developing in accordance with the economic laws of socialism. Its successful development requires consistent application, in socialist construction, of the law of planned, proportionate development; encouragement of the creative initiative of the people; continuous improvement of the system of international division of labour through the co-ordination of national economic plans, specialisation and co-operation in production within the world socialist system on the basis of voluntary participation, mutual benefit and vigorous improvement of the scientific and technological standard. It requires study of collective experience; extended co-operation and fraternal mutual assistance; gradual elimination, along these lines, of historical differences in the levels of economic development, and the provision of a material basis for a more or less simultaneous transition of all the peoples of the socialist system to communism.

Socialist construction in the various countries is a source of collective experience for the socialist camp as a whole. A thorough study of this experience by the fraternal parties, and its proper utilisation and elaboration with due regard to specific conditions and national peculiarities are an immutable law of the development of every socialist country.

In developing industrial and agricultural production in their countries at a high rate in keeping with the possibilities they have, the Communist and Workers' Parties of the socialist countries consider it their internationalist duty to make full use of all the advantages of the socialist system and the internal resources of every country to carry out, by joint effort and as speedily as possible, the historic task of surpassing the world capitalist system in overall industrial and agricultural production and then outstrip the economically most developed capitalist countries in *per capita* output and in the standard of living. To carry out this task, it is necessary steadily to improve political and economic work, continuously to improve the methods of economic management and to run the socialist economy along scientific lines. This calls for higher productivity of labour to be achieved through continuous technical progress, economic planning, strict observance of the Leninist principle of providing material incentives and moral stimuli to work for the good of society by heightening the political consciousness of the people, and for control over the measure of labour and consumption.

To provide a material basis for the transition of the socialist countries to communism, it is indispensable to achieve a high level of production through the use of the latest techniques, electrification of the national economy, and mechanisation and automation of production, without which it is impossible to provide the abundance of consumer goods required by a communist society. On this basis, it is necessary to develop communist social relations, vigorously promote the political consciousness of the people and educate the members of the new, communist society.

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The socialist camp is a social, economic and political community of free and sovereign peoples united by the close bonds of international socialist solidarity; by common interests and objectives, and following the path of socialism and communism. It is an inviolable law of the mutual relations between socialist countries strictly to adhere to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism. Every country in the socialist camp is ensured genuinely equal rights and independence. Guided by the principles of complete equality, mutual advantage and comradely mutual assistance, the socialist states improve their all-round economic, political and cultural co-operation, which meets both the interests of each socialist country and those of the socialist camp as a whole.

One of the greatest achievements of the world socialist system is the practical confirmation of the Marxist-Leninist thesis that national antagonisms diminish with the decline of class antagonisms. In contrast to the laws of the capitalist system, which is characterised by antagonistic contradictions between classes, nations and states leading to armed conflicts, there are no objective causes in the nature of the socialist system for contradictions and conflicts between the peoples and states belonging to it. Its development leads to greater unity among the states and nations and to the consolidation of all the forms of co-operation between them. Under socialism, the development of national economy, culture and statehood goes hand in hand with the strengthening and development of the entire world socialist system, and with an ever greater consolidation of the unity of nations. The interests of the socialist system as a whole and national interests are harmoniously combined. It is on this basis that the moral and political unity of all the peoples of the great socialist community has arisen and has been growing. Fraternal friendship and mutual assistance of peoples, born of the socialist system, have superseded the political isolation and national egoism typical of capitalism.

The common interests of the peoples of the socialist countries and the interests of peace and socialism demand the proper combination of the principles of socialist internationalism and socialist patriotism in politics. Every Communist Party which has become the ruling party in the state, bears historical responsibility for the destinies of both its country and the entire socialist camp.

The Declaration of 1957 points out quite correctly that undue emphasis on the role of national peculiarities and departure from the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism regarding the socialist revolution and socialist construction prejudice the common cause of socialism. The Declaration also states quite correctly that Marxism-Leninism demands creative application of the general principles of socialist revolution and socialist construction depending on the specific historical conditions in the country concerned, and does not permit of a mechanical copying of the policies and tactics of the Communist Parties of other countries. Disregard of national peculiarities may lead to the party of the proletariat being isolated from reality, from the masses, and may injure the socialist cause.

Manifestations of nationalism and national narrow-mindedness do not disappear automatically with the establishment of the socialist system. If fraternal relations and friendship between the socialist countries are to be strengthened, it is necessary that the Communist and Workers' Parties pursue a Marxist-Leninist internationalist policy, that all working people be educated in a spirit of internationalism and patriotism, and that a resolute

struggle be waged to eliminate the survivals of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism.

*The Communist and Workers' Parties tirelessly educate the working people in the spirit of socialist internationalism and intolerance of all manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism. Solid unity of the Communist and Workers' Parties and of the peoples of the socialist countries, and their loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine are the main source of the strength and invincibility of each socialist country and the socialist camp as a whole.*

In blazing a trail to communism, the peoples of the socialist countries are creating a prototype of a new society for all mankind. The working people of the capitalist world are following the constructive effort of the builders of socialism and communism with keen interest. This makes the Marxist-Leninist Parties and the peoples of the socialist countries accountable to the international working-class movement for the successful building of socialism and communism.

The Communist and Workers' Parties see it as their task indefatigably to strengthen the great socialist community of nations, whose international role and influence on the course of world events are growing from year to year.

*The time has come when the socialist states have, by forming a world system, become an international force exerting a powerful influence on world development. There are now real opportunities of solving cardinal problems of modern times in a new way, in the interests of peace, democracy and socialism.*

### III

The problem of war and peace is the most burning problem of our time.

War is a constant companion of capitalism. The system of exploitation of man by man and the system of extermination of man by man are two aspects of the capitalist system. Imperialism has already inflicted two devastating world wars on mankind and now threatens to plunge it into an even more terrible catastrophe. Monstrous means of mass annihilation and destruction have been developed which, if used in a new war, can cause unheard-of destruction to entire countries and reduce key centres of world industry and culture to ruins. Such a war would bring death and suffering to hundreds of millions of people, among them people in countries not involved in it. Imperialism spells grave danger to the whole of mankind.

The peoples must now be more vigilant than ever. As long as imperialism exists there will be soil for wars of aggression.

*The peoples of all countries know that the danger of a new world war still persists. U.S. imperialism is the main force of aggression and war. Its policy embodies the ideology of militant reaction. The U.S. imperialists, together with the imperialists of Britain, France and West Germany, have drawn many countries into NATO, CENTO, SEATO and other military blocs under the guise of combating the "communist menace"; it has enmeshed the so-called "free world", that is, capitalist countries which depend on them, in a network of military bases spearheaded first and foremost against the socialist countries. The existence of these blocs and bases endangers universal peace and security and not only encroaches upon the sovereignty but also imperils the very life of those countries which put their territory at the disposal of the U.S. militarists.*

The imperialist forces of the U.S.A., Britain and France have made a criminal deal with West-German imperialism. In West Germany militarism

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has been revived and the restoration is being pushed ahead of a vast regular army under the command of Hitler generals, which the U.S. imperialists are equipping with nuclear and rocket weapons and other modern means of mass annihilation, a fact which draws emphatic protests from the peace-loving peoples. Military bases are being provided for this aggressive army in France and other West-European countries. The threat to peace and the security of the European nations from West-German imperialism is increasing. The West-German revenge-seekers openly declare their intention to revise the borders established after the Second World War. Like the Hitler clique in its day, the West-German militarists are preparing war against the socialist and other countries of Europe, and strive to effect their own aggressive plans. West Berlin has been transformed into a seat of international provocation. The Bonn state has become the chief enemy of peaceful coexistence, disarmament and relaxation of tension in Europe.

The aggressive plans of the West-German imperialists must be opposed by the united might of all the peace-loving countries and nations of Europe. An especially big part in the struggle against the aggressive designs of the West-German militarists is played by the German Democratic Republic. The Meeting regards it as the duty of all the countries of the socialist camp and of all the peace-loving peoples to defend the German Democratic Republic—the outpost of socialism in Western Europe and the true expression of the peace aspirations of the German nation.

The U.S. imperialists are also busy reviving the hotbed of war in the Far East. Trampling upon the national independence of the Japanese people and contrary to their will, they have, in collusion with the Japanese reactionary ruling circles, imposed upon Japan a new military treaty which pursues aggressive aims against the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and other peace-loving countries. The U.S. invaders have occupied the island of Taiwan, which belongs to the Chinese People's Republic, and South Korea and are interfering more and more in the affairs of South Viet-Nam; they have turned them into hotbeds of dangerous military provocations and gambles. Threatening Cuba with aggression and interfering in the affairs of the peoples of Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, the U.S. imperialists strive to create new seats of war in different parts of the world. They use such forms of regional alliance as, for example, the Organisation of American States, to retain their economic and political control and to involve the peoples of Latin America in the realisation of their aggressive schemes.

The U.S. imperialists have set up a huge war machinery and refuse to allow its reduction. The imperialists frustrate all constructive disarmament proposals by the Soviet Union and other peaceful countries. The arms race is going on. Stockpiles of nuclear weapons are becoming dangerously large. Defying protests from their own people and the peoples of other countries, particularly in the African continent, the French ruling circles are testing and manufacturing atomic weapons. The U.S. militarists are preparing to resume disastrous atomic tests; military provocations that threaten serious international conflicts continue.

The U.S. ruling circles have wrecked the Paris meeting of the Heads of Government of the four Great Powers by their policy of provocations and aggressive acts, and have set out to increase international tension and aggravate the cold war. The war menace has grown.

The imperialist provocations against peace have aroused the indignation

and resistance of the peoples. U.S. imperialism has exposed itself still more and its influence in the world has sustained fresh and telling blows.

The aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed. But real forces have appeared that are capable of foiling its plans of aggression. War is not fatally inevitable. Had the imperialists been able to do what they wanted, they would already have plunged mankind into the abyss of the calamities and horrors of a new world war. But the time is past when the imperialists could decide at will whether there should or should not be war. More than once in the past years the imperialists have brought mankind to the brink of world catastrophe by starting local wars. The resolute stand of the Soviet Union, of the other socialist states and of all the peaceful forces put an end to the Anglo-Franco-Israeli intervention in Egypt, and averted a military invasion of Syria, Iraq and some other countries by the imperialists. The heroic people of Algeria continue their valiant battle for independence and freedom. The peoples of the Congo and Laos are resisting the criminal acts of the imperialists with increasing firmness. Experience shows that it is possible to combat effectively the local wars started by the imperialists, and to stamp out successfully the hotbeds of such wars.

*The time has come when the attempts of the imperialist aggressors to start a world war can be curbed. World war can be prevented by the joint efforts of the world socialist camp, the international working class, the national-liberation movement, all the countries opposing war and all peace-loving forces.*

The development of international relations in our day is determined by the struggle of the two social systems—the struggle of the forces of socialism, peace and democracy against the forces of imperialism, reaction and aggression—a struggle in which the superiority of the forces of socialism, peace and democracy is becoming increasingly obvious.

For the first time in history, war is opposed by great and organised forces: the mighty Soviet Union, which now leads the world in the decisive branches of science and technology; the entire socialist camp, which has placed its great material and political might at the service of peace; a growing number of peace-loving countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which have a vital interest in preserving peace; the international working class and its organisations, above all the Communist Parties; the national-liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies and dependent countries; the world peace movement; and the neutral countries which want no share in the imperialist policy of war and advocate peaceful coexistence. The policy of peaceful coexistence is also favoured by a definite section of the bourgeoisie of the developed capitalist countries, which takes a sober view of the relationship of forces and of the dire consequences of a modern war. The broadest possible united front of peace supporters, fighters against the imperialist policy of aggression and war inspired by U.S. imperialism, is essential to preserve world peace. Concerted and vigorous actions of all the forces of peace can safeguard the peace and prevent a new war.

The democratic and peace forces today have no task more pressing than that of safeguarding humanity against a global thermo-nuclear disaster. The unprecedented destructive power of modern means of warfare demands that the main actions of the anti-war and peace-loving forces be directed towards preventing war. The struggle against war cannot be put off until war breaks out, for then it may prove too late for many areas of the globe and for their population to combat it. *The struggle against the threat of a new world war*

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*must be waged now and not when atom and hydrogen bombs begin to fall, and it must gain in strength from day to day. The important thing is to curb the aggressors in good time, to prevent war, and not to let it break out.*

To fight for peace today means to maintain the greatest vigilance, indefatigably to lay bare the policy of the imperialists, to keep a watchful eye on the intrigues and manoeuvres of the warmongers, arouse the righteous indignation of the peoples against those who are heading for war, organise the peace forces still better, continuously intensify mass actions for peace, and promote co-operation with all countries which have no interest in new wars. In the countries where the imperialists have established war bases, it is necessary to step up the struggle for their abolition, which is an important factor for fortifying national independence, defending sovereignty, and preventing war. The struggle of the peoples against the militarisation of their countries should be combined with the struggle against the capitalist monopolies connected with the U.S. imperialists. Today as never before, it is important to fight perseveringly in all countries to make the peace movement thrive and extend to towns and villages, factories and offices.

The peace movement is the broadest movement of our time, involving people of diverse political and religious creeds, of diverse classes of society, who are all united by the noble urge to prevent new wars and to secure enduring peace.

Further consolidation of the world socialist system will be of prime importance in preserving durable peace. So long as there is no disarmament, the socialist countries must maintain their defence potential at an adequate level.

In the opinion of Communists the tasks which must be accomplished first of all if peace is to be safeguarded are to stop the arms race, ban nuclear weapons, their tests and production, dismantle foreign war bases and withdraw foreign troops from other countries, disband military blocs, conclude a peace treaty with Germany, turn West Berlin into a demilitarised free city, thwart the aggressive designs of the West-German revanchists, and prevent the revival of Japanese militarism.

History has placed a great responsibility for warding off a new world war first and foremost on the international working class. The imperialists plot and join forces to start a thermo-nuclear war. The international working class must close its ranks to save mankind from the disaster of a new world war. *No political, religious or other differences should be an obstacle to all the forces of the working class uniting against the war danger. The hour has struck to counter the forces of war by the mighty will and joint action of all the contingents and organisations of the world proletariat, to unite its forces to avert world war and safeguard peace.*

The Communist Parties regard the fight for peace as their prime task. They call on the working class, trade unions, co-operatives, women's and youth leagues and organisations, on all working people, irrespective of their political and religious convictions, firmly to repulse by mass struggles all acts of aggression on the part of the imperialists.

But should the imperialist maniacs start war, the peoples will sweep capitalism out of existence and bury it.

The foreign policy of the socialist countries rests on the firm foundation of the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and economic competition between the socialist and capitalist countries. In conditions of peace, the socialist system increasingly reveals its advantages over the capitalist system

in all fields of economy, culture, science and technology. The near future will bring the forces of peace and socialism new successes. The U.S.S.R. will become the leading industrial power of the world. China will become a mighty industrial state. The socialist system will be turning out more than half the world industrial product. The peace zone will expand. The working-class movement in the capitalist countries and the national-liberation movement in the colonies and dependencies will achieve new victories. The disintegration of the colonial system will become completed. The superiority of the forces of socialism and peace will be absolute. *In these conditions a real possibility will have arisen to exclude world war from the life of society even before socialism achieves complete victory on earth, with capitalism still existing in a part of the world.* The victory of socialism all over the world will completely remove the social and national causes of wars.

The Communists of all the world uphold peaceful coexistence unanimously and consistently, and battle resolutely for the prevention of war. The Communists must work untiringly among the masses to prevent underestimation of the possibility of averting a world war, underestimation of the possibility of peaceful coexistence and, at the same time, underestimation of the danger of war.

In a world divided into two systems, the only correct and reasonable principle of international relations is the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems advanced by Lenin and further elaborated in the Moscow Declaration and the Peace Manifesto of 1957, in the decisions of the 20th and 21st Congresses of the C.P.S.U., and in the documents of other Communist and Workers' Parties.

The Five Principles jointly advanced by the Chinese People's Republic and the Republic of India, and the propositions adopted at the Bandung Conference accord with the interests of peace and the peace-loving peoples.

Peaceful coexistence of countries with different systems or destructive war—this is the alternative today. There is no other choice. Communists emphatically reject the U.S. doctrine of "cold war" and "brinkmanship", for it is a policy leading to thermo-nuclear catastrophe. By upholding the principle of peaceful coexistence, Communists fight for the complete cessation of the cold war, disbandment of military blocs, and dismantling of military bases, for general and complete disarmament under international control, the settlement of international disputes through negotiation, respect for the equality of states and their territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, extensive development of trade, cultural and scientific ties between nations.

The policy of peaceful coexistence meets the basic interests of all peoples, of all who want no new cruel wars and seek durable peace. This policy strengthens the positions of socialism, enhances the prestige and international influence of the socialist countries and promotes the prestige and influence of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries. Peace is a loyal ally of socialism, for time is working for socialism against capitalism.

The policy of peaceful coexistence meets the basic interests of all peoples, launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle as the revisionists claim. The coexistence of states with different social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism. In conditions of peaceful coexistence favourable opportunities are provided for the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries and the national-liberation

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movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. In their turn, the successes of the revolutionary class and national-liberation struggle promote peaceful coexistence. The Communists consider it their duty to fortify the faith of the people in the possibility of furthering peaceful coexistence, their determination to prevent world war. They will do their utmost for the people to weaken imperialism and limit its sphere of action by an active struggle for peace, democracy and national liberation.

Peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems does not mean conciliation of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it implies intensification of the struggle of the working class, of all the Communist Parties, for the triumph of socialist ideas. But ideological and political disputes between states must not be settled through war.

*The meeting considers that the implementation of the programme for general and complete disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union would be of historic importance for the destinies of mankind. To realise this programme means to eliminate the very possibility of waging wars between countries. It is not easy to realise owing to the stubborn resistance of the imperialists. Hence it is essential to wage an active and determined struggle against the aggressive imperialist forces with the aim of carrying this programme into practice. It is necessary to wage this struggle on an increasing scale and to strive perseveringly to achieve tangible results—the banning of the testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons, the abolition of military blocs and war bases on foreign soil and a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments, all of which should pave the way to general disarmament. Through an active, determined struggle by the socialist and other peace-loving countries, by the international working class and the broad masses in all countries, it is possible to isolate the aggressive circles, foil the arms race and war preparations, and force the imperialists into an agreement on general disarmament.*

The arms race is not a war-deterrent, nor does it make for a high degree of employment and well-being of the population. It leads to war. Only a handful of monopolies and war speculators are interested in the arms race. In the capitalist countries, the people constantly demand that military expenditures be reduced and the funds thus released be used to improve the living conditions of the masses. In each country, it is necessary to promote a broad mass movement, for the use of the funds and resources to be released through disarmament for the needs of civilian production, housing, health, public education, social security, scientific research, etc. Disarmament has now become a fighting slogan of the masses, a pressing historical necessity. By an active and resolute struggle the imperialists must be made to meet this demand of the peoples.

The Communist and Workers' Parties of the socialist countries will go on consistently pursuing the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and doing their utmost to spare the peoples the horrors and calamities of a new war. They will display the greatest vigilance towards imperialism, vigorously strengthen the might and defensive capacity of the entire socialist camp and take every step to safeguard the security of the peoples and preserve peace.

*The Communists regard it as their historical mission not only to abolish exploitation and poverty on a world scale and rule out for all time the possibility of any kind of war in the life of human society, but also to deliver mankind from the nightmare of a new world war already in our time.*

*The Communist Parties will devote all their strength and energy to this great historical mission.*

## IV

National-liberation revolutions have triumphed in vast areas of the world. About forty new sovereign states have arisen in Asia and Africa in the fifteen post-war years. The victory of the Cuban revolution has powerfully stimulated the struggle of the Latin-American peoples for complete national independence. A new historical period has set in in the life of mankind: the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America that have won their freedom have begun to take an active part in world politics.

*The complete collapse of colonialism is imminent. The breakdown of the system of colonial slavery under the impact of the national-liberation movement is a development ranking second in historic importance only to the formation of the world socialist system.*

The Great October Socialist Revolution aroused the East and drew the colonial peoples into the common current of the world-wide revolutionary movement. This development was greatly facilitated by the Soviet Union's victory in the Second World War, the establishment of people's democracy in a number of European and Asian countries, the triumph of the socialist revolution in China, and the formation of the world socialist system. The forces of world socialism contributed decisively to the struggle of the colonial and dependent peoples for liberation from imperialist oppression. The socialist system has become a reliable shield for the independent national development of the peoples who have won freedom. The national-liberation movement receives powerful support from the international working-class movement.

The face of Asia has changed radically. The colonial order is collapsing in Africa. A front of active struggle against imperialism has opened in Latin America. Hundreds of millions of people in Asia, Africa and other parts of the world have won their independence in hard-fought battles with imperialism. Communists have always recognised the progressive, revolutionary significance of national-liberation wars; they are the most active champions of national independence. The existence of the world socialist system and the weakening of the positions of imperialism have provided the oppressed peoples with new opportunities of winning independence.

The peoples of the colonial countries win their independence both through armed struggle and by non-military methods, depending on the specific conditions in the country concerned. They secure durable victory through a powerful national-liberation movement. The colonial powers never bestow freedom on the colonial peoples and never leave of their own free will the countries they are exploiting.

The United States is the mainstay of colonialism today. The imperialists, headed by the U.S.A., make desperate efforts to preserve colonial exploitation of the peoples of the former colonies by new methods and in new forms. The monopolies try to retain their hold on the levers of economic control and political influence in Asian, African and Latin American countries. These efforts are aimed at preserving their positions in the economy of the countries which have gained freedom, and at capturing new positions under the guise of economic "aid," drawing them into military blocs, implanting military dictatorships and setting up war bases there. The imperialists endeavour to emasculate and undermine the national sovereignty of the

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newly-free countries, to misrepresent the principle of self-determination of nations, to impose new forms of colonial domination under the spurious slogan of "inter-dependence," to put their puppets in power in these countries and bribe a section of the bourgeoisie. They resort to the poisoned weapon of national strife to undermine the young states that are not yet strong enough. They make ample use of aggressive military blocs and bilateral aggressive military alliances to achieve these ends. The imperialists' accomplices are the most reactionary sections of the local exploiting classes.

The urgent tasks of national rebirth facing the countries that have shaken off the colonial yoke cannot be effectively accomplished unless a determined struggle is waged against imperialism and the remnants of feudalism by all the patriotic forces of the nations united in a single national-democratic front. The national democratic tasks on the basis of which the progressive forces of the nation can and do unite in the countries which have won their freedom, are: the consolidation of political independence, the carrying out of agrarian reforms in the interest of the peasantry, elimination of the survivals of feudalism, the uprooting of imperialist economic domination, the restriction of foreign monopolies and their expulsion from the national economy, the creation and development of a national industry, improvement of the living standard, the democratisation of social life, the pursuance of an independent and peaceful foreign policy, and the development of economic and cultural co-operation with the socialist and other friendly countries.

The working class, which has played an outstanding role in the fight for national liberation, demands the complete and consistent accomplishment of the tasks of the national, anti-imperialist, democratic revolution, and resists reactionary attempts to check social progress.

The solution of the peasant problem, which directly affects the interests of the vast majority of the population, is of the utmost importance to these countries. Without radical agrarian reforms it is impossible to solve the food problem and sweep away the remnants of medievalism which fetter the development of the productive forces in agriculture and industry. The creation and extension on a democratic basis of the state sector in the national economy, particularly in industry—a sector independent from foreign monopolies and gradually becoming a determining factor in the country's economy—is of great importance in these countries.

The alliance of the working class and the peasantry is the most important force in winning and defending national independence, accomplishing far-reaching democratic transformations and ensuring social progress. This alliance forms the basis of a broad national front. The extent to which the national bourgeoisie participates in the liberation struggle also depends to no small degree upon its strength and stability. A big role can be played by the national-patriotic forces, by all elements of the nation prepared to fight for national independence, against imperialism.

In present conditions, the national bourgeoisie of the colonial and dependent countries unconnected with imperialist circles, is objectively interested in the accomplishment of the principal tasks of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution, and therefore can participate in the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism. In that sense it is progressive. But it is unstable; though progressive, it is inclined to compromise with imperialism and feudalism. Owing to its dual nature, the extent to which the national bourgeoisie participates in revolution differs from country to country. This depends on concrete conditions, on changes in the relationship

of class forces, on the sharpness of the contradictions between imperialism, feudalism and the people, and of the contradictions between imperialism, feudalism and the national bourgeoisie.

After winning political independence the peoples seek solutions to the social problems raised by life and to the problems of reinforcing national independence. Different classes and parties offer different solutions. Which course of development to choose is the internal affair of the peoples themselves. As social contradictions grow the national bourgeoisie inclines more and more to compromising with domestic reaction and imperialism. The people, however, begin to see that the best way to abolish age-long backwardness and improve their living standard is that of non-capitalist development. Only thus can the peoples free themselves from exploitation, poverty and hunger. The working class and the broad peasant masses will play the leading part in solving this basic social problem.

In the present situation, favourable domestic and international conditions arise in many countries for the establishment of an independent national democracy, that is, a state which consistently upholds its political and economic independence, fights against imperialism and its military blocs, against military bases on its territory; a state which fights against the new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialist capital; a state which rejects dictatorial and despotic methods of government; a state in which the people are ensured broad democratic rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstrations, establishment of political parties and social organisations), the opportunity to work for the enactment of an agrarian reform and other domestic and social changes, and for participation in shaping government policy. The formation and consolidation of national democracies enables the countries concerned to make rapid social progress and play an active part in the people's struggle for peace, against the aggressive policies of the imperialist camp, for the complete abolition of colonial oppression.

The Communist Parties are working actively for a consistent completion of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution, for the establishment of national democracies, for a radical improvement in the living standard of the people. They support those actions of national governments leading to the consolidation of the gains achieved and undermining the imperialists' positions. At the same time they firmly oppose anti-democratic, anti-popular acts and those measures of the ruling circles which endanger national independence. Communists expose attempts by the reactionary section of the bourgeoisie to represent its selfish, narrow class interests as those of the entire nation. They expose the demagogic use by bourgeois politicians of socialist slogans for the same purpose. They work for a genuine democratisation of social life and rally all the progressive forces to combat despotic régimes or to curb tendencies towards setting up such régimes.

The aims of the Communists accord with the supreme interests of the nation. The reactionaries' effort to break up the national front under the slogan of "anti-communism" and isolate the Communists, the foremost contingent of the liberation movement, weakens the national movement. It is contrary to the national interests of the people and threatens the loss of national gains.

The socialist countries are true and sincere friends of the peoples fighting for liberation and of those who have thrown off the imperialist yoke. While

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rejecting on principle any interference in the internal affairs of young national states, they consider it their internationalist duty to help the peoples in strengthening their independence. They help and support these countries generously in achieving progress, creating a national industry, developing and consolidating the national economy and training national personnel. They co-operate with them in the struggle for world peace and against imperialist aggression.

The class-conscious workers of the colonial powers, who realised that "no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations," fought consistently for the self-determination of the nations oppressed by the imperialists. Now that these nations are taking the path of national independence, it is the internationalist duty of the workers and all democratic forces in the industrially developed capitalist countries to assist them vigorously in their struggle against the imperialists. It is their duty to assist them in their struggle for national independence and its consolidation, and in effectively solving the problems of their economic and cultural rebirth. In so doing, the workers defend the interests of the people of their own countries.

The entire course of the world history of recent decades shows the need for the complete and final abolition of the colonial system in all its forms and manifestations. All the peoples still languishing in colonial bondage must be given every support in winning their national independence. All forms of colonial oppression must be abolished. The abolition of colonialism will also be of great importance in easing international tension and consolidating universal peace. This Meeting expresses solidarity with all the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania who are carrying on an heroic struggle against imperialism. The Meeting hails the peoples of the young states of Africa who have achieved political independence—an important step towards complete emancipation. The Meeting extends heartfelt greetings and support to the heroic Algerian people fighting for freedom and national independence, and demands an immediate cessation of the aggressive war against Algeria. It indignantly condemns the inhuman system of racial persecution and tyranny in the Union of South Africa (apartheid) and urges democrats throughout the world actively to support the peoples of South Africa in their struggle for freedom and equality. The Meeting demands non-interference in the sovereign rights of the peoples of Cuba, the Congo and all the other countries that have won their freedom.

All the socialist countries and the international working-class and Communist movement recognise their duty to render the fullest moral and material assistance to the peoples fighting to free themselves from imperialist and colonial tyranny.

### V

The new balance of world forces offers the Communist and Workers' Parties new opportunities of carrying out the historic tasks they face in the struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.

The Communist Parties decide on the prospects and tasks of revolution according to the concrete historical and social conditions in their respective countries and with due regard to the international situation. They are waging a selfless struggle, doing everything already in present conditions, without waiting until socialism triumphs, to defend the interests of the working class and the people, improve their living conditions and extend the democratic rights and freedoms of the people. Knowing that the brunt of the struggle

for the liberation of its people from capitalist oppression rests upon it, the working class and its revolutionary vanguard will with increasing energy press forward its offensive against the domination of oppressors and exploiters in every field of political, economic and ideological activity in each country. In the process of this struggle, the people are prepared and conditions arise for decisive battles for the overthrow of capitalism, for the victory of socialist revolution.

The main blow in present conditions is directed with growing force at the capitalist monopolies, which are chiefly responsible for the arms race and which constitute the bulwark of reaction and aggression. It is directed at the whole system of state-monopoly capitalism, which defends monopoly interests.

In some non-European developed capitalist countries which are under the political, economic and military domination of U.S. imperialism, the working class and the people direct the main blow against U.S. imperialist domination, and also against monopoly capital and other domestic reactionary forces that betray the interests of the nation. In the course of this struggle all the democratic, patriotic forces of the nation come together in a united front fighting for the victory of a revolution aimed at achieving genuine national independence and democracy, which create conditions for passing on to the tasks of socialist revolution.

The big monopolies encroach on the interests of the working class and the people in general all along the line. The exploitation of working people is gaining in intensity; so is the process in which the broad peasant masses are being ruined. At the same time, the difficulties experienced by the small and middle urban bourgeoisie are growing more acute. The oppression of the big monopolies is becoming increasingly heavier for all sections of the nation. As a result, the contradiction between the handful of monopoly capitalists and all sections of the people is now growing more pronounced, along with the sharpening of the basic class contraction of bourgeois society—that between labour and capital.

The monopolies seek to abolish, or cut down to a bare minimum, the democratic rights of the masses. The reign of open fascist terror continues in some countries. In a number of countries, fascisation is developing in new forms: dictatorial methods of government are combined with fictitious parliamentary practices, stripped of democratic content and purely formal in character. Many democratic organisations are outlawed and are compelled to go underground, while thousands of fighters for the working-class cause and champions of peace are in prison.

On behalf of all the Communists of the world, this Meeting expresses proletarian solidarity with the courageous sons and daughters of the working class and the fighters for democracy languishing behind prison bars in the U.S.A., Spain, Portugal, Japan, West Germany, Greece, Iran, Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Iraq, Argentina, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Union of South Africa, the Sudan and other countries. The Meeting urges launching a powerful world-wide campaign to secure the release of these champions of peace, national independence and democracy.

The working class, peasantry, intellectuals and the petty and middle urban bourgeoisie are vitally interested in the abolition of monopoly domination. Hence there are favourable conditions for rallying these forces.

Communists hold that this unity can be achieved on the basis of the struggle for peace, national independence, the protection and extension of democracy,

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nationalisation of the key branches of economy and democratisation of their management, the use of the entire economy for peaceful purposes in order to satisfy the needs of the population, implementation of radical agrarian reforms, improvement of the living conditions of the working people, protection of the interests of the peasantry and the small and middle urban bourgeoisie against the tyranny of the monopolies.

These measures would be an important step along the path of social progress and would meet the interests of the majority of the nation. All these measures are democratic by nature. They do not eliminate the exploitation of man by man. But if realised, they would limit the power of the monopolies, enhance the prestige and political weight of the working class in the country's affairs, help to isolate the most reactionary forces and facilitate the unification of all the progressive forces. As they participate in the fight for democratic reforms, large sections of the population come to realise the necessity of unity of action with the working class and become more active politically. It is the primary duty of the working class and its Communist vanguard to head the economic and political struggle of the people for democratic reforms and the overthrow of the power of the monopolies, and assure its success.

Communists advocate general democratisation of the economic and social scene and of all the administrative, political and cultural organisations and institutions.

Communists regard the struggle for democracy as part of the struggle for socialism. In this struggle they continuously strengthen their bonds with the working people, increase their political consciousness, help them understand the tasks of the socialist revolution and realise the necessity of accomplishing it. This sets the Marxist-Leninist Parties completely apart from the reformists, who consider reforms within the framework of the capitalist system as the ultimate goal and deny the necessity of socialist revolution. Marxists-Leninists are firmly convinced that the peoples in the capitalist countries will in the course of their daily struggle ultimately come to understand that socialism alone is a real way out for them.

Now that more sections of the population are joining in an active class struggle, it is of the utmost importance that Communists should extend their work in trade unions and co-operatives, among the peasantry, the youth, the women, in sports organisations, and the unorganised sections of the population. There are new opportunities now to draw the younger generation into the struggle for peace and democracy, and for the great ideals of communism. Lenin's great behest—to go deeper among the masses, to work wherever there are masses, to strengthen the ties with the masses in order to lead them—must become a major task for every Communist Party.

The restoration of unity in the trade-union movement in countries where it is split, as well as on the international scale, is essential for increasing the role of the working class in political life and for the successful defence of its interests. The working people may belong to different trade unions, but they have common interests. Whenever different trade-union associations fought in common in the greatest class battles of recent years, they usually succeeded, precisely because of their unity, in winning the demands of the working people. The Communist Parties believe that there are real prerequisites for re-establishing trade-union unity, and will work perseveringly to bring it about. In those countries where no trade-union democracy exists in practice, the struggle for trade-union unity calls for continuous efforts aimed

at achieving trade-union independence and recognition and observance of the trade-union rights of all working people without political or any other discrimination.

It is also essential to peace and social progress that the national and international unity of all the other mass democratic movements be restored. Unity among the mass organisations may be achieved through joint action in the struggle for peace, national independence, the preservation and extension of democratic rights, the improvement of living conditions and the extension of the working people's social rights.

The decisive role in the struggle of the people of capitalist countries for the accomplishment of their tasks is played by the alliance of the working class and the working peasantry, which represents the main motive force of social revolution.

The split in the ranks of the working class, which the ruling classes, the Right-wing Social-Democratic leadership and reactionary trade-union leaders are interested to maintain on a national and international scale, remains the principal obstacle to the achievement of the aims of the working class. Communists work resolutely to eliminate this split.

The imperialists and reactionaries in various countries resort, along with means of suppression, to methods of deception and bribery in order to divide and disrupt the solidarity of the working class. The events of the last few years have again confirmed that this division undermines the positions of the working class and is advantageous only to imperialist reaction.

Some Right-wing Social-Democratic leaders have openly adopted imperialist views, defend the capitalist system and divide the working class. Owing to their hostility to communism and their fear of the mounting influence of socialism in world affairs, they are capitulating to the reactionary, conservative forces. In some countries the Right-wing leadership has succeeded in making the Social-Democratic Parties adopt programmes in which they openly disowned Marxism, the class struggle and the traditional socialist slogans. Thereby they have again done a service to the bourgeoisie. Resistance to this policy of the Right-wing leaders is mounting in the Social-Democratic Parties. The opposition also includes a section of the Social-Democratic Party functionaries. The forces favouring joint action by the working class and other working people in the struggle for peace, democracy and social progress are growing. The overwhelming majority of the Social-Democratic Parties, particularly the workers, are friends of peace and social progress.

Communists will continue to criticise the ideological positions and Right-wing opportunist practices of the Social-Democrats. They will continue working to induce the Social-Democratic masses to adopt positions of consistent class struggle against capitalism, for the triumph of socialism. The Communists are firmly convinced that the ideological differences which exist between themselves and the Social-Democrats must not hinder exchanges of opinion on the pressing problems of the working-class movement and the joint struggle, especially against the war danger.

Communists regard Social-Democrats among the working people as their class brothers. They often work together in trade unions and other organisations, and fight jointly for the interests of the working class and the people as a whole.

The urgent interests of the working-class movement demand that the Communist and Social-Democratic Parties take joint action on a national

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and international scale to bring about the immediate prohibition of the manufacture, testing and use of nuclear weapons, the establishment of atom-free zones, general and complete disarmament under international control, the abolition of military bases on foreign soil and the withdrawal of foreign troops, to assist the national-liberation movement of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries, to safeguard national sovereignty, promote democracy and resist the fascist menace, improve the living standards of the working people, secure a shorter working week without wage cuts, etc. Millions of Social-Democrats and some Social-Democratic Parties have already in some form or another come out in favour of solving these problems. It is safe to say that *on overcoming the split in its ranks, on achieving unity of action of all its contingents, the working class of many capitalist countries could deliver a heavy blow to the policy of the ruling circles in the capitalist countries. It could make them stop preparing a new war, repel the offensive of monopoly capital, and have its daily vital and democratic demands met.*

In the struggle for the improvement of the living conditions of working people, the extension and preservation of their democratic rights, the achievement and defence of national independence, for peace among nations, and also in the struggle to win power and build socialism, the Communist Parties advocate co-operation with the Socialist Parties. The Communists have the great theory of Marxism-Leninism—a theory that is consistent, scientifically substantiated and borne out by life—and rich international experience in socialist construction. They are prepared to hold discussions with Social-Democrats, for they are certain that this is the best way to compare views, ideas and experience with the aim of removing deep-rooted prejudices and the division among the working people, and of establishing co-operation.

The imperialist reactionaries, who try to arouse distrust for the Communist movement and its ideology, continue to intimidate the people by alleging that the Communists need wars between states to overthrow the capitalist system and establish a socialist system. The Communist Parties emphatically reject this slander. The fact that both world wars, which were started by the imperialists, ended in socialist revolutions by no means implies that the way to social revolution is necessarily through world war, especially now that there exists a powerful world system of socialism. Marxists-Leninists have never considered that the way to social revolution lies through wars between states.

The choice of social system is the inalienable right of the people of each country. Socialist revolution cannot be imported, nor imposed from without. It is a result of the internal development of the country concerned, of the utmost sharpening of social contradictions in it. *The Communist Parties, which guide themselves by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, have always been against the export of revolution. At the same time they fight resolutely against imperialist export of counter-revolution. They consider it their internationalist duty to call on the peoples of all countries to unite, to rally all their internal forces, to act vigorously and, relying on the might of the world socialist system, to prevent or firmly resist imperialist interference in the affairs of any people who have risen in revolution.*

The Marxist-Leninist Parties head the struggle of the working class and the working people, for the accomplishment of the socialist revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one form or another. The forms and course of development of the socialist revolution

will depend on the specific balance of the class forces in the country concerned, on the organisation and maturity of the working class and its vanguard, and on the extent of the resistance put up by the ruling classes. Whatever form of dictatorship of the proletariat is established, it will always signify an extension of democracy, a transition from formal, bourgeois democracy to genuine democracy, to democracy for the working people.

The Communist Parties reaffirm the propositions put forward by the Declaration of 1957 on the forms of transition of different countries from capitalism to socialism.

The Declaration points out that the working class and its vanguard—the Marxist-Leninist Party—seek to achieve the socialist revolution by peaceful means. This would accord with the interests of the working class and the people as a whole, with the national interests of the country.

Today in a number of capitalist countries the working class, headed by its vanguard, has the opportunity, given a united working-class and popular front or other workable forms of agreement and political co-operation between the different parties and public organisations, to unite a majority of the people, win state power without civil war and ensure the transfer of the basic means of production to the hands of the people. Relying on the majority of the people and resolutely rebuffing the opportunist elements incapable of relinquishing the policy of compromise with the capitalists and landlords, the working class can defeat the reactionary, anti-popular forces, secure a firm majority in parliament, transform parliament from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people, launch an extra-parliamentary mass struggle, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions for peaceful realisation of the socialist revolution. All this will be possible only by broad and ceaseless development of the class struggle of the workers, peasant masses and the urban middle strata against big monopoly capital, against reaction, for profound social reforms, for peace and socialism.

In the event of the exploiting classes resorting to violence against the people, the possibility of non-peaceful transition to socialism should be borne in mind. Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily. In this case the degree of bitterness and the forms of the class struggle will depend not so much on the proletariat as on the resistance put up by the reactionary circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, on these circles using force at one or other stage of the struggle for socialism.

The actual possibility of the one or the other way of transition to socialism in each individual country depends on the concrete historical conditions.

In our time, when communism is not only the most advanced doctrine but a social system which actually exists and which has proved its superiority over capitalism, conditions are particularly favourable for expanding the influence of the Communist Parties, and vigorously exposing anti-communism—a slogan under which the capitalist class wages its struggle against the proletariat—and for winning the broadest sections of the working people for Communist ideas.

Anti-communism arose at the dawn of the working-class movement as the principal ideological weapon of the capitalist class in its struggle against the proletariat and Marxist ideology. As the class struggle grew in intensity, particularly with the formation of the world socialist system, anti-communism became more vicious and insidious. Anti-communism, which is indicative of

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the extreme decline of bourgeois ideology and of its deep ideological crisis, resorts to monstrous distortions of Marxist doctrine and crude slander against the socialist social system, presents Communist policies and objectives in a false light, and carries on a witch-hunt against the democratic peaceful forces and organisations.

Effectively to defend the interests of the working people, maintain peace and realise the socialist ideals of the working class, a resolute struggle must be waged against anti-communism—that poisoned weapon which the bourgeoisie uses to fence off the masses from socialism. A greater effort is required to explain the ideas of socialism to the working peoples, to educate them in a revolutionary spirit, and to develop their revolutionary class consciousness. It is necessary to show all working people the superiority of socialist society by referring to the experience of the countries of the world socialist system, demonstrating in concrete form the benefits which socialism will actually give to workers, peasants and other sections of the population in each country.

Communism assures people freedom from fear of war; it brings lasting peace, freedom from imperialist oppression and exploitation, and from unemployment and poverty. It leads to general prosperity and a high standard of living; freedom from fear of economic crises, and a rapid growth of the productive forces for the benefit of society as a whole. It frees the individual from the tyranny of the moneybag, and leads to the all-round spiritual development of man, the fullest development of talent and the unlimited scientific and cultural progress of society. All the sections of the population, with the exception of a handful of exploiters, stand to gain from the victory of the new social system, and this must be brought home to millions of people in the capitalist countries.

## VI

The world Communist movement has become the most influential political force of our time, a most important factor in social progress. As it fights bitterly against imperialist reaction, for the interests of the working class and all working people, for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism, the Communist movement is making steady headway, is becoming consolidated and tempered.

There are now Communist Parties active in 87 countries of the world. Their total membership exceeds 36,000,000. This is a signal victory for Marxism-Leninism and a tremendous achievement of the working class. Like-minded Marxists are rallying in the countries which have shaken off colonial tyranny and taken the path of independent development. Communist Parties consider it their internationalist duty to promote friendship and solidarity between the working class of their countries and the working-class movement of the countries which have won their freedom in the common struggle against imperialism.

The growth of the Communist Parties and their organisational consolidation, the victories of the Communist Parties in a number of countries in the struggle against deviations, elimination of the harmful consequences of the personality cult, and the greater influence of the world Communist movement open new prospects for the successful accomplishment of the tasks facing the Communist Parties.

Marxist-Leninist Parties regard it as a law of their activity strictly to observe the Leninist standards of Party life in keeping with the principle of

democratic centralism, and to cherish Party unity like the apple of their eye. They strictly adhere to the principle of Party democracy and collective leadership, for they attach, in keeping with the organisational principles of Leninism, great importance to the role of the leading party bodies in the life of the Party. They work indefatigably for the strengthening of their bonds with the Party membership and with the broad masses of the working people, and do not allow the cult of the individual, which shackles creative thought and initiative of Communists. They vigorously promote the activity of Communists, and encourage criticism and self-criticism in their ranks.

The Communist Parties have ideologically defeated the revisionists in their ranks who sought to divert them from the Marxist-Leninist path. Each Communist Party and the international Communist movement as a whole have become still stronger, ideologically and organisationally, in the struggle against revisionism, Right-wing opportunism.

The Communist Parties have unanimously condemned the Yugoslav variety of international opportunism, a variety of modern revisionist "theories" in concentrated form. After betraying Marxism-Leninism, which they termed obsolete, the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia opposed their anti-Leninist revisionist programme to the Declaration of 1957; they set the L.C.Y. against the international Communist movement as a whole, severed their country from the socialist camp, made it dependent on so-called "aid" from U.S. and other imperialists, and thereby exposed the Yugoslav people to the danger of losing the revolutionary gains achieved through a heroic struggle. The Yugoslav revisionists carry on subversive work against the socialist camp and the world Communist movement. Under the pretext of being outside blocs, they engage in activities which prejudice the unity of all the peace-loving forces and countries. Further exposure of the leaders of Yugoslav revisionists and active struggle to safeguard the Communist movement and the working-class movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists, remain an essential task of the Marxist-Leninist Parties.

The practical struggles of the working class and the entire course of social development have furnished a brilliant new proof of the great all-conquering power and vitality of Marxism-Leninism, and have thoroughly refuted all modern revisionist "theories."

The further development of the Communist and working-class movement calls as stated in the Moscow Declaration of 1957, for continuing a determined struggle on two fronts—against revisionism, which remains the main danger, and against dogmatism and sectarianism.

Revisionism, Right-wing opportunism, which mirrors bourgeois ideology in theory and practice, distorts Marxism-Leninism, robs it of its revolutionary spirit, and thereby paralyses the revolutionary will of the working class. It disarms and demobilises the workers and all working people, in their struggle against oppression by imperialists and exploiters, for peace, democracy and national-liberation, for the triumph of socialism.

Dogmatism and sectarianism in theory and practice can also become the main danger at some stage of development of individual parties, unless combated unrelentingly. They rob revolutionary parties of the ability to develop Marxism-Leninism through scientific analysis and apply it creatively according to the specific conditions. They isolate Communists from the broad masses of the working people, doom them to passive expectation or Leftist, adventurist actions in the revolutionary struggle. They prevent the Communist

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Parties from making a timely and correct estimate of the changing situation and of new experience and using all opportunities to bring about the victory of the working class and all democratic forces in the struggle against imperialism, reaction and the war danger. Thereby they prevent the peoples from achieving victory in their just struggle.

At a time when imperialist reaction is joining forces to fight communism it is particularly necessary to consolidate the world Communist movement. Unity and solidarity redouble the strength of our movement and provide a reliable guarantee that the great cause of communism will make victorious progress and all enemy attacks will be effectively repelled.

Communists throughout the world are united by the great doctrine of Marxism-Leninism and by the joint struggle for its realisation. The interests of the Communist movement require solidarity by every Communist Party in the observance of the estimates and conclusions on the common tasks in the struggle against imperialism, for peace, democracy and socialism, jointly reached by the fraternal Parties at their meetings.

The interests of the struggle for the working-class cause demand of each Communist Party and of the great army of Communists of all countries ever-closer unity of will and action. It is the supreme internationalist duty of every Marxist-Leninist Party to work continuously for greater unity in the world Communist movement.

A resolute defence of the unity of the world Communist movement on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and the prevention of any actions which may undermine that unity, are a necessary condition for victory in the struggle for national independence, democracy and peace, for the successful accomplishment of the tasks of the socialist revolution and of the building of socialism and communism. Violation of these principles would impair the forces of communism.

All the Marxist-Leninist Parties are independent and have equal rights; they shape their policies according to the specific conditions in their respective countries and in keeping with Marxist-Leninist principles, and support each other. The success of the working-class cause in any country is unthinkable without the internationalist solidarity of all Marxist-Leninist parties. Every party is responsible to the working class, to the working people of its country, to the international working-class and Communist movement as a whole.

The Communist and Workers' Parties hold meetings whenever necessary to discuss urgent problems, to share experiences, acquaint themselves with each other's views and positions, work out common views through consultations and co-ordinate joint actions in the struggle for common goals.

Whenever a Party wants to clear up questions relating to the activities of another fraternal Party, its leadership approaches the leadership of the Party concerned; if necessary, they hold meetings and consultations.

The experience and results of the meetings of representatives of the Communist Parties held in recent years, particularly the results of the two major meetings—that of November 1957 and this Meeting—show that in present-day conditions such meetings are an effective form of exchanging views and experience, enriching Marxist-Leninist theory by collective effort and elaborating a common attitude in the struggle for common objectives.

The Communist and Workers' Parties unanimously declare that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been, and remains, the universally recognised vanguard of the world Communist movement, being the most

experienced and steered contingent of the international Communist movement. The experience which the C.P.S.U. has gained in the struggle for the victory of the working class, in socialist construction and in the full-scale construction of communism, is of fundamental significance for the whole of the world Communist movement. The example of the C.P.S.U. and its fraternal solidarity inspire all the Communist Parties in their struggle for peace and socialism, and represent the revolutionary principles of proletarian internationalism applied in practice. The historic decisions of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. are not only of great importance for the C.P.S.U. and communist construction in the U.S.S.R., but have initiated a new stage in the world Communist movement, and have promoted its development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

All Communist and Workers' Parties contribute to the development of the great theory of Marxism-Leninism. Mutual assistance and support in relations between all the fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties embody the revolutionary principles of proletarian internationalism applied in practice.

Ideological issues are of especial significance today. The exploiting class tries to counteract the achievements of socialism by exerting ever greater ideological pressure on the people as it seeks to keep them in spiritual bondage to bourgeois ideology. Communists regard it as their task to launch a determined offensive on the ideological front, to work to free the people from the shackles of all types and forms of bourgeois ideology, including the pernicious influence of reformism, and to disseminate among the people progressive ideas making for social advancement, the ideas of democracy and freedom, the ideology of scientific socialism.

Historical experience shows that the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people persist over a long period even after the establishment of a socialist system. This demands extensive work by the Party for the Communist education of the people and a better Marxist-Leninist training of Party and government cadres.

Marxism-Leninism is a great integral revolutionary doctrine, the guiding light of the working class and working people of the whole world at all stages of their great battle for peace, freedom and a better life, for the establishment of the most just society, communism. Its great creative, revolutionising power lies in its unbreakable link with life, in its continuous enrichment through a comprehensive analysis of reality. On the basis of Marxism-Leninism, the community of socialist countries and the international Communist, working-class and liberation movements have achieved great historic successes, and it is only on its basis that all the tasks facing the Communist and Workers' Parties can be effectively accomplished.

*The meeting sees the further consolidation of the Communist Parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, of proletarian internationalism, as a primary condition for the unification of all working-class, democratic and progressive forces, as a guarantee of new victories in the great struggle waged by the world Communist and working-class movement for a happy future for the whole of mankind, for the triumph of the cause of peace and socialism.*

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## *The Chinese in Latin America*

By VICTOR ALBA

WHEN in 1953 the Central Obrera Boliviana was examining the proposals for agrarian reform submitted by a commission appointed by the President of Bolivia, the Communist José Pereira criticised the proposals and read out a draft law on agrarian reform which, in the opinion of the Communists, adequately met Bolivian conditions. Nufflo Chavez, Minister for Peasant Affairs, stated that this Communist draft was an almost literal translation of the Chinese agrarian reform law of 1950.<sup>1</sup>

At that time, very few people in Latin America knew what was happening in China, and nobody except the Communists was interested. It needed a minister who was very well informed, and with a comprehensive knowledge of all the many proposals for agrarian reform throughout the world, to reveal the origin of the draft law submitted by the Communists.

Seven years later there was more talk of China than of the Soviet Union in Latin America. What had happened in the interval? And to what extent does Communist China exercise ideological or political influence there? The establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba (under Fidel Castro's régime) and Communist China, which thus obtained its first foothold in a country of the Western hemisphere, gives these questions a certain topicality.

### CHINESE PROPAGANDA

In 1953 the Bolivian Communist Pereira was only taking advantage of a text that was useful for his purposes. At that time there was practically no Chinese Communist literature available in the Spanish language. But Peking soon filled the gap, and today the Chinese give unflagging attention to Latin American affairs and to propaganda in the twenty countries south of the Rio Bravo. We shall examine the reasons for this sudden interest later; for the moment, let us see how and through what channels it is displayed.

The central committee of the Chinese Communist Party has set up an Institute for South American affairs, run by Chu Tu-nan, and an Association for Sino-Latin-American Friendship; Chou En-lai and the Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi were present at the opening ceremony in

<sup>1</sup> Robert J. Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution*, pp. 63-64.

Peking.<sup>2</sup> The official Chinese News Agency, Hsin Hua (NCNA), opened a branch in Havana at the end of 1959; its news service is distributed by Prensa Latina, the agency run by Fidel Castro's government.<sup>3</sup> Associations for Sino-Latin-American Friendship have been established in the major cities—in Havana, Rio, Mexico City, Buenos Aires, La Paz, Santiago, Bogota, Montevideo and Caracas.

After a tour of Latin America in 1959 by Yao Chen and three other members of the propaganda department of the Chinese Communist Party, a Spanish edition of the periodical *China Reconstructs*, printed in Montevideo and Havana, began to circulate widely. The publication in Spanish of Chinese pamphlets and books (including speeches and poems by Mao Tse-tung, speeches by Chou En-lai and others, legal documents and classical texts) was substantially increased, and in many Latin American bookshops there can now be found works in Spanish, published in Peking, at very low prices. Of Chinese periodicals put out in the Spanish language, the most widely distributed are *Revista de Pekin*, *Ciencia China* and *Mujer China*.

Starting in 1958, Radio Peking broadcast from seven to fourteen hours weekly in Spanish. A "Peking Letter," broadcast weekly, gives news about China and replies to questions from the public. It should be noted that these broadcasts give fairly full reports about political and social movements in Latin America, and that the information about the Democratic and Socialist Parties is pretty accurate, although it is not presented objectively. Each week there is also seven hours broadcasting in Portuguese.

The Peking Opera toured Latin America in 1956, and in 1959 a company of acrobats spent ten months there. Visits by Chinese officials do not appear to be very frequent. A Chinese trade-union delegation attended the trade union congresses of Cuba and of Chile, and later, at the end of 1959, visited Uruguay.

#### LATIN AMERICAN VISITORS TO CHINA

Before embarking on this attempt at penetration, Peking began inviting Latin American visitors to China, particularly journalists. In 1955 some Mexican fellow-travelling journalists went there. Later the Mexican painter David A. Siqueiros, member of the Communist Party (and the man who organised the first attempt on Trotsky's life in 1940), was received in Peking on his way to India to visit Mr. Nehru. General Lazaro Cardenas, ex-president of Mexico and committee member of the Peace Movement, was received by Mao, and at the end of 1960 the Vice-President of Brazil, Joao Goulart, was invited to visit the Chinese capital.

<sup>2</sup> Richard C. Hottelet, "Communism in Latin America," *The New Leader*, April 4, 1960.

<sup>3</sup> *Christian Democratic Review*, June-July 1960, p. 22.

In 1959 Mao received, on at least two occasions, groups of Latin American visitors—representatives of twelve Communist parties in March, and of fourteen in October. On the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the Chinese People's Republic 135 Latin Americans from nineteen countries attended the celebrations by invitation. For 1959 as a whole, invitations were extended to 402 Latin Americans.<sup>4</sup> They were grouped into 107 delegations, of which fourteen came from Chile, thirteen from Brazil, twelve from Venezuela, eleven from Uruguay, ten from Argentina, and nine from Cuba.

The visitors are not always enthusiastic about what is shown to them. Mr. Errasuriz, for example, chairman of the Senate Commission on Foreign Affairs of Chile, commented on his return to Santiago on the absence of religious liberty in China.<sup>5</sup> The majority of the visitors were surprised to find that those who accompanied them in China and acted as guides spoke excellent Spanish and knew a good deal about Latin American affairs.

These delegations are very carefully chosen. On November 16, 1960, for example, five Ecuadorian writers and artists left Quito to spend three months in China and Russia; these were the painter Oswaldo Guayasamin, the well-known novelist Jorge Icaza, the painter Diogenes Paredes, Director of the National School of Fine Arts, the journalist Pedro Jorge Vera, and the novelist Nelson Etupinan Bass. Two eminent personalities declined to take part in the trip, the writer Benjamin Carrion and the ex-rector of the Ecuador Central University, Dr. Julio Enrique Paredes.<sup>6</sup>

In the manner that has now become traditional, members of these delegations on their return give talks, make declarations, write articles and even books. There have been at least twenty such books published by Latin American trippers—in Mexico, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Havana. None of them is critical in tone, nor even merely a dispassionate account.

#### LATIN AMERICAN CURIOSITY

Few things annoy Latin Americans more than the hypothesis of those historians who attribute to them Oriental origins. If an anthropologist or archaeologist wants to make enemies in Latin America, he need only publish an article setting forth his reasons for believing that the present inhabitants of the continent are the distant descendants of Chinese or Polynesian forebears.

The immigration of Chinese in the nineteenth century did nothing

<sup>4</sup> *Press of the Americas* (organ of the Inter-American Press Association), September 1, 1960.

<sup>5</sup> *Christian Democratic Review*, loc. cit.

<sup>6</sup> *Diario del Ecuador*, November 16, 1960.

to modify this attitude, which, it should be said, is not racialist in origin, but derives rather from the wish to remain close to the civilisation of Europe and Christianity. The roughly 100,000 Chinese now living in Latin America, mainly in the countries on the Pacific coast, are engaged for the most part in commercial occupations. As a rule they do not join in any political activity, and the Chinese Nationalist embassies make no great effort to attract them. There is little evidence at the moment that agents of the Chinese Communist régime have had much success among these colonies of Chinese; but in Cuba, as we shall see, they have used pressure on their former compatriots, the majority of whom have acquired Cuban nationality.

There is nothing in the cultural traditions of Latin America to stimulate these countries to take an active interest in China. It is scarcely even remembered that the Mexican silver peso at one time served as currency in China. Of the countries of Asia, it was rather Japan which aroused admiration and interest because of its rapid economic development and its victories over the United States in 1941-42. What then are non-Communist Latin Americans looking for in China? There is undoubtedly a good deal of curiosity about an exotic country, interest in its revolution—the more so as it is vigorously hostile to the United States, and everything which is liable to annoy the United States can count *a priori* on the sympathy of a large section of Latin American public opinion.

But there is something else. For Latin Americans, the U.S.S.R. is a country that is already industrialised, that no longer has to face the problems confronting Latin America. Moreover, there are entries on the debit side of the Soviet balance sheet—Hungary in 1956, the inept and sterile policies pursued by Latin American Communist parties over many years, the fact that it is already a great power (and has, consequently, already lost that sympathy with the persecuted and the weak which the masses always find so attractive).

China, on the other hand, presents a number of similarities with the Latin American situation, at least in the eyes of the less well-informed, whose picture of China has been shaped by Western propaganda agencies. To them, China is a country which, under Communism, has carried through its agrarian reform. More than that, it has founded the communes which, to those Latin Americans enamoured of the theocratic and communist traditions of the pre-Columbian age (Incas and Aztecs), gives Communist China an additional attraction. It is a country which has freed itself from the domination of foreign capital and is industrialising itself without the help of foreign investment—that, at any rate, is the belief held by the majority of Latin Americans. Finally, China is

attacking the country which is regarded as the enemy by a large section of public opinion in Latin America today.

What this adds up to is the superficial but widespread belief that China sets an example to Latin America, provides an experience that can be used to shape Latin American development, and, above all, to promote agrarian reform which everybody, conservatives included, now believes to be both necessary and urgent. With this state of mind and this scanty information, it is not surprising that many non-Communist Latin Americans are interested in China and accept invitations to visit that country. The interest is clearly even greater when those invited are Communists or fellow-travellers. Another thing to be taken into account is that Soviet aid to Communist parties and Communist front organisations is suspect to many, whereas Chinese aid, coming from a country seen from the angle described above, is looked on rather as evidence of solidarity. India might have capitalised on her achievements, too, had she adopted the same policy of propaganda and invitations as China has. But what is happening in India is virtually unknown in Latin America and the embassies of India (all too few) do nothing to give publicity to the democratic methods of development practised in their country.

The dangers inherent in the Chinese methods of development do not appear on the surface. If reference is made to the extreme exploitation of the masses of the Chinese people, the facts are more often than not brushed aside as the invention of anti-Communist propaganda; there is the same reaction as there was twenty years ago to information about Russian forced labour camps. And for a continent with the highest rate of population increase in the world, a country with more than six hundred million inhabitants (according to the official figure) exercises a peculiar kind of fascination, the more so as the Latin Americans invited to Peking are not themselves workers or peasants, but intellectuals, bourgeois politicians, students, that is to say, people who see their counterparts in China enjoying a privileged position and not suffering in their persons from the effect of totalitarian methods of development. In this context, Chinese propaganda is effective and finds a fairly large audience, particularly as it concentrates on accomplishment rather than on theory.

#### PEKING'S AIMS

What, on their side, do the Chinese Communists hope to find in Latin America? In the first place, the support of its governments for the admission of the Chinese People's Republic to the United Nations, which they think will happen as a result of pressure exercised by public opinion and by the organisations in which they can exert influence. Secondly, if the differences between Moscow and Peking are real and deep, it may be assumed that Peking hopes to win the support of the

Latin American Communist parties and strengthen its position by expanding its influence in Latin American circles; it is of interest to note that the press agencies on November 25, 1960, reported that the representatives of the Latin American Communist parties aligned themselves with the Chinese at the conference of Communist parties in Moscow.

It would be hazardous to give too much credence to these reports; nevertheless, it is not unlikely that they are advocates of a "hard" policy, for they have no chance of attaining power in the near future except in a situation similar to that which developed in Cuba, and such situations are created only by a hard policy, as much on the national as on the international level. It is also likely that the Latin American Communist parties see in this a way of profiting from the growing popularity of China in their continent.

But we should also take into account that the Latin American Communist parties have become extremely bureaucratic; almost all of them are composed largely of officials rather than rank and file, and, with the exception of Chile and Brazil, have little direct influence as parties on the masses. Only rarely do Communist Party bureaucrats dare to take an independent stand, least of all against those on whom they are directly dependent, in this case Moscow. If the report that the Latin American representatives came out on the side of Peking at the Moscow Conference is confirmed, it must be assumed that the Chinese Communist Party is beginning to take over the role of guide among the Latin American parties, that is to say, financing and directing their activities to a greater extent than Moscow does, working through the bureau in Prague which coordinates the activities of Latin American Communists. But so far there is no evidence to support this assumption.

However that may be, it should not be forgotten that the general secretary of the Uruguayan Communist Party, R. Arismendi, wrote in *Problems of Peace and Socialism (World Marxist Review)* that the Chinese example is "a classic example" and a "reliable compass." Nor should we forget that the Brazilian Communist Party, when it was going through a difficult internal crisis in 1952, laid down a new line not very different from that advocated by the Chinese—to attack, not imperialism in general, but American imperialism; to limit the demand for agrarian reform to large estates only, leaving medium and small holdings untouched; to call for the expropriation of only those business undertakings with American interests, and to organise a popular front. The programme has had only moderate success, but it is still being copied in one respect or another by other Latin American Communist parties. (It has not been possible to substantiate the rumour circulated by the Brazilian Communists themselves that their leader, Luiz Carlos Prestes, had long and secret conversations with Mao in October, 1960. But the fact that the

rumour is current, and was put out by the Communists themselves, bears witness to the prestige which China enjoys in Latin America.)

To sum up, Latin America offers China a fruitful field, in which it can easily win influence, prestige and even battles. "Latin America," ran a report by the NCNA, broadcast by Peking radio on December 27, 1959, "has become the front line in the anti-imperialist struggle." A year after that, events in Cuba showed that this way of looking at things had not become obsolete.

#### CHINA AND CUBA

What were these events?

Of the Chinese living in Latin America one-third, about 35,000, are in Cuba; they are mostly traders. Until the second half of 1960, Castro's régime maintained diplomatic relations with Nationalist China. Then Castro accused the Nationalist China embassy of giving support to his enemies, and forty-eight hours later relations between the two were broken off. Recognition of the Chinese People's Republic followed shortly after, and was in its turn followed by a visit to Peking by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, President of the Cuban Central Bank and Castro's right hand man. While he was there, a commercial agreement between the two countries was signed.

But even before relations with Nationalist China had been broken, Castro's régime facilitated the work of the Chinese Communists. The NCNA established a branch at Havana, employing six journalists and working jointly with Prensa Latina. Chinese residents in Cuba received questionnaires sent by the "Association of Chinese who have returned to their homeland," and Chinese Communist groups were organised under the name of "League for the New Democracy." Of the three Chinese language journals published in Cuba, one quickly turned Communist, and now all three are.<sup>7</sup> Castro's government requested and received the aid of Chinese agricultural experts to improve rice cultivation. There are also some Dutch experts.<sup>8</sup>

The Sino-Latin-American Friendship Society has issued a number of statements in support of Castro's régime. During Guevara's visit, Chou En-lai publicly condemned the American naval patrols in the Sea of Antilles in November 1960, sent there at the request of the Governments of Nicaragua and Guatemala to protect these countries against the supposed possibility of invasion by forces friendly to Castro.

When the United States stopped its preferential purchases of Cuban sugar, Peking made a symbolical gesture and bought 50,000 tons—an

<sup>7</sup> *New York Times*, July 4, 1960.

<sup>8</sup> R. Heifetz, "A Visit to Cuba," *The Island Times* (Puerto Rico), November 18, 1960.

insignificant quantity for the Cuban sugar industry, but an opening for an ample propaganda operation. The trade agreement is more ambitious: it grants Cuba a loan of 240 million roubles (60 million dollars at the official—but unrealistic—exchange rate), to run from 1961 to 1965, for the purchase of capital goods. At the same time, under a protocol to the agreement, China undertakes to train Cuban technicians and to buy a million tons of sugar, while Cuba will buy Chinese products of equivalent value. China is also to send a government mission to Cuba.<sup>9</sup>

Some of the statements made by Guevara during his visit to China reveal the reasons why Chinese propaganda is easy and effective in Latin America. He said, for instance, that "We Cubans can well understand the Chinese people because both of us have been subjected to American imperialist blockade, to insult and aggression. The implacable hatred of imperialism for our two peoples, and our great yearning for complete liberation and for peace, have long united us in fraternity."

After underlining how important it was for Cubans to establish people's communes, Guevara proclaimed the need for a worldwide anti-imperialist front. Chou En-lai replied that China would support the Cuban revolution and that "so long as the Cuban people and the other Latin American peoples remained united . . . the final victory of the national and democratic revolution in America cannot be prevented by any power on earth."<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps it is not out of place to note that Cuban interest in China was visibly enhanced after Khrushchev's statement that his undertaking to have recourse to rockets to support Castro was a "symbolic undertaking." It may be that in the near future a division of opinion will arise among Castro's friends. Raul Castro, for example, said in Havana that Cuban help in "liberating other countries" will take the form not of armed aid, but of "keeping alive our revolution, which is a beacon and example for the entire continent." Guevara, on the other hand, when he arrived in Peking, contended that the liberation of the Latin American nations would be brought about not by elections nor by illegal opposition, but by "the armed struggle of the people." We should not forget that Cuba has today the most powerful army in Latin America, although its naval and air forces have been immobilised by the desertion of a good part of their technical experts. The use to which these forces are put may depend on whether one or other of these two points of view will prevail; Chinese help (until now quite modest in scale) may swing the balance as between these two men, the only two who appear to have any influence over Fidel Castro.

It would be an exaggeration to say that Chinese influence today, in

<sup>9</sup> Reuter, November 30, 1960.

<sup>10</sup> United Press International, November 18 and 28, 1960.

## THE CHINESE IN LATIN AMERICA

Latin America as a whole and Cuba in particular, is greater than Soviet influence, or that it is decisive or dominant. However, what has been written here suggests that conditions favour the expansion of Chinese influence. There is not enough information to assess the degree of expansion in recent months—which is one more reason for following closely this aspect of the Latin American situation.

# ***The U.S. and Diplomatic Recognition : The Contrasting Cases of Russia and Communist China***

By JOSEPH G. WHELAN

STRICTLY speaking, recognition is a formal legal act. It involves interchangeable commitments to undertake certain mutual obligations according to international law and custom. In a broader sense, it is a formal declaration of intention to carry on relations with other states in the society of nations.

The politics of recognition are, however, far more important and complex than the legalities that recognition entails. Recognition is more than a legal act. It is a political act, and as such reflects the inner dynamics of international and domestic politics. Considerations of power relationships in world affairs enter into the calculations of recognition. Domestic politics are not only directly relevant but in some instances are the determining factor. Similarly economic, and even psychological, elements often play a key role.

The problem of American recognition of Soviet Russia and the current question of recognising Communist China illustrate the many forces at work in the diplomacy of recognition.<sup>1</sup> They show the impact that power relationships in the world, domestic politics, and economic forces have on the more simplified legal act of recognition. As case studies, they reveal also characteristic American responses to emerging Communist powers and provide some conceptual framework within which to judge Sino-American relations.

## **THE WORLD SITUATION IN 1933**

### ***Distribution of World Power and Forces of Change***

World politics in the early 1930s was essentially multi-polar. Great Britain and France, buttressed by flourishing imperial systems, were among the most powerful world states. Germany was still in eclipse. Fascist Italy loomed as a threat to peace in Europe. Soviet Russia had

<sup>1</sup> Historically, there have been three criteria used by the United States in according recognition: (1) the ability of the government to control and rule the country; (2) acceptance of the government by the people; and (3) the willingness and ability of the government to carry out its international obligations. The emphasis given to these principles throughout American diplomatic history has varied widely. The first principle, stressing *de facto* control, prevailed prior to the Civil War; it was revived at the end of the nineteenth century, and again in the 1930s after a period when we insisted upon constitutional legitimacy as the governing criterion. The

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yet to demonstrate its capacity as a great power. America's weight in the equation of world affairs remained uncertain as it reverted deeper into isolation when threats from abroad became more acute.

Forces of change were at work in 1933, however, which profoundly affected the structure of world affairs and more specifically the course of Soviet-American relations. These forces were set into motion mainly by four major events occurring in the early 1930s: the emergence of Hitlerian Germany and the rise of militaristic Japan combined with the progress of Soviet Russia's first Five-Year Plan and the great depression in the United States. These events produced effects which together created incentives to both sides for recognition.

### *Motivations Underlying Soviet and American Policy*<sup>2</sup>

The mainspring of Soviet foreign policy in the early 1930s was to protect the "Socialist Motherland" against threats from abroad and to contribute to stabilising world affairs so that the main task of building Socialism in the Soviet Union could be completed. During this period Soviet Russia was beset by many external dangers. The 1920s and 1930s were an era when the equation of power weighed heavily against the Russians, and they talked continually of a "capitalist encirclement." Japan, having seized Manchuria in 1931, threatened the Soviet Far Eastern maritime provinces. The ascent of Hitler to power in January 1933 posed a new threat to Soviet security in Europe. This danger was regarded as more potential than imminent; the chief concern of Moscow was the Japanese threat.<sup>3</sup>

To the Soviets, the United States was one of its most likely collaborators against the Japanese. The United States Government had already taken the initiative among the Great Powers in denouncing the Japanese seizure of Manchuria. By 1932-33, the Soviet Government actively sought a rapprochement with the United States to balance Japanese power in the Far East.<sup>4</sup>

Economic motivations also entered into Soviet policy toward the United States. To fulfil the expectations of the First Five-Year Plan, the Russians looked abroad to foreign producers, particularly to the United States where advanced industrial development and superior technical skills had long captured the attention of their planners. But economic factors in Soviet motivations were at best secondary.

second principle was an outgrowth of the Civil War experience, and the third related specifically to the problem of recognising Soviet Russia. Currently, the United States recognises all Communist states belonging to the Soviet bloc and carries on diplomatic relations with all except Albania. It does not recognise Communist China.

<sup>2</sup> This section is based upon Robert Paul Browder's *The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), Chap. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Browder, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

Similarly, economic factors played only a secondary role in the formulation of American policy.<sup>5</sup> In the 1920s American trade with Soviet Russia had flourished. The United States had been, in fact, one of the chief suppliers to the Russians during the period of revival under the New Economic Policy. The decline in American business during the great depression quickened the interest of American business groups advocating recognition.<sup>6</sup> The great majority of Americans justified recognition on the grounds that Soviet-American trade would stimulate economic recovery. The Soviets encouraged this notion. And as the level of Soviet trade dropped during 1931-33 agitation for recognition accelerated. Much of this sentiment was translated into active pressure for political recognition.

But the chief American motivation for recognition was political. The international situation profoundly influenced President Roosevelt's decision. Many policy-makers in the Roosevelt Administration believed that normal relations with Moscow would open the way to possible co-operation between the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union for preserving peace.

The emergence of Hitlerian Germany was considered in Washington as in Moscow, to be more a potential threat than an imminent one. The threat from Japan was already immediate and real. No doubt both of these disturbing political realities influenced the President's decision and quickened his interest in devising a system for preserving peace.<sup>7</sup>

#### INTERNAL FACTORS IN AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF SOVIET RUSSIA

##### *Political Factors*

Americans in 1933 accepted recognition of Soviet Russia as a matter of course. It was not a political issue in the Presidential election of 1932. At best it lay on the periphery of the election campaign. Recognition was, in short, a politically acceptable course.<sup>8</sup> There were no serious domestic risks to be taken. Once elected, President Roosevelt was determined to correct what he and many responsible persons regarded as an anomalous situation already existing for almost sixteen

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>6</sup> Saul G. Bron, former chairman of Amtorg, wrote in 1930 that more than fifty additional technical assistance contracts were being negotiated in almost all important industries. A number of agreements with individual American engineers and technicians invited to work in the Soviet Union were also in the process of negotiation. An appended list of technical assistance contracts negotiated between the Soviet Government and American firms and engineers included leading American companies. For example, Dupont was engaged to assist in erecting fertiliser factories; General Electric aided the Soviet electrical industry, and Sperry Gyroscope Company gave assistance in manufacturing marine instruments. See, Saul G. Bron, *Soviet Economic Development and American Business* (New York: Horace Liveright, 1930), pp. 99, 144-146.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 108-112.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

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years. The President's leading advisers concurred with his judgment. Negotiations for recognition were concluded and formalised in an executive agreement (in the form of an exchange of letters) on November 16, 1933.

In Congress as elsewhere recognition was not a serious political issue. Small pockets of opposition existed in the Senate and the House of Representatives, but they had no perceptible effect on the course of events.<sup>9</sup> Mass opinion in the United States seemed to be largely unperturbed by the movement toward recognition. Dissent was minimal. According to one student of public opinion, recognition of Soviet Russia became "increasingly reasonable and natural."<sup>10</sup> Business groups were particularly vocal in favour of a revision of policy and prominent Americans made vigorous pleas for recognition.

A sampling of the national press after recognition had become an accomplished fact indicated a "considerable unanimity in accepting it as a foregone conclusion," although some doubts regarding Soviet integrity were expressed here and there.<sup>11</sup>

### *Points of Difference and Similarity*

As nation-states the Soviet Union and the United States differed sharply, but in the realm of international politics their immediate interests coincided remarkably. Their outlooks on world affairs were very different, as were their long-range political objectives; but the general role each was to play on the international scene as they sought to achieve their respective vital interests was mutually understood and mutually acceptable.

By 1933, both nations believed that the establishment of normal relations would be beneficial. A mutual awareness of immediate and potential dangers stemming from the excesses of Japanese imperialism and the recrudescence of Germany under Hitler provided the necessary catalyst. Each nation had tangible political assets to gain from the rapprochement; each came to have the will to bring it about.

Considerations of power, shared political and economic interests, and common goals determined Soviet-American relations in 1933. To what extent, if any, do the same factors exist today in Sino-American relations?

## THE WORLD SITUATION IN 1957-60

### *Distribution of World Power*

Since the close of the Second World War, the distribution of world

<sup>9</sup> Joseph G. Whelan, *United States Recognition of Soviet Russia: A Brief Historical Survey of American Public Opinion, 1917-33*, (Washington: Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1952), p. 34 et seq. (unpublished).

<sup>10</sup> Meno Lovenstein, *American Opinion of Soviet Russia* (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941), p. 149.

<sup>11</sup> *The Literary Digest*, December 2, 1933, v. 116:13.

power has changed radically. A bi-polar power system prevails with Soviet Russia and its allies at one centre and the United States with its allies at the other. Prior to the Second World War the Soviet Union was the only Communist power, with not more than 17 per cent. of the earth's surface under its control and 3 per cent. of the world's population. Today Communist countries cover about a quarter of the earth and have a third of its population. The phenomenal growth of Communist power has emboldened Khrushchev to claim that the world balance of forces has shifted to the advantage of the Communist camp. No longer do world Communists claim to be caught in the trap of a "capitalist encirclement."

The United States with its cluster of allies in Asia and Europe represents the other pole of world power. In contrast to the isolationism of the 1920s and 1930s, the United States has now undertaken a global commitment. A minus factor in the present equation of power is the liquidation of the enormous imperial holdings of Britain and France. As a consequence, the British and French no longer wield the same power as in the inter-war period. In contrast, however, West Germany and Japan, though diminished territorially, are allied with the United States.

Another power constellation of lesser magnitude but of increasing importance in world affairs consists of the rising neutralist states of Asia and Africa. Many observers of foreign affairs contend that these states, hovering between the prevailing poles of power, may represent a vital counterweight in the future balance of world power.

### *Forces of Change*

Within this triangular scheme of world politics forces of change are at work, but no prospects exist for any fundamental and immediate change in the world distribution of power which would induce a Sino-American rapprochement. Perhaps, the only real possibility of a realignment of power lies in the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Most responsible observers of Sino-Soviet affairs agree, however, that expectations of a rift in this alliance, at least in the immediate future, are unwarranted, despite the existence of tensions. There is every reason to believe that both agree that advantages outweigh the disadvantages, thus providing a force of cohesion within the alliance, although even greater strains can be expected in the future. Among the advantages are, Soviet economic and technical assistance to China, military aid and mutual protection, the prestige that comes from unity in a powerful political alliance, and the advantages of a united power *bloc* for expanding Communism. Potential sources of friction are the existence of common frontiers and long-contested border areas in Central Asia, rivalries within the Communist *bloc* for political leadership, competing interests based on material and cultural differences, differing approaches

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to developing Communism, and the present gap in comparative economic strengths.<sup>12</sup>

Forces of change at work in world affairs, however, have had no real effect on the positions of Communist China and the United States. At this point the policies of both nations conflict totally.

### *Some Aspects of Peking's Policy Toward the United States*

Ever since the Communist conquest of China, Peking's foreign policy has been based upon open and avowed hostility toward the United States. The fact that the United States is the leading capitalist power, and thus a "natural" enemy, and that it has challenged Peking's pre-eminence in Eastern Asia accounts for this attitude. No other power could impede Peking's ambitions in the Far East. It was the United States that prevented the conquest of Formosa and complete destruction of the Nationalist régime, fought the Chinese in Korea, assisted in limiting Communist gains in Indo-China, and constructed a network of security pacts, backed by military power and economic aid, to check Communist Chinese expansion by military or non-military means. In the mind of Peking's Communist leaders the United States is *the* enemy both for ideological reasons and those of international politics. Everywhere in Asia, Peking's objectives have been consistent: to displace American influence and thus eliminate the chief obstacle and threat to China's expansion and political control.<sup>13</sup>

Specific points of difference revolve around Peking's claim to be the legitimate government of China including Formosa, with rights to represent China in the U.N., and active military preparations coupled with threats to "liberate" Formosa. The Communists oppose a solution of the problem on the "two-China" principle, that is, acceptance of the principle of a divided China, one on the Mainland, the other on Formosa. They continue to demand the withdrawal of American military forces from around the Formosa area, refuse to renounce the use of force there as a pre-condition to considering "other matters" and generally oppose the American military build-up in Asia.

### *Some Aspects of American Policy Toward Peking*

American policy has been at direct opposites with Peking's asserted interests. At first, it was openly hostile, particularly during the Korean War. In recent years, however, it seems to have undergone some modification suggesting possibly passive acceptance of the *status quo*

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Congress Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Foreign Policy: U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, Study No. 11*, February 14, 1960, Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 45.

<sup>13</sup> Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1958* (New York: Harper for Council on Foreign Relations, 1959), pp. 310-311.

in the Far East. There can be no doubt that the United States has responded to continuing Chinese military pressures rather than been itself the initiator of these pressures.

The United States has withheld recognition from the Peking régime and opposed its admission to the U.N. because the Chinese Communists, manifestly hostile to accepted modes of international conduct, have consistently refused to settle outstanding differences through peaceful means. In defence of its interests the United States continues to recognise the Nationalist Government on Formosa as the only legitimate government of all China, including the Island of Formosa, and has supported its claim to continued representation in the U.N. It has introduced a military force in the Formosa straits to prevent any attempted Peking conquest or a return of the Nationalist forces to the mainland. In addition to these broad policy positions the United States has provided economic and military aid to Formosa, undertaken treaty commitments to defend it, and imposed stringent restrictions on trade with the mainland. By instituting essentially defensive programmes of economic and military aid to countries in Eastern Asia and by creating a defensive military alliance structure there, the United States has thus far successfully checked Chinese Communist expansion in Asia.

#### *Similarities and Differences in Chinese and American Policies*

Despite the apparently irreconcilable differences between Communist Chinese and American policies both governments may possibly have one area of common interest and that is on the disarmament question. But there are no assurances that China would favour arms reduction at this point in its development. The most that can be said is that the United States Government has been thinking in terms of acknowledging Peking's role in a general disarmament settlement. In answer to a question on the possibility of Peking's participation in discussions of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, Secretary of State Christian Herter remarked:

This is, of course, wholly possible. I do not see the necessity of bringing Red China in until the nations that are going to be sitting at that table come nearer to agreement than they seem to have been in discussing this matter in the past. Red China is obviously a very big factor in any very ambitious disarmament programme such as Mr. K. [Khrushchev] has suggested, and would obviously have to be a party to a world-wide disarmament scheme if other nations were to consider it.<sup>14</sup>

On their part the Chinese claim that they must participate in any negotiations for a universal arms control arrangement. On January 21, 1960, Marshal Ch'en Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, warned that "any international disarmament agreement which is arrived at without the

<sup>14</sup> *The New York Times*, September 23, 1959, p. 26.

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formal participation of the Chinese People's Republic and the signature of its delegate cannot, of course, have any binding force on China."<sup>15</sup>

One channel of communications available for use if the two countries want to improve relations is the continuing ambassadorial conferences between representatives of both governments first in Geneva and now in Warsaw. By and large, these conferences have not solved any major outstanding differences, but they do represent a quasi-formal relationship which neither side seems disposed to break off.

A substantial barrier separates Communist China and the United States. But if ideological differences present a great obstacle to harmonious relations, it is not because of a fixed or inbred hostility on the part of Americans. They have demonstrated their capacity for compromise in establishing relations with other Communist states on a mutually acceptable basis. But, at this juncture Peking seems less disposed than ever toward conciliation, and its actions cannot fail to deepen distrust in the United States. In September 1958, Chinese military pressure on Quemoy was renewed, and for a time relations reached a new critical point. Many Americans interpreted China's aggression against Tibet as an alarming demonstration of Peking's aggressive intent in Asia. The recent seizure of territory along the Indian border seemed to demonstrate further Peking's unwillingness to ease tensions in the Far East. Press reports even indicated new strains in Sino-Soviet ties, owing to an apparent clash over whether or not to concur in a *détente* in the Cold War. In recent months dispute broke out into the open over the validity of Khrushchev's thesis of denying the inevitability of war which is the central point in the current line of "peaceful co-existence." Nor could China's recent declarations of domestic policy be expected to create a favourable disposition in the United States toward the Peking régime. Establishment of the Commune system in an effort to achieve Communism in one great leap forward was critically received even in Communist countries.

In general, therefore, prospects for a fusion of interests on the international level seem at this time to be very remote.<sup>16</sup>

If this is the state of things internationally, what effect do domestic

<sup>15</sup> Quoted in *The Economist*, February 20, 1960, p. 695.

<sup>16</sup> World opinion on recognition of Communist China continues to be divided, although the gap is narrowing. By early 1959, forty-four countries recognised the Nationalist Republic of China, forty-two of which were members of the U.N. and three (Republic of Korea, Vietnam and the Vatican) were not. On the other hand, twenty-eight members of the U.N. (excluding the Ukraine and Byelorussia) recognised Communist China. Nine were from the Communist bloc. In addition, Switzerland and four unrecognised Communist régimes (North Korea, East Germany, Outer Mongolia, and North Vietnam) also recognised the Peking régime. Recently, Castro's régime in Cuba established diplomatic relations with Peking. A world-wide poll taken recently on the question of admitting China to the U.N. showed that while the United States stands virtually alone in opposing Peking's admission, still less than a majority approved. See, *World Gallup Poll News Service*, November 19, 1958.

American affairs have on the question of recognition? And, what is the prevailing mood of the American people and their Government toward this problem?

#### INTERNAL FACTORS IN AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA, 1957-60

##### *Impact on Domestic Political Affairs*

Probably no foreign policy problem in many years has split the nation's body politic so deeply as the "loss" of China. The Truman Administration was attacked for "mishandling" the Communist question. Communist China's intervention in the Korean War, the prolonged stalemate which brought mounting casualties to over 144,000 and deaths to 25,000, and the indecisive nature of the conflict aggravated the prevailing partisan climate. Criticism covered the whole range of the Truman Administration's treatment of Communism, both domestically and internationally, and became the central issue in the Presidential campaign of 1952. Indicative of the deep feeling on this issue was the China "plank" in the Republican Party platform. The plank charged the Administration with requiring "the National Government of China to surrender Manchuria with its strategic ports and railroads to the control of Communist Russia." It charged further that the Administration had urged "that Communists be taken into the Chinese Government and its military forces," that it had "denied the military aid that has been authorized by Congress and which was crucially needed if China were to be saved," and "substituted on our Pacific flank a murderous enemy for an ally and friend."<sup>17</sup>

Few would doubt the significance of the "China issue" in domestic politics in 1952, but the "issue" today does not seem to carry the same weight. Peace in Korea in 1953 drew out much of the emotional appeal—the Chinese are no longer killing Americans, and the passage of seven years seems to have discharged much of the static electricity in the political atmosphere. In the 1956 Presidential election, for example, both parties took almost identical positions in their platforms opposing the seating of the Peking régime in the United Nations.<sup>18</sup> The possibility of recognition was not mentioned. The Formosa Resolution, passed by a comfortable majority, committed the nation to defending Formosa against the Chinese Communists and thus to supporting the Nationalist régime.

<sup>17</sup> Republican Platform of 1952: in Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, *National Party Platforms, 1840-1956* (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 497. The Democratic Platform stated: "Our military and economic assistance to the Nationalist Government of China on Formosa has strengthened that vital outpost of the free world, and will be continued," p. 476.

<sup>18</sup> Porter and Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 557 and 525.

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Partisan criticism did emerge, however, in the Quemoy crisis of September 1958. But concern in this case had no direct bearing on recognition or the general conceptual framework of the Administration's policy. Rather, criticism focused on the extended commitment to defend the offshore islands, stemming from the fear of war with Communist China over islands which many critics believed were of questionable military value for the defence of Taiwan and a political liability for the United States.<sup>19</sup>

In 1959, the American correspondent of the London *Economist* observed that Americans "are still greatly afraid of being tarred with the pro-Communist brush if they speak up for revision of policy toward China; and the dead of Korea are not forgotten."<sup>20</sup> However, Chalmers Roberts of the *Washington Post* believed that attitudes had changed. In a comment on speeches by Senators Warren G. Magnuson (D.—Wash.) and Clair Engle (D.—Calif.) in March 1959 calling for a moderate revision of China policy, he observed that "the Red China taboo shows signs of having passed its peak some time ago, probably coincident with the departure from the Senate and the subsequent defeat of Senator William F. Knowland." Mr. Roberts went on to say: "Neither of these statements nor others from House members or from Senators who publicly agreed with Magnuson and Engle brought down the political house. Apathy was the general result."<sup>21</sup>

For the next year and a half critical comments on China policy were made here and there in various sectors of American political life. Critical commentaries were made by some Senators during the second session of the Eighty-Sixth Congress. Bi-partisan pleas came for more "flexibility" in China policy, far short of any sort of recognition and at best expansion of informal communications between both countries. Ending trade restrictions was also another subject for emphasis, especially among Senators from the West.

As the major parties approached the Presidential campaign of 1960, China policy appeared to be only one of many foreign policy subjects for public discussion and then seemingly holding a place fairly low on the scale of more pressing political issues. China policy in 1960 was clearly not the issue it was in 1952. Both platforms virtually repeated pledges made previously against recognition and seating China in the U.N. The Republicans' platform stated that they would "continue in this

<sup>19</sup> At that time, the Administration's extended commitment in this crisis found little public support in 100 newspapers used by the State Department to test public opinion and in letters received in the Department from private citizens. Similarly, Congressional mail was "running heavily" against Administration policy. The *New York Times*, October 5, 1958, p. 3. See also J. Clement Lapp, "The United States and Quemoy," *Western World*, November 1958, pp. 12-14.

<sup>20</sup> *The Economist*, July 25, 1959, p. 222.

<sup>21</sup> The *Washington Post and Times Herald*, June 7, 1959, p. E4.

opposition because of compelling evidence that to do otherwise would weaken the cause of freedom and endanger the future of the free peoples of Asia and the world."<sup>22</sup> The Democratic platform regretted that the policies and actions of the Peking régime interrupted "generations of friendship between the Chinese and American peoples," asserted that normal diplomatic relations were "impossible under present conditions," but indicated the disposition to "welcome any evidence" that the régime was "genuinely prepared to create a new relationship based on respect for international obligations."<sup>23</sup> During the campaign the Presidential contenders, Vice-President Richard Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy, hotly debated America's position on Matsu and Quemoy but at no time did they express contrasting opinions on the problem of recognition or seating Peking in the U.N.<sup>24</sup>

#### *Executive Department*

The prevailing public mood of the nation on the China problem is readily discernible in the attitudes of the Executive Department, Congress, and public opinion as a whole. The Eisenhower Administration consistently refused to recognise the Communist Chinese Government until China showed signs of modifying its aggressiveness and actively worked to prevent the seating of the Chinese in the U.N. Secretary of State John

<sup>22</sup> *Building a Better America: Republican Platform, 1960* (Washington: Republican National Committee, 1960), p. 3.

<sup>23</sup> Democratic Platform, *The Rights of Man*, Democratic National Convention, Los Angeles, July 12, 1960, p. 17.

<sup>24</sup> President (then Senator) Kennedy's views on China policy were set forth in a memorandum prepared early in 1960. According to President Kennedy, "this is not a proper time for the recognition of Red China. In view of the Peking Government's failure to free American prisoners, its aggressive designs and actions against Tibet and South Asia, and its unwillingness to guarantee the integrity of Formosa, there is strong reason to withhold recognition. I feel there is merit in the view that China should not be allowed to 'shoot its way' into the United Nations and thence to recognition by the United States. I do not see it as a moral issue primarily, but I do think we have every right to expect reciprocal benefits from such recognition. On the positive side, I believe it would be well if there were more open windows between the peoples of China and the peoples of the Western nations. Some promising approaches to this end could be made by allowing the press and other private individuals greater latitude in visiting and reporting on China."

In an interview published in the *New Republic* on June 27, 1960, p. 9, Mr. Kennedy remarked: "One of the first things I would do is bring Communist China into the nuclear test ban negotiations in the hope that this would lead to other things. If they were to participate actively and in a way that was responsive then I would go back to the newsmen issue. Then we would have to see about Formosa and the rest. We would have to continue to indicate that we're not going to permit them to dominate South-east Asia, that while we're glad to discuss Formosa we're still going to meet our treaty commitments."

On February 6, 1960, Mr. Nixon remarked: "I can think of nothing which would be more detrimental to the cause of freedom and peace . . . than to recognise Red China and admit it to the United Nations at this time. . . . Now, will (this position) never change? The answer is: it will change, but only when the policies of the Communist Chinese Government change." (See, *The Congressional Quarterly*, March 11, 1960, p. 390.)

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Foster Dulles reiterated what has been long-standing policy when he said in an address in San Francisco on June 28, 1957:

Internationally, the Chinese Communist régime does not conform to the practices of civilised nations; does not live up to its international obligations; has not been peaceful in the past and gives no evidence of being peaceful in the future. Its foreign policies are hostile to us and our Asian allies. Under these circumstances, it would be folly for us to establish relations with the Chinese Communists which would enhance their ability to hurt us and our friends.<sup>25</sup>

On November 5, 1958, President Eisenhower acknowledged that international situations were constantly changing, but he could see no change in American policy on recognition "as long as Red China continues to do some of the things which we cannot possibly stomach," among which was the unwarranted imprisonment of American citizens in violation of solemn promises.<sup>26</sup>

There were no signs that the Chinese were any more willing to "conform to the practices of civilised nations" and abandon their aggressiveness. They suppressed the Tibetan revolt, seized territory along the Indian border, and continued to threaten to take Formosa by force if necessary. On October 7, 1959, Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon reaffirmed United States policies in the Far East, warned that the Communist seizure of Formosa and the offshore islands would invite the risk of "total" war, and declared that the Soviet Union as the leader of the Communist *bloc* must share responsibility for Peking's actions. After citing the list of hostile Chinese activities, particularly those of the past year, Mr. Dillon states, "these pronouncements forbid any optimism on the future of Peking's foreign policy."<sup>27</sup>

### *United States Senate*

Both Houses of Congress have supported the Administration policy of withholding recognition from Communist China, and since 1953 have taken the position, in the form of a provision in the State Department Appropriation Act, opposing Peking's admission to membership in the United Nations as the representative of China.<sup>28</sup> But a growing concern seems to be emerging in some Congressional quarters for a change from what has been described as a "completely negative" policy to one of

<sup>25</sup> Quoted in Martin Packman, *China Policy*, Editorial Research Reports (1957), p. 552.

<sup>26</sup> Quoted in Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1958* (New York: Harper for Council on Foreign Relations, 1959), p. 339.

<sup>27</sup> *The New York Times*, October 8, 1959, p. 10. For the most complete explanation of United States policy of non-recognition of Communist China, see *Department of State Bulletin*, September 8, 1958, pp. 385-390.

<sup>28</sup> For the most recent reference to this provision on China policy, see the Department of State Appropriation Act in *Public Law 86-678, Eighty-Sixth Congress*, August 31, 1960, p. 7, under "General Provisions—Department of State."

qualified rapprochement. Presumably, this means a policy of expanded contacts with the Peking Government, but short of recognition.<sup>29</sup>

Senate critics of Administration policy have in the past generally focused their attention on the economic and, to a lesser extent, the political, aspects of Sino-American relations. The British decision in 1957 to relax export controls on China trade provoked many Senators to call for a re-evaluation of American trade policy toward China.<sup>30</sup> Possibilities of agreement on arms limitations in the U.N. Disarmament Sub-Committee meetings during 1957 increased pressure in favour of admitting China to the U.N. Since then, this line of argument has been given greater weight by proponents of a change in policy.<sup>31</sup>

Interest in reconsidering United States policy toward China may have been quickened by the Quemoy crisis of September 1958. This crisis, which some observers asserted had created a dangerous war situation in the Formosa Straits, provoked much public and Congressional criticism, particularly from leading Democrats. Some Republican Members of Congress joined in the criticism, but by and large Republican legislators stood behind the Administration. This upsurge of criticism soon subsided, however, after the crisis itself was successfully weathered.<sup>32</sup>

There was little discussion on China policy in the Senate during the first session of the Eighty-Sixth Congress beginning January 1959. The most outspoken criticism of Administration policy came from Senator Clair Engle (D.—Calif.), a member of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee.<sup>33</sup> In a detailed, analytical speech the Senator joined Senator Magnuson in a plea for an appraisal of China policy, emphasising especially the need for an exploratory, flexible policy leading eventually to recognition. On June 8, Senator Robert Byrd (D.—W. Va.) followed up with a speech strongly supporting present policy,<sup>34</sup> but there was no "great debate" on China policy in the Senate. Democratic Senators present commended Mr. Engle; and the occasion stirred up no sharp criticism from the Republican members. The *New York Times* carried no report of the Engle speech.<sup>35</sup>

The only other discussion of China policy occurred after publication of one of several studies on foreign policy sponsored by the Senate

<sup>29</sup> *The Economist*, July 25, 1959, p. 221.

<sup>30</sup> Packman, *op. cit.*, p. 546.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 556.

<sup>32</sup> *The New York Times*, September 7, 1958, p. 19; September 14, 1958, p. E5; and October 5, 1958, p. 3.

<sup>33</sup> For the text of Senator Engle's speech, see, *Congressional Record*, May 21, 1959, pp. 7877-7885 (daily edition).

<sup>34</sup> *Congressional Record*, June 8, 1959, pp. 9145-9150 (daily edition).

<sup>35</sup> A radio-television debate on China policy between Senator Homer E. Capehart (R.—Ind.) and Representative Charles O. Porter (D.—Ore.) in August 1959 brought out very sharply contrasting views but caused no disturbances in the political atmosphere of the Congress. See, the *American Forum*, August 9, 1959.

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Committee on Foreign Relations. The report, prepared by Conlon Associates, Ltd., recommended a gradual revision of American policy that would eventually normalise Sino-American relations, bring Communist China into the U.N., recognise Nationalist Formosa as a new republic and prepare the groundwork for *de facto* recognition. In a press release announcing publication of the study, Senator William Fulbright (D.—Ark.), Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, agreed that recognition at the present time was not possible in view of Peking's "continued belligerence and offensive manners." He did not believe, however, that it was "wise" to continue ignoring over six hundred million people on the Chinese mainland "in the naïve belief that they will somehow go away."<sup>36</sup>

The question of recognition arose several times in the Senate during the Second Session of the Eighty-Sixth Congress, not as a subject for serious debate, but merely as a basis for policy explorations and critical commentary. Discussion of the China problem moved generally along bi-partisan lines. Those expressing views on the question supported current non-recognition policy but stated in differing ways the need for more "flexibility." A persistent theme was the need to include China in any arms control agreement that may be concluded. Senators Alexander Wiley (R.—Wis.) and George D. Aiken (R.—Vt.), leading Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee, stressed the need for a critical examination of our China policy. Senators Mike J. Mansfield (D.—Mont.) and Wayne Morse (D.—Ore.) of the same Committee and Senator Warren Magnuson, Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, expressed a similar view and urged expanding informal ties with Peking.<sup>37</sup>

As Chairman of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Senator Magnuson conducted a series of hearings early in May on trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Criticism of the Administration's trade policy toward China and Soviet Russia was the major focus of the hearings. But the underlying tone of comments by some of the Senators present implied disagreement with the general prevailing policy

<sup>36</sup> The *New York Times*, November 1, 1959, p. 27. Similarly, when asked to comment on the report, Senator Gale McGee (D.—Wyo.) asserted his opposition at this time, but believed that the United States should "reopen the whole question and see what changes we should make." "Times have changed," the Senator said, "and policies that were good for 1949 are not necessarily good for 1959." On the other hand, Senator Michael J. Mansfield (D.—Mont.), a leading foreign policy spokesman in the Senate for the Democrats, pointed out that the Korean War has never been formally ended and American prisoners were still being held in Chinese Communist prisons. See, the *Washington Star*, November 3, 1959, p. B3.

<sup>37</sup> See, *Congressional Record*, February 23, 1960, pp. 2910-2911; April 19, 1960, pp. 7557-7558; June 23, 1960, pp. 12873, 12874 and 12876; May 23, 1960, pp. 1000-1002; May 23, 1960, pp. 10034-10035; and June 2, 1960, pp. 10793-10794 (daily edition). See also, addresses by Senator Joseph S. Clark, Jr. (D.—Pa.), before American Academy of Political Science, Philadelphia, April 8, 1960.

toward the Peking régime. Senators Magnuson, Engle, and Strom Thurmond (D.—S.C.) critically examined Administration witnesses. On the other hand, Senator John O. Pastore (R.—R.I.) stated categorically that the “consensus of opinion” in the Senate was “unanimous” in opposing Communist China’s admission to the United Nations, adding that “we are a long way from recognition.” According to the Senator, “at any time you may ask a Member of Congress how he feels about this, you get varied answers but in substance everybody is against it and that is understandable.” In a further clarification of his position, the Rhode Island Senator observed,

... I tell you very frankly I see very little here that the State Department will do without some kind of sanction from Congress, and that is not forthcoming—I think we can agree on that—at least I can state it as my opinion as of this moment, that I don’t think there is going to be any move on the part of Congress to sanction the recognition of Red China for some time to come unless there are certain other developments in co-operation on the part of Red China.<sup>38</sup>

Another forthright statement against any change in policy, even a moderate one, came from Senator Norris Cotton (R.—N.H.). In a speech from the Senate floor on August 25, 1960 entitled, “No Softening of our Policy Toward Red China,” Senator Cotton called attention to the “chorus of voices” demanding a change in policy, sharply criticised any move to alter current policy, and made an earnest plea for steadfastness. Senators Barry Goldwater (R.—Ariz.), Kenneth Keating (R.—N.Y.), and John Sherman Cooper (R.—Ky.) injected words of support against policy revisions.<sup>39</sup>

#### *United States House of Representatives*

Nor was there any extraordinary discussion in the House on the China issue during the Eighty-Sixth Congress. An appeal for a gradual revision of policy came from Representatives Charles O. Porter (D.—Ore.) and Leonard G. Wolf (D.—Iowa) but was countered in critical speeches from both Republican and Democratic members.<sup>40</sup> In an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, Chester Bowles (D.—Conn.) urged that the United States get off “dead centre” and establish an “imaginative” China policy based on the “reality” of two Chinas. Referring specifically to mainland China, Mr. Bowles recommended that the United States strive to establish

<sup>38</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, *Hearings on Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc*. Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 27.

<sup>39</sup> The *Congressional Record*, August 25, 1960, pp. 16417–16421 (daily edition). As in the case of the Engle speech a year before, the Cotton speech went unmentioned in the *New York Times*.

<sup>40</sup> See, *Congressional Record*, June 4, 1959, pp. 8948–8956; June 9, 1960, pp. 11435–11436; June 28, 1960, pp. A5564–A5565; June 3, 1960, p. 10973; and June 16, 1960, pp. 11887–11888 (daily edition).

"people-to-people contacts" with the mainland Chinese. A "useful" first step would be to offer a "fresh approach" to the exchange of newsmen. Educators, politicians, and businessmen should also be exchanged. Mr. Bowles also urged a programme of expanded trade to offset China's thrust to South-East Asia for material and land resources.<sup>41</sup>

The most complete expression of views by the House on China policy, except for the usual provision in the State Department Appropriation Act on opposing Peking's admission to the U.N., occurred with consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 369 on August 16, 1959. Passed by a vote of 368 to 2, this resolution specifically called for barring Communist China from admission to the U.N.<sup>42</sup> The report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, approved by a vote of 22 to 1, stated that since 1948 the House on 15 occasions condemned the admission of Communist China to the U.N. and its specialised agencies. Four reports made to the House by Foreign Affairs sub-committees contained similar expressions. Until the Peking régime refrained from the threat of or the use of force in international disputes, the report declared, it must be regarded as unwilling to uphold U.N. principles and thus was ineligible for admission.<sup>43</sup>

To sum up, therefore, the prevailing consensus in Congress is opposed to recognition of the Peking régime and admitting it to the U.N. With few exceptions members of the House seem to adhere firmly to this position. On the other hand, members of the Senate appear to tolerate, at most, discussion of current China policy but only in terms of very moderate revisions and those only to take effect well in the future.

### *Public Opinion*

Frequently in the past George Gallup, Director of the American Institute of Public Affairs, conducted numerous polls to determine public attitudes on recognition of China and seating the Communist Government in the U.N.<sup>44</sup> Similarly, many Members of Congress have in recent years polled their constituents on the question of China policy. Congressional

<sup>41</sup> Chester Bowles, "The 'China Problem' Reconsidered," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960, pp. 476-486.

<sup>42</sup> *Congressional Record*, August 17, 1959, pp. 14727-14736 (daily edition), and the *New York Times*, August 18, 1959, p. 3.

<sup>43</sup> U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Expressing the Sense of Congress Against Seating of the Communist Régime in China as Representative of China in the United Nations*, Report No. 825, First Session, Eighty-Sixth Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959). Representatives William Meyer (D.-Vt.) and Thomas L. Ashley (D.-Ohio) voted against the resolution.

<sup>44</sup> The question of admission to the U.N. has obvious relevance to this analysis as an indicator of general attitudes among Americans toward China and as an indicator, too, of possible hints of a shift in public opinion for revision of policy. Admission of China to the U.N. with United States approval would undoubtedly be regarded as a *démarche* of the first importance, possibly even a prelude to formal recognition.

polls are particularly important in that they represent a more intense sampling of opinion than the Gallup polls. Proportionately, Congressional surveys probably represent a polling of more people in ratio to the population of the district than Gallup polls do nationally. Given the limitations of all polls, it is possible to make three broad generalisations on the basis of an examination of Gallup polls for the past ten years, Congressional polls for the years 1958-60, and other published polls: (1) Americans oppose recognition and admission of Communist China to the U.N.; (2) they would welcome some contacts with the Peking régime; and (3) in a crisis situation, as for example, during the Quemoy crisis, they prefer a settlement through the U.N.

There seems to be no doubt that the general mood of the American people is opposed to recognition and seating Communist China in the U.N. For example, a Gallup poll taken in November 1958 indicated that only 20 per cent. believed the Chinese should be admitted to the U.N.: 63 per cent. opposed; and 17 per cent. had no opinion.<sup>45</sup> Congressional polls, even recent ones, indicate a similar pattern. For example, a poll taken in early 1960 on the same subject-matter in the fifth Congressional District of Minnesota (population: 337,552 in 1950) indicated that 22 per cent. favoured admission of China to the U.N. "under present circumstances," 67 per cent. opposed, and 11 per cent. had no opinion.<sup>46</sup>

Further analysis also indicates that sections of the American people would welcome some contacts with the Peking régime. On the question of whether American newsmen should be permitted to go to China, one national poll (57 per cent.) and another taken in a section of New York (68 per cent.) indicated a clear willingness for some contacts. A minority also favours some trade relations.<sup>47</sup>

It is also possible to draw the broad generalisation that under crisis conditions, as for example during the Quemoy crisis of 1958, opinion seemed to favour letting the U.N. bear the burden of solving serious problems that arise in Sino-American relations. An overwhelming percentage (91 per cent.) of those polled by Mr. Gallup throughout the nation favoured turning the matter over to the U.N. More than a majority (61 per cent.) polled at that time were also willing to accept the neutralisation of Formosa and place it under the protection of the U.N. It is arguable that this is the first step toward accepting the "two Chinas" principle.<sup>48</sup> A significant corollary to this attitude is the belief among 63 per cent. of those polled by the Carnegie Endowment for International

<sup>45</sup> *World Gallup Poll News Service*, November 19, 1958.

<sup>46</sup> *Congressional Record*, June 25, 1960, p. 13330 (daily edition).

<sup>47</sup> *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, June 30, 1957, p. B12, and *Congressional Record*, May 14, 1959, pp. A4087-A4088 (daily edition).

<sup>48</sup> *Public Opinion News Service*, September 26, 1958.

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Peace that, while China should not be recognised, the United States should still not leave the U.N. in the event of Chinese admission.<sup>49</sup>

An analysis of opinion among individuals, groups, organisations, and the Press reveals the same general disposition against recognition of China and admission to the U.N. By and large, groups particularly interested in foreign affairs have been cautious in their approach to the China problem, although there seems little doubt that many favour a continuous reappraisal of policy. In July 1959, the London *Economist* observed: "Any typical audience of the World Affairs Council, whether in New York, St. Louis, or San Francisco, will contain substantial numbers of people, probably a majority, who want at least exploratory efforts to be made to end the Chinese impasse."<sup>50</sup> The American Assembly, a group of leading Americans from all walks of life interested in foreign policy matters, expressed these general sentiments at its conference on China in late 1956.<sup>51</sup> Similarly, the Rockefeller Brothers' report of 1959 urged a candid approach to our policy toward the Peking régime.<sup>52</sup>

Samplings here and there in the Press reveal some contrasting views on revising China policy. Walter Lippmann has urged adoption of a "two-China policy" as the "rational" solution to the American dilemma.<sup>53</sup> This approach implies political acceptance of the Peking régime. The *Washington Post* has suggested a similar solution in terms of establishing an independent Formosa.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand, the *New York Times* has strongly supported an Administration declaration reaffirming its China policy. "Our policy is not 'inflexible' or forever," the *Times* argued editorially, "but it will be changed only if the Peking régime makes a change possible by abandoning policies which threaten world peace and our own security."<sup>55</sup> The *Washington Star* acknowledged the dilemma of America's China policy. Recognition, it said editorially, would "powerfully assist" the Communists in tightening their hold over 600,000,000 Chinese but Communist control over the country is undeniable. The *Star* questioned whether it was in the nation's best interest to withhold recognition and whether it would be possible to do so for long.<sup>56</sup>

The *Christian Science Monitor* has urged closer relations with the Peking régime. Commenting editorially, the *Monitor* asserted the first "small move" was that long recommended by the *Monitor*, "by

<sup>49</sup> The *Christian Science Monitor*, November 21, 1958, p. 1.

<sup>50</sup> The *Economist*, July 25, 1959, p. 222.

<sup>51</sup> American Assembly, *The United States and the Far East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 225-227.

<sup>52</sup> The *New York Times*, December 8, 1959, p. 24.

<sup>53</sup> The *Washington Post and Times Herald*, May 30, 1957, p. A17, and June 6, 1957, p. A19.

<sup>54</sup> The *Washington Post and Times Herald*, October 10, 1958, p. A14.

<sup>55</sup> The *New York Times*, August 11, 1958, p. 20.

<sup>56</sup> The *Evening Star* (Washington), November 24, 1958, p. A12.

many others, and by the Rockefeller group," of getting more direct information through American reporters in China and by means of more contacts on the special ambassadorial level. According to the *Monitor*, this "might be the first step toward solving the puzzling problem of how to deal with a belligerent new muscle-flexer."<sup>57</sup> The *San Francisco Chronicle*, the *Milwaukee Journal*, and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* were among the many Western and mid-Western newspapers commenting favourably on Senator Engle's speech advocating a moderate revision of China policy.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, former Senator Knowland's *Oakland Tribune* attacked Mr. Engle's "dubious circumlocutions" in its leading columns.<sup>59</sup> In contrast, the *Journal Times* of Racine, Wisconsin, gave editorial support to Senator Wiley's proposal for flexibility in regard to China policy.<sup>60</sup> And recently the editor of the influential *Honolulu Advertiser*, George Chaplin, made a similar plea for flexibility in a series of lead editorials.<sup>61</sup>

Attitudes toward China policy in the Press and periodical literature have probably been determined largely by the general political orientation of the publication. The *Saturday Evening Post*, for example, strongly opposed recognition.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, the *Progressive* has urged recognition.<sup>63</sup>

Particularly important are the attitudes of leading religious organisations, some of whom have been the most vocal among private groups on China policy. The Protestant Church has been sharply divided on this question. A serious controversy erupted in 1958 when the Fifth World Order Study Conference of the National Council of Churches urged recognition of China and admission to the U.N. Not until late in 1959 did this controversy subside after the Council resolved to "further study" the matter.<sup>64</sup>

The Catholic Church has consistently opposed revision of our China policy. Although the Hierarchy has never taken a formal position, Church organisations, the Catholic Press, and leading clergymen have sharply criticised any movement toward policy revisions. Similarly, Jewish organisations, religious and secular, have not taken a formal position in this matter mainly because the issue does not bear directly on specific Jewish interests. Leaders of the Jewish religious community have, however, voiced critical opinions of prevailing policy.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>57</sup> The *Christian Science Monitor*, December 9, 1959.

<sup>58</sup> *Congressional Record*, July 30, 1959, pp. A6597 et seq., and June 30, 1959, pp. 11087-11088 (daily edition).

<sup>59</sup> The *Economist*, July 25, 1959, p. 221.

<sup>60</sup> *Congressional Record*, February 23, 1960, pp. 2910-2911 (daily edition).

<sup>61</sup> *Congressional Record*, May 26, 1960, pp. 4527-4529 (daily edition).

<sup>62</sup> The *Saturday Evening Post*, November 14, 1959, p. 10.

<sup>63</sup> The *Progressive*, November 1958, p. 2.

<sup>64</sup> *Report of the Department of International Affairs*, N.C.C., September 30, 1959, p. 9.

<sup>65</sup> These judgments are based upon surveys of literature, correspondence with leading groups, and direct inquiries with organisation headquarters.

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The Chamber of Commerce of the United States supports American policy towards China under existing conditions. The A.F.L.-C.I.O. also opposes recognition. The American Farm Bureau Federation has never taken a formal position on the China question, but according to its Washington headquarters, the general sentiment within the organisation is opposed to recognition. Leading veterans' organisations such as the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Catholic War Veterans, and Jewish War Veterans also oppose recognition.<sup>66</sup>

To sum up, there seems to be little doubt that the mood of the nation, as reflected in recent public opinion surveys conducted on a national scale and on a selective basis by Members of Congress is one of opposition to recognising China and admitting its government to the U.N. The same attitude prevails among leading groups in prominent secular and religious organisations, except for some leaders within the Protestant Church. Some leading publications and organisations also support the prevailing national consensus. However, there seems to be a substantial minority that advocates a revision of policy. Published polls which register this minority dissent do not project the limits of revision. Some critics, particularly in the Press and among groups interested in foreign policy have, however, suggested a moderate approach along lines developed by Senator Engle.

### *Economic Factors*

The political aspects of recognition inevitably have a close correlation with the economic. The lure of trade with China has been an important factor in the mounting pressure for a revision of policy particularly by economic interests along the West Coast and in the South. In the past United States trade with China had been substantial. Exports in 1947, before the Communist conquest, amounted to \$353,600,000 and in 1948 to \$273,400,000.<sup>67</sup> Conquest by the Communists brought on a total embargo. Trade potential with Peking is not great since the bulk of Chinese trade is directed towards the Communist bloc. However, one analyst has estimated that trade with China, if resumed, would amount to \$200 to \$300 million in the first years and would subsequently increase.<sup>68</sup> But, of total imports between 1950 and 1958 the Communist states supplied 96.6 per cent. of petroleum, 99.5 per cent. of locomotives and 92.1 per cent. of trucks. There has been, however, a market for chemicals, pharmaceuticals, ferrous metals and steel products, vehicles, farm implements, machine tools and power generators, fertilisers, raw wool, copper, scientific instruments, microscopes and photographic apparatus.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> *The New York Times*, June 9, 1957, p. E3.

<sup>68</sup> *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 17, 1959, p. 15.

<sup>69</sup> *The New York Times*, December 13, 1959, p. 23.

However small the China trade potential may be in proportion to total American trade, businessmen are not generally disposed to reject a chance to break into a new market, particularly when competitors have already moved in. In the short run, according to one observer, China trade would provide no more than a useful supplement to the thriving trade of the West Coast. But the main concern of American businessmen has been the growing trade of Western Europe in China which induces the fear that the Chinese market will be pre-empted by the time they get there.<sup>70</sup> In May 1957, Great Britain, a member of the fifteen-nation China Committee for establishing mutual policy on China trade, announced its decision to relax trade restrictions.<sup>71</sup> This action, along with growing West European trade with Communist China spurred on by a suspension of Sino-Japanese trade, stirred some interest in American business circles. In 1958, West German exports to China increased from \$48 million in 1957 to \$162 million; British from \$34 million to \$76 million; Italian from \$15 to \$33 million; and French from \$21 to \$44 million.<sup>72</sup>

Businessmen and labour organisations on the West Coast have taken the initiative in urging a review of trade policy. Shipping interests have complained vocally of the trade embargo. George E. Talmadge, Jr., Vice-President of the Pacific Transport Line-States Line and President of the San Francisco Area World Trade Association, seriously questioned the effectiveness of the embargo.<sup>73</sup> The *Pacific Shipper*, a trade publication, has campaigned for several years on scrapping the trade embargo. A source of great complaint has been the active trans-shipment trade actually carried on so that American goods, as Representative Thomas Pelley (R.—Wash.) said, "are and have been continuously going to Red China over an extended period, including strategic materials in substantial quantities."<sup>74</sup> The San Francisco Chamber of Commerce has never passed a resolution on China policy but through its World Trade Department the Chamber has taken an active part in calling attention in Washington to the need for exploring the possibilities of trade and of opening channels of information to Mainland China.<sup>75</sup> San Francisco foreign traders numbering 730 have called for a termination of the embargo.<sup>76</sup> Speaking in San Francisco in June 1957, Henry Ford called for a re-examination of America's policy toward Peking.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>70</sup> *The Economist*, July 25, 1959, pp. 221-222.

<sup>71</sup> *The New York Times*, May 31, 1957, p. 1.

<sup>72</sup> *Journal of Commerce*, June 22, 1959, p. 21.

<sup>73</sup> Ralph Friedman, "The United States and China Trade," *Eastern World*, November 1958, p. 39.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>75</sup> *The Economist*, July 25, 1959, p. 221.

<sup>76</sup> Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>77</sup> *The Economist*, July 15, 1957, p. 977.

Businessmen in Oregon have also urged the embargo's revision. Ivan Block, a prominent industrial consultant from Portland, observed that the consequences of reopening trade with Peking and tapping the great economic potential there would "stagger the imagination."<sup>78</sup> The Chairman of the board of Portland's First National Bank has criticised prevailing policy. Mr. Herman Sites, President of Sites Silverwheel Freight-Lines, also of Portland, added his criticisms to others of the embargo.<sup>79</sup> Labour unions have also urged a policy revision. The International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union has been the "loudest voice" demanding trade resumption.<sup>80</sup> The Lumber and Sawmill Workers' Union and the International Woodworkers of America have added their critical voices.<sup>81</sup>

Southern economic interests have also criticised the existing embargo. Mr. Edward W. Cook, President of Cook and Co., one of the largest cotton firms, speaking to a meeting of the cotton buyers' division of the Cotton Manufacturers' Association of Georgia, sharply criticised the embargo and called for an "agonising reappraisal" of "our China policy including the trade embargo." Current policy, instead of crippling China, was, according to Mr. Cook, helping it build up domestic industries to compete with American markets.<sup>82</sup>

Public opinion polls in the West seem to support the criticisms of many businessmen. In 1958, the *Portland Oregonian* and the *San Francisco Chronicle* conducted a poll. Only 2 per cent. of those replying to the *Chronicle* favoured retaining the embargo. A main point in the criticisms was the belief in the embargo's ineffectiveness.<sup>83</sup> A poll conducted in Oregon in 1958 revealed a substantial percentage, but not a majority, of those polled favouring relaxation of restrictions.<sup>84</sup> A similar poll taken a year later indicated that only 19 per cent. of the participants favoured retaining the total embargo.<sup>85</sup>

Similar demands for revision of trade policy have been made in Congress. Immediately after the British declaration in 1957 to lower its trade restrictions several Senators from the West and South voiced their disapproval of restrictions on the China market.<sup>86</sup> Demands for revision continued into the first session of the Eighty-Sixth Congress. Senator Engle declared that trade with China should be put on the same

<sup>78</sup> Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

<sup>79</sup> *Congressional Record*, June 4, 1959, p. 8753 (daily edition).

<sup>80</sup> *The Economist*, July 25, 1959, p. 221.

<sup>81</sup> Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>83</sup> *The Economist*, July 25, 1959, p. 221.

<sup>84</sup> *Congressional Record*, May 21, 1958, p. 8191 (daily edition).

<sup>85</sup> *Congressional Record*, May 26, 1959, p. 8171 (daily edition).

<sup>86</sup> *Business Week*, June 8, 1957, p. 118; the *Evening Star* (Washington), June 17, 1957, p. A5; the *Denver Post*, May 23, 1957, p. 4.

basis as that with Soviet Russia.<sup>87</sup> Significantly, all five Members of Congress from Oregon have supported the movement for revising trade restrictions.<sup>88</sup>

In May 1960, the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee considered the problem of trade with the Sino-Soviet *bloc* in a series of public hearings. Interrogation and discussion ranged from an examination of the problem of trans-shipment to the benefits accruable by having trained, efficient, and politically responsible businessmen in China.<sup>89</sup>

The lure of trade with China, as the first phase in expanding political relations, has thus played some part in shaping the attitudes of the American people toward recognition of the Peking régime. Appeals for a reappraisal of trade policy have come largely from the West Coast and the South where the economic interests of those areas, particularly of the West, are tied in closely with the Far East. Apparently, other areas of the nation have not felt the pressing economic need for expanded trade with Mainland China to the same degree.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

##### *Generalisations on the International Level*

Power considerations play a dominant role in the politics of recognition. This is the most compelling conclusion that emerges from this comparative analysis of America's recognition policy toward Soviet Russia and Communist China. In 1933, the distribution of world power and the forces of political change in world affairs led Moscow to want recognition and to conduct itself diplomatically in ways calculated to make it more acceptable to Washington. Similarly, the distribution of world power and forces of change gave Washington an incentive towards granting recognition. The situation is different today. The distribution of power has radically changed since 1933. So have the forces for change. The Communist *bloc* is now vast in size and enormously powerful. In the present era of bipolarity and global confrontation in which Communist power renders irrelevant the long-standing Soviet fear of what they called "capitalist encirclement," drastic changes in power alignments are far less likely to occur than in the 1930s. Tensions exist and will no doubt continue to exist in Sino-Soviet relations but emerging strains within the Communist *bloc* are not likely to disrupt *bloc* solidarity and bring on any radical shift in power relationships. An

<sup>87</sup> The *Washington Post and Times Herald*, May 22, 1959, p. A6.

<sup>88</sup> The *Economist*, July 25, 1959, p. 221. For a survey of views on China policy of six members of the Oregon Congressional delegation, see *Congressional Record*, June 1, 1959, pp. 8458-8459 (daily edition).

<sup>89</sup> Hearings of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on "Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc."

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emerging "third force" in the shape of a neutralist *bloc* suggests the only real possibility for change but even this need not necessarily work to America's advantage.

There must also be specific political incentives on both sides as a pre-condition to recognition. In 1933, both the United States and Soviet Russia had vital interests to preserve. Recognition seemed to be a natural step in achieving that end. No such cohesion of interests exists today between the United States and Peking. Indeed, it may be argued that for purposes of domestic solidarity and the compulsion to assert its authority in the Communist "camp" China would not want recognition. Improvement of relations with the United States would also relieve the Chinese of what is now essentially a contrived "external threat" which at this juncture seems to be the last thing they want to lose. Ideological incompatibility seems, indeed, to be far too great a barrier for the Chinese to overcome, especially given their present mood of ultramontane Leninism.

Recognition, as Americans interpret it, presupposes a mode of conduct generally acceptable to international society. For a moralistically-inclined people like the Americans this is an important factor. In the early 1930s Soviet Russia was entering the era of the "united front" when sharp revolutionary tactics were replaced by a more moderate tactical approach to world politics. At that time, the Russians sought to give the appearance of civility and of being a "trustworthy" participant in world affairs. In sharp contrast, the Chinese have created the reverse impression. Periodic military actions in the Formosan Straits, the suppression of the Tibetan revolt, seizure of large areas along the Indian border, and now the doctrinal dispute with Moscow in which China has been denying the validity of "peaceful coexistence" and asserting the contrary doctrine of the inevitability of war, have only confirmed the objections of many that China is not yet ready to assume a responsible role in international society. In general, Communist China has not been accepted in international society to the extent that Soviet Russia was in 1933.

Recognition also requires a certain psychological compatibility where prevailing attitudes of the mind are not disturbed by serious emotional differences. Complicating Sino-American relations has been the lasting emotional legacy of the Korean War. No such factor disturbed Soviet-American relations. Except for small military units in Northern Russia and Siberia, no American troops suffered directly from the Bolsheviks. But Americans have not yet forgotten the 144,000 casualties and 25,000 deaths suffered as a consequence of Communist aggression in Korea. This reality has introduced a highly emotional element into Sino-American relations and its impact cannot be underestimated. Also,

Chinese insistence upon holding Americans in prisons without just cause is looked upon by many Americans as another demonstration of their "inhumanity," and similarly, adds another highly charged emotional element in existing tense political relations. Repudiation by China of the whole Protestant and Catholic missionary enterprise in China constitutes still another source of emotional agitation. Senator Cotton probably spoke for many Americans when he recently observed on the Senate floor that the American people and their leaders "have not forgotten the shallow graves in Korea," the casualties, the prisoners "languishing in Chinese prisons," nor have they forgotten the "flaunting, abuse, and brutality of the Red régime."<sup>90</sup>

An era of general conditioning through informal ties would seem to be another prerequisite for recognition, an era which for Americans would permit a testing of Chinese attitudes. This would permit an adjustment of views and attitudes informally and establish the mood for more direct and fuller commitments on the official level. A tradition of unofficial relations with Soviet Russia in 1933 had existed for over a decade before diplomatic relations were finally established. Trade was extensive, and the Russians had an agency in the United States to negotiate with American businessmen for trade and technical assistance. The United States had even extended aid to the famine-stricken Russians in the early 1920s amounting to over \$60,000,000. American businessmen, technicians, journalists and others visited Russia, and in turn Russians visited America. Nothing of this sort exists with China today. The aggressive conduct of the Peking régime has prevented the development of any such informal relationship as existed with Soviet Russia. As a consequence no trade is carried on; nor is there any friendly exchange of visitors. In fact, the only existing unofficial tie is the quasi-diplomatic apparatus of ambassadorial meetings first in Geneva and now in Warsaw.

Finally, recognition requires a certain compatibility of wills. United States recognition of Soviet Russia was a positive act of will by both parties: Moscow and Washington wanted to establish diplomatic relations. This is not true of Peking and Washington today.

#### *Generalisations on the Domestic Level*

On the domestic level, an essential element in the politics of recognition, especially in a democracy, is an existing public consensus that would support such action. In 1933, the President and his advisers in the State Department wanted recognition to satisfy what they believed to be vital national interests. Small pockets of resistance existed in Congress, but the general consensus of that body overwhelmingly supported the President's action. Similarly, public opinion was in a receptive

<sup>90</sup> The *Congressional Record*, August 25, 1960, p. 16420 (daily edition).

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mood for such a major shift in policy. Notably the issue had no overriding importance in the Presidential campaign of 1932. Domestic factors all considered, no serious obstacles obstructed the road toward recognition.

Today the public mood contrasts sharply with that of 1933. Formidable domestic barriers impede recognition of the Peking régime. The loss of China may no longer be the powerful political issue it was a decade ago, but the political climate, though apparently calm, perhaps even apathetic, is hardly ready for accepting the idea of recognition. The Executive Branch continues to oppose any revisions of policy. Recognition can never come about unless it exercises its constitutional prerogatives. Congress also opposes recognition, and public opinion appears to support this view. Voices of dissent have been raised, but by and large their proposals for revision have been very moderate.

Domestic politics are not, however, the sole determinant of the public consensus on recognition. Economic factors can profoundly affect the public mood and the thinking of the Government. To Americans of 1933 the main focus of national attention was the great economic depression. They looked upon expanded trade with Soviet Russia as a panacea for declining inventories and rising unemployment. This attitude, rooted in economic causes, was translated into political action. Economic factors do not, however, seriously enter into the present problem of recognising Communist China. In contrast to 1933, the nation is now enjoying unprecedented prosperity. The only pressure for expanded trade with China has come from economic interests in the West and, apparently to a lesser extent, in the South.

### *Prospects for Future Revisions of Policy*

What then is the likelihood that either China or the United States will change their policies? Judging from the material presented in this analysis it does not seem likely that normal diplomatic relations will be established between the United States and Peking for some time to come. Prospects for a far-reaching shift in power alignments at the international level—a factor contributing to the Soviet-American rapprochement—seem unlikely. Changes in the alignments of world states in the foreseeable future, if any at all, are far more likely to occur in the uncommitted areas of Asia and Africa. At this juncture of world affairs Peking does not seriously seek a rapprochement. Indeed it seems determined to continue, at least, for the present, to exacerbate tensions not only in relations with the United States but also throughout Asia. And American policymakers, responding to overt acts of Chinese hostility and bound by defensive political arrangements in the Far East, seem little disposed towards any drastic revision of policy. So long as Peking

pursues a hostile and aggressive policy in world affairs American attitudes on recognition are not likely to change.

Changes in American policy, if they occur, will probably come about only very gradually. They would seem to be contingent largely upon the general world situation, and, most of all, upon the willingness of the Peking régime to seek an acceptable rapprochement. Perhaps the only real prospects for closer relations—but not necessarily more friendly relations—lie in the area of arms control, but that issue, as the American specialist in Chinese affairs, Doak Barnett, observed in his recent study on Sino-American relations, is a problem for the future rather than the immediate present in Asia.<sup>91</sup> The United States and its Western Allies have already acknowledged that any workable comprehensive disarmament plan must include Communist China. In the event that the conclusion of an agreement with Soviet Russia seems likely, concurrence of the Peking régime would surely be sought. This conjecture assumes, however, that arms control on a universal scale is an attainable goal and that Moscow has sufficient influence over Peking to induce it to accept an agreement. There is also the question of whether or not the Chinese at this point in their development would really want disarmament. Peking's leaders have been demonstrably insensitive to the consequences of a thermo-nuclear war. Then, too, there is always the possibility that when the Chinese develop their own nuclear capability, they would translate this asset into political power by demanding admission to the "nuclear club" and thus gain a larger voice in international affairs. At any rate, the arms control question does offer one avenue, however, remote, that could bring China and the United States into closer relations.

Another road of access is through the U.N. There is a real possibility that the United States may one day find itself outvoted on the question of admitting Communist China to membership. Faced with this specific problem, the United States may be compelled to deal with the larger problem of expanding political relations with the Peking Government, not so much as a matter of preference but as a practical necessity. But such an eventuality does not necessarily mean that friendlier relations or even recognition will result. New states continue to gain admission to the U.N. Possibly eighteen new African states are soon to be among the membership. What effect they will have upon this question is problematical. In the past four years, however, the pattern of voting in the U.N. has been changing, and Mr. Barnett concludes that the vote "will eventually" go against the United States. It may be deferred for

<sup>91</sup> A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy* (New York: Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1960), p. 146.

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several years, he observed, or it may happen suddenly.<sup>82</sup> But even this possibility is contingent upon whether or not the majority of member states believes that their individual interests and that of the world community would be best served by Peking's admission.

In large measure, therefore, China's future relations with the United States would seem at this point to depend not so much upon United States policy which now, by and large, seems to be disposed toward an adjustment along lines of a *status quo* in the Far East, but more specifically upon the will of Peking's leadership to initiate an era of easing tensions and eventually of accommodation.

<sup>82</sup> Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 451-452. On October 8, 1960, the General Assembly barred the Communist Chinese from membership for at least another year. The Assembly voted to adopt the Steering Committee's recommendations to take no action on China's membership by a vote of 42 to 34 with 22 abstentions. The vote in 1959 was 44 to 29 with 9 abstentions. See, the *New York Times*, October 9, 1960, p. 1.

## **The Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism\***

By A. M. HALPERN

This paper attempts to develop some hypotheses concerning Communist China's political strategy toward the Asian area, with particular reference to the function in this strategy of neutralism. I have chosen November 1957 as the initial date for the period to be examined in the belief that a major shift in the overall Chinese line on both domestic and international problems took place at or about this time. At the root of this shift was the Chinese conviction that a decisive shift in the world balance of power, symbolised by Sputnik I, had occurred. I take this Chinese estimate to be genuine and to provide the essential standpoint from which all problems of foreign political strategy have been evaluated by the Chinese for the past three years.

The focus of this paper, then, will be on the variations in the Chinese line on neutralism seen as one component of the general problem of how to use a position of strength. To anticipate the conclusions, it seems to me that the Chinese have not discovered to their own satisfaction the appropriate solution either to the total problem or to the particular component of the total problem under special examination here. This failure can be attributed in part to lack of unanimity in the Communist *bloc*, but more importantly to the failure of the Chinese themselves to understand clearly the nature of the world with which they have been dealing; or, to put it somewhat differently, to the failure of events to conform to China's expectations.

A good deal of this paper will concern itself with Chinese communications. I am inclined to feel that the Chinese have over the past three years rather clearly revealed their real calculations in their published statements and that an analysis of their political strategy which takes their public statements at something very close to face value is not too far off the mark. This has not been the case in all previous periods of the present régime's existence, and the proposition that it has been characteristically so during the present period helps to formulate some rather interesting questions. Some of this frankness may be the result of severe conflicts of judgment within the *bloc*. But why did these have to be argued out before the eyes of the world? Some may reflect a

\* This article was presented as a paper to the Third International Sociological Conference in Japan last September. The postscript was added in January this year.

generally over-sanguine faith in future victory. And there remain some instances in which the Chinese refrained from making their intentions explicit.

In a certain sense I would even be willing to say that during this period Chinese statements have been a more reliable guide to their underlying calculations than the record of their behaviour in international affairs has been. An analysis based on their behaviour alone yields a picture of inconsistency and of severe and sudden fluctuations. There is a tendency to account for these often in terms of the immediate tactical requirements of the situations that the Chinese have had to deal with. This procedure risks overlooking the connectedness of concurrent actions in different areas. Analysis of Chinese statements is capable of bringing out their underlying intentions, their estimate of the situation (for example, what problems they have recognised as being inherent in given situations and in what form), their ideologically predetermined tendencies, and perhaps also something of the emotional factors which seem to have entered importantly into the making of decisions in the foreign policy field. I should add further that while the record of behaviour trends provides affirmative evidence concerning the most dramatic or climactic events, it yields only negative evidence for fairly long periods concerning Chinese strategy toward countries of the Asian area with whom relations have been more or less inactive. The communications record provides evidence throughout the period concerning the development of a total design involving the futures of the countries of the area as a whole.

Without going into detail, I should like to stipulate that approximately coincident with the major shift in foreign policy perspectives in late 1957 there occurred, as one result of the rectification campaigns of 1957, a power shift within the Chinese leadership. This shift brought into key decision-making positions a group of men devoted to a radical policy. For convenience' sake, and in order to differentiate them from certain radical members of the Chinese élite in earlier periods, I shall refer to this group as the "native radicals." This group has shown itself to be devoted to the belief that great leaps in development are possible, that virtually inexhaustible energies can be created by mobilisation of the masses, and that strict control of all developments by the vanguard party is the key to success. While the more conservative and less doctrinaire wing of the party leadership continues to have some effect on policy, the major impulse seems to come from the native radicals, who have continued to consolidate their position even until recently and perhaps not yet to their own satisfaction.

The implementation of a domestic radical line has been carried out avowedly as a consistent continuation of policies originally laid down many years ago. I think it likely that the differences between a radical

and a conservative domestic policy have been more nearly self-evident in the views of the Chinese leadership than the differences between a radical and a conservative foreign policy. There are a number of indications that a radical line in foreign affairs is to some extent a projection of the radical line on domestic affairs, a projection which in some cases has predisposed the Chinese to a partial, rather distorted, view of the realities. In this sense I subscribe to the view that domestic political developments have exercised a powerful influence on the formulation of Chinese foreign policy. But I see little or no real support for the view that the Chinese leadership has created or inflamed crises in external affairs solely or largely for the purpose of affecting domestic morale.

To return to the problem, I will argue here that in late 1957 the Chinese leadership committed itself to the thesis of a decisive shift in the balance of power and to a strategy based on this thesis; that between November 1957 and approximately May 1958 the implications of this view were worked out in terms of a fairly well-defined strategy and tactics; that over the next year and a half the strategy and tactics were put into practice, but periodically revised for certain pragmatic reasons; that about October 1959 the whole strategy was subjected to reconsideration; and that a somewhat changed strategy and tactics was developed during October and November, 1959. At two points, then—in November 1957 to May 1958 and October to November 1959—I postulate not just changes of trend or accommodations to the flow of events, but the occurrence of full-dress policy reviews, involving conscious recognition of the strategic nature of the problems at issue and involving the whole apparatus of decision-making—position papers, group discussions and debates, and the issuance of directives to the appropriate sections of the administrative structure.

#### *Peking's Outlook in Late 1957*

The basic view of the world situation adopted in late 1957 is largely embodied in the Moscow Declaration of November 1957, and in the later Chinese interpretation thereof. One of the key elements was clearly an estimate that Soviet developments in military technology constituted a real break-through. Of almost equal importance was the estimate that the *bloc* economy was capable of outstripping the West. These two points, leading to the conclusion of permanent *bloc* superiority, have been made repeatedly by the Chinese. In the economic competition, the Chinese initially believed their cause favoured not only by an absolute advantage in rate of growth, but by regressive trends in the capitalist economies. During at least the first half of 1958, Chinese spokesmen seem to have genuinely believed that the economic recession in the U.S. was the beginning of a continuous trend, which would deepen into a

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depression that would also affect the economies of the allies of the United States. By the end of 1958, this forecast seems to have been abandoned, but belief in the ultimate economic victory of the *bloc* was not. The quality of this belief, however, seems to have become somewhat less rational and somewhat more messianic in the face of failure to achieve goals of domestic production and international trade which may have been unrealistic to begin with but to which, nevertheless, the Chinese leadership had a strong emotional attachment.<sup>1</sup>

On the political side, Chinese statements, even prior to Mao Tse-tung's attendance at the celebration in Moscow of the Fortieth Anniversary of the October Revolution, had been stressing *bloc* unity and Soviet leadership. Chinese commentary after the Moscow Declaration increased this stress, describing the Declaration as a "turning point" in strengthening the unity of the Socialist camp and the international Communist movement. The *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial on the Declaration stated the formula which dominated later comment:

It is of great significance that the Moscow meeting pointed out the central role of the Soviet Union in the solidarity of the Socialist countries. Solidarity must have a centre, a leader. At a time when the imperialist camp refuses peaceful coexistence, spares no effort to undermine the Socialist countries and the international Communist movement, and menaces all humanity with plans for new war, recognition of this truth is especially necessary for the Socialist camp, the bulwark of world peace, and for the Communist ranks in all countries, the backbone of the international workers' movement.

This position of the Soviet Union as the centre of solidarity is an objective reality brought about historically, and not something that somebody has created artificially. The Soviet Union is the first and most powerful Socialist country and the experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is, comparatively, the most complete, the richest, and that which has weathered the severest tests. Strengthening the solidarity of the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and the solidarity of the international Communist movement with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as its centre conforms not only to the interests of the people of the Socialist countries and the international proletariat but also to the interests of the cause of world peace and progress and the interests of all mankind.<sup>2</sup>

The designation of the central position of the U.S.S.R. as the product

<sup>1</sup> Forecasts of a U.S. depression are contained in articles by Chi Tai, in *World Culture*, No. 4, 1958, Yang Chung-kwang, in *World Culture*, No. 10, 1958, and Chang Wen-t'ien, in the inaugural issue of *Red Flag*, June 1958. See also *Kwang-ming Jih-pao*, May 11, 1958. Negative effects of the U.S. recession on South-east Asian economies are described in *Ta Kung Pao*, April 26, 1958. The *Jen-min Jih-pao* New Year's editorial, January 1, 1959, refers briefly to 1958 as a year of economic disaster for the capitalist world, but *Red Flag*, No. 4, 1959, in its editorial and in an article by Yu Chao-li, concentrates on Communist growth with little or no mention of capitalist decline. The drop in China's exports is briefly described by Tillman Durdin, in the *New York Times*, February 7, 1959.

<sup>2</sup> *Jen-min Jih-pao*, November 25, 1957, translated by NCNA.

of great historical forces invested the facts with a quasi-religious authority. Mao in his Fortieth Anniversary speech had already spoken of the "sacred international responsibility of all Socialist countries to strengthen the solidarity of the Socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union." Chinese writers in the immediately following period stressed the identification of patriotism with internationalism to such an extent as to imply that China's efforts in the foreign policy field should pursue *bloc* interests even under some circumstances to the detriment of what might be considered China's immediate national interests. Lin Po-ch'ü, in greeting the Fortieth Anniversary of the October Revolution made this point in an atypical but revealing statement:

To strengthen international unity, our people should resolutely oppose and eliminate bourgeois nationalism. Although nationalism may signify progressiveness on certain occasions and in certain countries, it can only represent the reactionary side in China. Under present conditions in China, bourgeois nationalism in reality represents only selfishness and egoism of the bourgeoisie. It demands that we place the interests of our nation above the overall international interests of all the proletariat and labouring people of other countries. As a result, it will bring harm to the unity of internationalism as well as to the fundamental interests of our people.<sup>3</sup>

Accordingly during the following two years the Chinese not only acclaimed developments in areas such as the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, which were rather remote from her own sphere of influence, but devoted a significant amount of energy to promoting such developments. The Chinese thus have seen themselves as involved in foreign affairs on a world-wide scale, not only on an Asian scale. By the same token, however, the Chinese have tended more and more to evaluate their own foreign political accomplishments more highly in terms of their contribution to the advancement of world Communism, not only to China's own international position. There has thus developed a certain contradiction, in that China's interests close to home were not advanced at the same rate that *bloc* interests throughout the world seemed to be. Furthermore, this contrast came to be felt as especially frustrating inasmuch as the Chinese evaluation of their own importance to the *bloc* was not matched either by corresponding gains in their position in Asia or by willingness on the part of the *bloc* to provide all-out support for Chinese attempts to improve this position.

Besides affirming the decisive superiority of the *bloc*, the Moscow Declaration, and even more clearly the later Chinese commentary, defines

<sup>3</sup> NCNA, Peking, November 6, 1957. See also an article by Chu Po in *Ta Kung Pao*, December 15, 1957, translated in the *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 1685, which asserts that world proletarian unity is the "real content of internationalism," and which restates Mao's older formulation of the revolutionary uses of the national bourgeoisie.

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the basic world situation as one of continuing unresolvable conflict between the two camps. If this premise is stated in the Declaration in terms of peaceful co-existence and peaceful competition, its meaning to the Chinese was soon made more clear in Chinese commentaries. The occasion for this clarification was the dispute with the Yugoslavs, in the course of which the Chinese were very emphatic in pointing out that the problem of our times is and remains in their eyes the simple question of who will win. The meaning of winning in this connection is further specified by repeated Chinese assertions that imperialism represents the death throes of the capitalist system.

In the Moscow Declaration, specific reference was made to the newly independent countries as being part of the force for peace. In Chinese commentary over the next few months, the relationship between the Socialist camp and the newly independent countries was represented as one in which the Socialist camp endorses and supports the national objectives of the newly independent countries. In short the position was that the newly independent countries of their own accord pursue objectives which the Chinese regard as progressive, so that it is possible for Communism and nationalism to work together without either determining the objectives of the other. During the first half of 1958 the term neutrality was hardly ever used by the Chinese in reference to either the policy or the desired trend in the newly independent countries, but rather to trends in the countries of the Western camp.<sup>4</sup>

The function of the newly independent countries was occasionally defined during 1958 as that of constituting a peace area. Some uses of this term indicate that from the Chinese point of view the movement for national independence has not only a long-term revolutionary significance as an element in the ideological conflict but a short-term military significance as providing a buffer zone contributing to the security of China against military attack. Regarding the Asian countries which were "still struggling" for national independence, neither the Declaration nor Chinese commentary was very specific. From the beginning of 1958, however, and rather consistently thereafter up to the present, Chinese statements about or directed to these countries, in particular the Asian members of SEATO, have emphasised anti-missile base propaganda and have recommended neutrality as an alternative to their existing policy.<sup>5</sup> In these cases neutrality clearly was equivalent to denial of military facilities to the U.S. and to very little, if anything, more. Thus the military value of neutralism has been present as a factor in Chinese

<sup>4</sup> It should be noted here, since the tactics later were altered, that this view provides for co-operation on the government-to-government level.

<sup>5</sup> See particularly Chinese comments on the March, 1958, SEATO Council meeting in Manila.

thinking both before and during the whole period. Since the beginning of 1959 it has received more emphasis in the Chinese view of the function of the newly independent countries, at times to the extent of virtually replacing other considerations.

#### *Clarification of Chinese Views*

It was precisely these views and strategic outlook that were challenged by Tito, a challenge which led to the ideological interchange between China and Yugoslavia and to a noteworthy clarification of Chinese plans with regard to the third countries. Tito's views were that the world balance of power now permitted mutual conciliation and the reduction of tension, as opposed to the Chinese view that the balance of power permitted active pursuit, if necessary by aggressive means, of world revolutionary goals. In the course of the debate and thereafter, particularly in the context of the Quemoy affair, the Chinese made it entirely clear that they not only did not hesitate to provoke the imperialists and even run the risk of war but they in fact considered this the proper use of a position of strength.<sup>6</sup>

Again, in advancing the concept of active co-existence, Tito argued that the interests of the newly independent countries were not only separate from those of the Communist world and legitimate in their own right but that they were in the direction of international unity and conciliation. These goals could best be achieved by a more or less organised third force, within which mutual co-operation would lead to economic development and consequently increasing political weight as a factor standing between the two camps. In effect Tito, demonstrating a much better grasp than the Chinese of the psychology of the neutrals, was stating that the Chinese, in their attempt to identify their international

<sup>6</sup> This position was already indicated in the *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial of November 24, 1957, previously cited: "Some say, since the meetings of the Communist and workers parties call for peace and peaceful co-existence in their declarations, why should they indulge in discussing the balance of forces? We Communists have always stood for peace, but peace can only be won, not begged for. The imperialists show no compassion for the people. They recognise only strength. History has seen numerous aggressive wars which have never been caused by too great a strength on the side of the people opposing war or the victims of aggression. On the contrary, the aggressors have invariably unleashed wars when have been able to do as they wished with impunity, or at least when they thought they could. . . . In this situation, is it not very clear who is for and who is against peace? Is it not very clear that peace cannot be begged for from the aggressors? The declarations of both the Moscow meetings point to the characteristic feature of the present situation—that the people already have sufficient strength to prevent war and safeguard peace provided they unite in this struggle and constantly maintain their vigilance. The declarations explain the changes in the balance of forces precisely in order to give the people full confidence in the cause of peace and convincingly mobilise the broad masses to force the imperialist blocs to abandon their diabolical plans of war." Several writings of the first half of 1958 recount the post-war history of "people's" military successes and stress the thesis of the superiority of man over weapons. But it is only in the context of the Quemoy affair that provocation of imperialism is actively justified.

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goals with the international goals of the neutrals, were perpetrating a fraud. Here Tito touched on what has been a continuing contradiction in China's declared position in relation to the other Asian countries; namely, that China tries at one and the same time to identify itself as a nationalist country, whose goals are phrased in the same terms as those of other nationalist countries, and as a Communist country, whose goals are identified with those of the Communist *bloc*. The contradiction is evidently not apparent to the Chinese, but the history of the years 1958 and 1959 indicates that it became increasingly clear to several of the nationalist countries of Asia.<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile, Tito's efforts succeeded in eliciting from the Chinese a confirmation of his views. The Chinese reply to Tito specified, among other things, that the third countries could achieve national liberation only by identifying themselves with the *bloc* and taking a position opposed to the imperialist camp; moreover, this could be achieved ultimately only by united front movements under the effective leadership of local Communist parties. The development of this process is best indicated by some quotations. On June 4, the *Jen-min Jih-pao* stated editorially that the difference between Yugoslav revisionism and neutralism in general was that:

Ordinary neutral countries cannot serve the purpose of subversion which the United States requires, but often themselves become the target of U.S. subversion.

The fight against Yugoslav revisionism is not only to draw a clear-cut dividing line between Marxism-Leninism and anti-Marxism-Leninism, to let all supporters of Socialism recognise the leading group of the Yugoslav Communist League for what they are, and so serve to consolidate the core of the peace forces—the Socialist camp and the international workers' movement. It is also to let all supporters of peace recognise the imperialists, particularly the U.S. imperialists, for what they are and see clearly where the danger of war lies. This is naturally even more obviously in the interests of peace.<sup>8</sup>

The same source a few weeks later stated in reply to Tito's Labin speech of June 15, 1959:

We will not bother here to discuss the stand of various types of neutralists. Many peaceful, neutral countries, far from having carried out sabotage against the Socialist countries, have, on the contrary, forged good relations with them. They can therefore be completely confident of the friendship of the Socialist countries in their struggle to safeguard peace, resist aggression, and develop their own national economies. In contrast to the neutralists in general, the Tito elements, putting out the signboard of Marxism-Leninism and a Socialist country, mix themselves

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, the *New York Times*, May 13, 1958, account of Nehru's criticism of Chinese attacks on Tito.

<sup>8</sup> *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 4, 1958, translated by NCNA.

in the ranks of the international proletariat to corrode, disintegrate, and subvert.<sup>9</sup>

On February 22, 1959, following Tito's visit to Indonesia, where he made a major speech presenting the concept of "active co-existence," the *Jen-min Jih-pao's* observer commented that:

... the Tito clique's "active co-existence" and "no blocs" policy is entirely different from the policy of peace and neutrality of the many newly independent Asian and African countries. The latter is founded on the principles of peaceful co-existence prescribed by the Bandung conference, and conforms with the interests of these countries and world peace, whereas the Tito clique has sold itself to the imperialists, coats their ugliness with perfume, and serves them.

What is "no bloc" about this policy? Where is its "active co-existence" when it maliciously slanders the Soviet Union, attacks China, opposes the Socialist camp and tries to sabotage the unity of the countries of the Socialist camp? The actions of the Tito clique prove very precisely indeed that whoever takes to stubborn hostility to the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp cannot at the same time oppose imperialism, and therefore cannot be genuinely neutral.

The Tito clique aims at neither Socialism nor peaceful neutrality, but is serving as the task force of imperialism, to penetrate into the Socialist and the national independence movements to do damage. Its effort is directed at dividing the Socialist camp, breaking the unity between the Socialist camp and the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa, and disturbing the unity in and between these newly independent countries. . . .

... There is a wealth of facts, past and present, showing that friendship and unity with the Socialist countries is essential for the Asian and African people in their struggle for freedom and independence. This is precisely why the imperialists are constantly bent on undermining such unity.

The current attempt of the Tito clique to set up a so-called third bloc, and all its other activities, is obviously designed to serve this imperialist scheme.<sup>10</sup>

Finally, on March 18, 1959:

The policy of peace and neutrality of the Asian and African national[ist] countries starting from their anti-colonialist stand, cannot but assume the characteristic of uniting with the Socialist countries against imperialism. The Asian and African national[ist] countries of course do not belong to the camp of Socialism. But they share with the Socialist countries common interests in the struggle against imperialist aggression and in defence of world peace. All countries and peoples that strive for and uphold national independence have the full sympathy and support the Socialist countries. The Socialist countries are their most reliable friends.

On the other hand, all countries and peoples that strive for and

<sup>9</sup> *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 26, 1958, translated by NCNA.

<sup>10</sup> *Jen-min Jih-pao*, February 22, 1959, translated by NCNA.

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uphold national independence are in irreconcilable contradiction with the imperialist countries headed by the U.S. . . .

To fight against ferocious imperialism, they need support from the Socialist countries and want to develop friendly relations with them. The friendship between the Socialist countries and the peaceful neutral nations in Asia and Africa established in the course of their common struggle against imperialism and in defence of peace can never be undermined by the Tito clique. . . .

At a moment when the national countries in Asia and Africa, above all the Arab states, urgently need to strengthen unity among themselves and among all anti-imperialist forces in their respective countries, Tito acted as a provocateur to undermine this unity everywhere and incited opposition in the Asian and African countries to the so-called "enemies of unity outside and inside."

. . . The Presidium of the National United Front of Burma has denounced Tito as having interfered in Burma's internal affairs in violation of the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Western news agencies, too, have disclosed that Tito had estranged the relations between the governments and the Communist parties in the countries he visited. . . .

Numerous facts have proved that the Communists are champions standing in the foremost front in the struggles for national liberation. Exclusion or persecution of the Communist parties and other progressive forces in the respective countries will weaken or even undermine the struggle against imperialism. . . . In any case, in the nationalist countries in Asia and Africa where the great cause of struggling against imperialism has not yet been completed, any weakening of or sabotage against the national united fronts will inevitably give a chance to the imperialists and play into the hands of the imperialists. . . .<sup>11</sup>

In the course of these and other concurrent arguments, then, the Chinese not only revived the phrase "peace and neutrality" in connection with the "newly independent" countries but passed through three phases in defining their relationship to these countries. At first, the formula was that the Chinese supported the aims of the independents—"their cause is ours." Next, they asserted that the independents needed Chinese support—"our cause is theirs." The final formula dealt with common experiences and interests, especially anti-colonialism—"our causes are the same, but we have shown how to succeed."

I think it is not accidental that the debate with Tito flared up in May 1958. The opening of the debate coincided with other developments which, taken together, indicate that by the beginning of May the Chinese had developed a general strategic approach and a plan of action designed to maximise the advantages they believed to be inherent in the newly established balance of power. Even prior to May they had taken the first step of reviving their demands for the unification of Korea and

<sup>11</sup> *Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 18, 1959, translated by NCNA. An even more explicit statement of the leading role of Communist parties is in *Jen-min Jih-pao's* editorial of November 19, 1958, on the anniversary of the Moscow Declaration.

Vietnam. The breaking off of economic relations with Japan in early May 1958 has been given a variety of interpretations. As part of a major foreign policy design, it seems to me best understood as an act of economic warfare deriving from the Chinese analysis of the American recession and its effect on the economies of Asian countries. In this sense the move had some temporary success, but at the expense of damage to China's reputation for reliability as a trading partner. Whether the non-economic consequences of the move were clearly calculated in advance by the Chinese and accepted as reasonable costs or whether they were miscalculated, remains a mystery.

If the move was a deliberate economic warfare manoeuvre, it fits rather well with the revival of the "two Chinas" question as an international issue, and with the later attack on Quemoy. All of them are possibly understandable as part of a strategy based on Mao's principle of determining the direction of the main blow. In this context, the main blow had to be directed against East Asia, because this was the basis of U.S. military strength in Asia. Thus the shift from the weak Chinese posture of 1957, when the U.S. was increasing its military power in East Asia, to the bellicose posture of 1958, when the Chinese felt that the local balance could safely be redressed to their advantage.

At the same time Mao's principle specifies the necessity of neutralising the middle forces. Applied to the international scene in 1958, this required continued friendly relations with South and South-east Asia. In fact, certain parts of South-east Asia were not extremely susceptible to Chinese pressure. But even where such pressure was possible, for example, in Laos and perhaps in Burma, the Chinese seem not to have exerted as much as they could have. They accepted developments which they recognised as adverse to their interests and which by the end of the year represented serious setbacks. Among these were the upsurge of nationalism in Laos and the taking over of power by military leaders in Pakistan, Thailand and Burma, together with the increasing influence of the military in Indonesian politics.<sup>12</sup>

### *Frustrations of 1958*

With respect to several foreign policy goals the Chinese failed during 1958. Even though one cannot state positively what the exact Chinese objective in Quemoy was, it is reasonable to say that the goal was not achieved, in part because of failure to evoke the sympathy and support

<sup>12</sup> The need felt by the Chinese to have a quiet rear in South and South-East Asia is somewhat amusingly illustrated by a map entitled "The World in 1958," published in *Peking Review*, January 6, 1959, in conjunction with the *Jen-min Jih-pao* New Year's editorial. The only spot between Quemoy and Arabia deemed worthy of a number designating an important development was Indonesia, where the "rebellion with backstage U.S. support" is said to have been "foiled"—without, we may point out, any meaningful participation by the Chinese.

of the Asian neutrals. Meanwhile, the Chinese trade offensive in South and South-east Asia bogged down by the end of the year, largely because of Chinese inability to deliver. At the same time Japanese economic activities in the area increased. The increase may not have been a terribly significant one from the point of view of the Japanese economy, but the Chinese during 1958 and even more during 1959 have indicated that they feel in a disadvantageous position as compared with Japan in terms of potentiality for future development.

The frustrations of 1958, matched, it appears, by corresponding domestic difficulties and differences of opinions both within the Chinese leadership and between China and the U.S.S.R. concerning Chinese domestic policy, did not lead to a constructive readjustment of goals. It resulted, apparently, simply in a sense of frustration and a heightening of non-rational attachment to a view of the world as continuing to move in the desired direction provided only that sufficient determination was shown and sufficient energy mobilised. Toward the end of the year 1958 Chinese slogans increasingly reflected an apocalyptic vision. Imperialism was represented not so much as engaged in prolonging its final death struggle, but as trapped in a morass of difficulties. It was described as a paper tiger, as one who places a noose around his neck, and as one who lifts a stone only to crush his own foot. Favourite slogans of the period were: "the enemy rots with each passing day, while for us things are getting better and better"; "the forces of the new will defeat the forces of decay"; "despise the enemy strategically, but respect him tactically"; and the like.<sup>18</sup>

The mood of the time seems to be succinctly and comprehensively expressed in the following passages:

... U.S. imperialism already has one foot in the grave and can with as much justice be described as "a rotting bone in a graveyard."

The imperialists and the reactionaries in various countries always stir up anti-Soviet and anti-Communist disturbances the better to suppress their own peoples and the revolutionary movements in their own countries. But this can only scare the weak-kneed. The revolutionary people, on their part, will be tempered in these tempests and emerge stronger than ever. ... The more reactionary their enemies become, the greater revolutionary fervour the people will acquire and the faster their enemies will go to their doom. Indomitable Communists and all revolutionaries grow to maturity amid stress and storms, which provide them with the opportunity of getting to know the laws of waging the struggle against the reactionaries. At times temporary losses may occur owing to lack of experience in fighting the imperialists and the reactionaries, but losses help you to learn. As the Chinese saying goes,

<sup>18</sup> A key document of the period is the collection of Mao Tse-tung's writings reissued in late October 1958, under the title *The Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers*.

"A fall in the pit, a gain in wit." And that is why bad things can be turned to good account.<sup>14</sup>

Imperialism is in its last days. Inspired by the programme of the Moscow meetings for peace, democracy, national liberation and socialism, the revolutionary proletarian class and the labouring people of all countries in the world have become increasingly mature in their perseverance and far-sightedness in the cause of revolution. . . .

In history, new-born forces invariably grow from small to large forces and finally achieved the dominant position; the decaying forces invariably turn from large into small forces, till they finally meet their fate of destruction. In the course of historical development, the backward movement towards death which the decaying forces manifest is absolute. Certain forward movement they manifest in their ferocity is transient, and therefore relative. On the contrary, the forward movement manifested by the new-born forces in their growth is absolute. Certain backward movement they manifest in setbacks is transient, and consequently relative. Certain forward movements of the decaying forces and certain backward movements of the new-born forces are mere twists and turns in the historical development. These twists and turns are often unavoidable. Through these twists and turns, there lies greater retreat in the forward movement of the decaying forces but greater progress is in store for certain backward movement of the new-born forces.<sup>15</sup>

Clearly implied in these statements is the trend toward a distinction between peoples and governments, which in practice resulted in a shift of emphasis from government-to-government relations with neutral countries toward the revival of people's diplomacy. Throughout much of 1959, the Chinese put themselves forward as a model rather than a threat to the other Asian countries. The model that they represented at this point was not one of internal revolution but one of liberation from colonial domination. China was identified with the newly independent countries at this point not so much in terms of common international goals as in terms of a common past and as an inspiration, demonstrating to the Asian and African peoples that they too could free themselves from foreign domination and from economic and cultural backwardness at one stroke. Some ancient allegations were revived concerning European contempt for the intellectual qualities of other races, to whose defence the Chinese leaped. Imperialism was now represented less as a direct military threat to neutral countries, but rather as pursuing a policy of subversion and of creating splits and divisions between the people of China and the peoples of the other Asian countries.

The defensive mentality of the Chinese at the turn of the year is indicated by the revival of the term neutrality as part of the formula describing the desired posture on the part of neutral countries. In fact

<sup>14</sup> Yu Chao-li, "The Forces of the New are Bound to Defeat the Forces of Decay," in *Red Flag*, August 16, 1958; translation in SCMP No. 1837.

<sup>15</sup> *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial, November 19, 1958, previously cited.

this defensive mentality seems to correspond to the real world situation which the Chinese faced at that point and to have been borne out by the nature of the climactic conflicts of the first nine months of 1959 involving Tibet, Laos and eventually Indonesia. In both the Tibetan and the Laotian affairs the hand of the Chinese was forced by events not of their own making. Laos was the simpler problem, and the Chinese response to it was worked through slowly, cautiously, and under severe controls. By September 1959, Communist goals had been made clear: to preserve the Pathet Lao and its potential leverage on Laotian politics; to preserve the *status quo* established by the Geneva agreements; and to establish as the price for a solution a coalition government and the adoption of a policy of "peace and neutrality." The Tibetan problem was both more difficult and more inflammatory, possibly because of a real and justifiable foresight on the part of the Chinese that the Tibetan situation itself would not soon or easily be brought under control, but also because of the extraordinary impact of the affair on India.

#### *Sino-Indian Tension*

The Tibetan and later the Indian border incidents appear to have produced within India a crisis of faith regarding both India's own policies and China's good-will. The Chinese handling of India was at first cautious and for some time continued to be, on the official level, comparatively restrained. But by the end of April, 1959, a full-dress propaganda campaign had been mounted. This involved accusations of Indian "expansionist" plots and adoption of "the heritage of colonialism," with specific names mentioned. Those accused of villainy seem to belong to a category the Chinese would identify as "national bourgeoisie," of whom they would expect "vacillation" and "compromise with imperialism" on the model of China's own modern history. Certain Chinese statements at this time seem to carry out in relation to India the distinction they had already begun to draw, as in Laos and elsewhere, between the people and "native reactionaries." There were as well strong emotional reactions. A prominent element in Chinese statements is a sense of offended dignity, summarised in the phrase "China has stood up" and exemplified by the manner in which the Chinese made an issue of insults offered to Mao's portrait. By autumn, the Chinese had reached the point of describing the border issue as one of "great right and great wrong." This phrase had previously been applied to the Taiwan situation. It may perhaps convey implications relating to the conditions of "just wars," a problem later discussed more or less systematically in Chinese statements of 1960.

The effect of this behaviour on India was to promote polarisation of India's internal politics. The Indian Communist Party, or at least its

hard core, was forced into an extreme position, to the detriment of its immediate political effectiveness. Nationalist pressures on Nehru mounted, leading to developments in Indian defence policy.

If there is any sense in measuring the impact of events of this sort in cold-war terms, then clearly the Chinese lost, not only in prestige, but in the ability to protect their own interests by negotiating with India. As the Indian reception of President Eisenhower showed, there were corresponding gains for the U.S. But several points concerning Chinese motives remain obscure. It would appear that the results of their conduct should have been largely predictable, and that a more practical course of action was available if they wished to limit the damage to their prestige. The discrepancy between Chinese official and public pronouncements in the early phases of the Tibetan incident suggests that some portion of the leadership may have wanted to follow the moderate course. Possible reasons why this course was not followed can be speculatively offered. The Tibetan situation itself has not easily yielded to control; it may be that the Chinese were willing to lose prestige in India and elsewhere for the sake of keeping Tibet isolated. The emotional element may have carried weight with the native radical leadership, particularly if supported by what appeared to be confirmation of its prejudices concerning the role of bourgeois nationalism. The ill effects on China of polarisation of Indian politics would not count as heavily with a group whose expectations for the future were in any case predicated on revolutionary popular movements and who in other areas were willing to divide the "people" from "native reactionaries." Finally, and quite plausibly, it has been suggested that China counted on becoming so strong in the predictable future that it could then enforce its will on other Asian countries with or without their consent.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, Tillman Durdin in the *New York Times*, September 13, 1959, and Norman D. Palmer, "Chinese Shadow on the Asian Rim," in *New Leader*, May 23, 1960. The latter covers also the deterioration of Chinese-Indonesian relations. The nearest thing to a clean Chinese repudiation of bourgeois nationalist leadership in the newly independent countries was made by Wang Chia-hsiang, "The International Significance of the Victory of the Chinese People," *Red Flag*, No. 19, October 1, 1959, and by Ying Yu, "Ten Years' Peaceful Foreign Policy," *World Culture*, No. 19, October 5, 1959. A passage from the latter is worth quotation: "... U.S.-headed imperialism . . . has left no stone unturned in sabotaging our good relations. The imperialists are also conspiring with the reactionary clique of these nationalist countries to whip up an anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet movement in a vain attempt to make these countries give up peace and neutrality and join the military aggressive camp under the wing of U.S. imperialism. It must be pointed out that the leaders of these countries often, in varying degrees, align themselves with the reactionary clique in its anti-Chinese movement. What they differ from the latter is that there still exist certain contradictions between them and the imperialists, and besides that, they cherish the desire for peace and neutrality. But, at the same time, they maintain such intricate relations with the imperialists as lead them to manifest an expansionist ambition. Under the clamour and instigations of imperialism and reactionaries, such double-faced 'neutralists' often show vacillations."

"Recently, the leaders in India, seizing the opportunity of China curbing the rebellion

In contrast to the overall pattern of 1958, as the Chinese in 1959 found their problems mounting in South and South-East Asia, their manoeuvres toward a sort of rapprochement with Japan progressed. The premise on which these manoeuvres were based was again the distinction between the "people" and "reactionary elements," with the specific objective of overthrowing the Kishi government. The premise was clearly established in March 1959, by inducing Mr. Asanuma to issue his well-known dictum accepting the Chinese position that American imperialism was the common enemy of the Japanese and the Chinese people. In the following months, by a process which resembled the recapitulation of phylogeny by ontogeny, China re-established her relations with Japan on the pattern of "people's diplomacy." China entertained a number of Japanese guests. At one extreme were delegations of the Japan Communist Party, and at the other such representatives of the Japanese "bourgeoisie" as Messrs. Ishibashi and Matsumura.

Just as the Chinese formula for a preferred policy on the part of Japan—peace, neutrality, independence, and democracy—was somewhat more complex than those it offered other countries, so the pattern of its manoeuvres toward Japan was more intricate. The success of this effort can be measured by the degree to which significant Japanese political elements had arrived by autumn at the conclusion that Japan was faced by a drastic choice between mutually exclusive alternatives—the revised Japan-U.S. Security Pact or the possibility of normal relations with China. Somewhat as in Laos, the Chinese demands on Japan were simultaneously directed at its domestic political balance and its pattern of foreign relations.

The evidence concerning China's position toward the smaller Asian countries "still struggling" for independence is comparatively meagre. In general it shows the tendencies earlier noted to equate neutralism with denial of military facilities to the U.S. Throughout 1959, in proportion to the increase in political power of military figures and the establishment, highly tentative in some cases, of patterns of sub-regional co-operation, Chinese comment concerning these countries increased in volume and in the degree of expressed hostility. Both trends were reciprocated in the target countries. In proportion as the Chinese attacked the régimes of these countries as anti-popular and, wherever reality would provide even the minimum of support, described local Communist groups as the true

started by the upper-level reactionary clique of Tibet, have come out openly to interfere with what is purely a matter of China's internal affairs. Furthermore, they attempted to violate the territorial integrity of China on the Sino-Indian border. Such acts in contravention of the Five Principles are obviously harmful to Sino-Indian friendship, and will only please the imperialists and reactionaries. The Chinese people have exercised the greatest patience toward these anti-Chinese activities and after long periods of tolerance, found it necessary to hit back so as to distinguish what is right and what is wrong."

spokesmen for the people's interests, the target countries responded with actions adverse to China.<sup>17</sup>

By October 1, 1959, China was thus at odds in one way or another, with almost all of Asia, while at the same time making demands on the Asian countries in the name of neutralism which these countries found unacceptable in the name of nationalism. China also was receiving little support from the Soviet Union. In the conflict with India, the Soviet Union tried to moderate the difficulties. In the Laotian affair, it provided formal diplomatic support for China's declared demands, but no more. Meanwhile, further development of the Chinese line on neutralism became involved in the more general disagreement with the Soviet Union concerning disarmament, revisionism and the nature of imperialism—a disagreement which still goes on as this is written.

### *The Line Softens*

This is not the place to go into the details of the larger ideological issue. It is evident that Khrushchev did not resolve this issue during his October visit to Peking. It appears probable, however, that he did succeed in reorienting the Chinese position on neutralism, at least with regard to the "newly independent" countries. A plausible reconstruction of the course of events would be as follows: After Khrushchev's visit, there was a review of Chinese total policy throughout the month of October and the early part of November. Some of the signs that this review had been completed and that its conclusions were being translated into action were apparent in the steps taken by China toward the Asian nations: Chou En-lai's notes to India of November 7, December 17, and December 26, 1959, while conceding no claims, were phrased in terms which contributed to the possibility of negotiations. Ch'en Yi's correspondence with Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio on the overseas Chinese, while full of complaints, recriminations, and self-justification, also embodied some workable proposals, later carried out, which in view of the nature of the issue were on the conciliatory side.

<sup>17</sup> Without going into excessive detail, I should like here to indicate the type of documentation available.

THAILAND: After the Sarit coup, a number of NCNA releases dealing with closure of Chinese schools, arrests of subversive elements, the Thai-Cambodian dispute, and the role of Thailand in the Laotian incident; specifically, NCNA on December 15, 1958, expressing the end of China's "patience"; March 6, 1959, on the Thai ban on Chinese imports; May 30, 1959, and July 30, 1959, on Thai-Laotian co-operation; September 30, 1959, on Thai "persecution of peace fighters"; and January 4, 1960, on U.S. economic aid.

PAKISTAN: NCNA, April 8, 1959, critique of the Pakistani economy; July 23, 1959, on Pakistani collaboration with the U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek; and August 1, 1959, *Kwang-ming Jih-pao* article, generally critical of Pakistan's policies.

MALAYA: NCNA, August 1, 1958, transmission of a manifesto of the Communist Party of Malaya; February 5, 1959, on closure of the Bank of China office in Kuala Lumpur; May 2, 1959, in reply to the Malayan Government's White Paper on subversive activities; and November 27, 1959, on U.S. investments in Malaya.

## THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LINE ON NEUTRALISM

In January, coinciding closely in time with the N.P.C. resolution on China's participation in disarmament negotiations, came the announcement of Ne Win's visit to Peking to conclude the Sino-Burmese border agreement. This was then followed by the conclusion of the agreement with Nepal.

Khrushchev's visit to South Asia, in February 1960, served a number of functions. Apart from the implication that Soviet intervention was now needed in an area formerly virtually conceded to be a Chinese sphere of influence, it provided an occasion for reaffirmation of the original line of the Moscow Declaration, that the Socialist camp was the best friend of the newly independent countries. His kind words in India, comparing the peoples of Asia to "Prometheus unbound" and praising India's policy of neutrality and "keeping out of war blocs" as a source of "wisdom and strength," were matched by the attention he gave to economic development and by offers of cash. The Burmese visit was apparently badly prepared and ineffective, and Khrushchev made some tactical blunders in Indonesia as well. But in Indonesia, too, his basic stand was that "your cause is ours" and that "a neutral, active, and independent policy of non-participation in military alliances makes a positive contribution to the cause of easing international tension and maintaining world peace."<sup>18</sup> Again as in India, Khrushchev stressed economic development and economic aid. His proposal that India and Indonesia as well as Communist China should take part in a future summit conference showed a grasp of the Indonesian mentality equal to Tito's.

Thus by April 10, Chou En-lai in his report on foreign relations to the N.P.C. was able to say:

We firmly believe that no matter what complex questions may have been left over from history between China and [the nationalist] countries [of Asia], reasonable solutions can be found for them all, so long as friendly consultations are conducted in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.<sup>19</sup>

He could also point to the Sino-Burmese and Sino-Nepalese border agreements as tokens of good faith and report substantial progress on implementation of the Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty. On his visit to India later in the month, though Chou conceded nothing and obtained no concessions, he maintained the position that the problem was of a "limited and temporary nature," a question "left over by history," and should not be overweighted in comparison with the cause of peace, economic development, and two thousand years of friendly relations. Even at his Katmandu Press conference, Chou's criticism of Nehru's

<sup>18</sup> Joint Soviet-Indonesian statement of February 28, 1960, translation by TASS.

<sup>19</sup> *Peking Review*, April 12, 1960.

statement that the Chinese Government was responsible for aggression was delivered in a civilised manner.<sup>20</sup>

While China's diplomatic actions toward the "newly independent" countries, like Khrushchev's, conformed to the position that "your cause is ours," and Chou En-lai's trip in particular helped restore the rather frayed pattern of relations on the government-to-government level, both Chinese and Russian hostile pressure on the Japanese Government mounted steadily. Full-scale Chinese pressure dates from no later than November 27, 1959, and was subsequently maintained through a series of statements, mass rallies, and other means of support, moral or material, to the political opponents of Prime Minister Kishi and the Security Pact. The Russians, though continuing negotiations with Japan on economic matters, have collaborated by threatening to retain Habomai and the Shikotans, by Khrushchev's attempted manoeuvre in Indonesia to obtain a joint condemnation of the Security Pact, and by a series of memoranda delivered to the Japanese Government criticising the Pact and proposing as an alternative a Russian guarantee of Japan's neutrality. The outcome of these efforts will not be discussed here, except to point out that Chinese objectives, like those of the Japanese Communist Party, stopped a good deal short of a revolutionary *coup d'état*.

With regard to the lesser countries of Asia, there is one significant bit of negative evidence. In the spring of 1960, the Communists refrained from exerting pressure on the political situation in Laos.

Thus in the spring of 1960 the situation seems to have returned almost to that of two years earlier. For the Chinese, East Asia is once again the object of the main blow and South and South-East Asia are the quiet rear. The Communists once more endorse the cause of the newly independent countries and promote friendly relations between states in accordance with the spirit of Bandung. Though none of this directly affects the trends in South-East Asia adverse to Chinese interests (military governments, sub-regional agreements, the upset balance on the Indian border and in Indo-China, the adverse image of China that has developed, the economic progress of Japan in South-East Asia, etc.), peaceful competition is again the watchword and the prospects for peaceful co-existence are again said to be favourable.

Ideologically, however, besides the continuing debate within the Soviet bloc on revisionism, the Chinese have never quite returned to the same view of the future of neutralism as they had in early 1958.

<sup>20</sup> Chou's travelling companion, Vice-Premier Ch'en Yi, at this point in the Press conference, revealed the continued existence of Chinese resentment by breaking in to say: "I want to call your attention to the fact that China is a country which is being wronged. I want to stress the fact that China is a country which is being wronged." It is to be noted that several of Ch'en Yi's recent statements have conformed to those of the native radicals.

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The position as redefined contains some new theses. Yu Chao-li put the problem in the context of the transformation of the imperialist rear into the anti-imperialist front, maintaining the position that "Our cause is yours":

... The national democratic movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is an important force in defence of world peace. Imperialism has always used colonies and semi-colonies, with their manpower and material and financial resources, as its rear for the waging of war. Since World War II, the national democratic movement has spread over Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The movement caused, and continues to cause, the disintegration of the imperialist colonial system. Thus, what was originally a rear for imperialism in war has become a front in the struggle against imperialism.

The mysterious continent and the "quiet backyard" have become volcanoes erupting beneath the feet of the imperialists. . . . This situation has compelled the imperialists to use their main forces to suppress the national democratic movement in the colonies and semi-colonies.

... The enemies of world peace are merely a few greedy bellicose groups. They are always encircled by the mass of the people within their own countries who do not want war. The Communist parties and the enlightened working-class in the imperialist countries firmly stand, as always, at the forefront in defence of world peace and carry on the most arduous struggle despite oppression by the reactionaries in their own countries.<sup>21</sup>

Yu Chao-li again, commemorating Lenin's birth, discussed the possibility of war arising from the anti-colonial struggle:

According to the Leninist theory, the contradictions between imperialism on the one hand and the colonies and semi-colonies on the other are irreconcilable and antagonistic in nature. They constitute one of the root causes of modern war. . . . Lenin also said, "In the era of imperialism, national wars waged by the colonies and semi-colonies are not only possible but inevitable. . . . The national wars waged by the colonies against imperialism will inevitably be a continuation of their national liberation policy." Are these principles of Lenin's no longer applicable to present conditions? Does the process of the disintegration of the old imperialist colonial system signify the end of their colonialist policy? Will imperialism voluntarily relinquish its plunder and domination of the colonies and semi-colonies making it unnecessary for the latter to wage national liberation wars?

In such countries, the struggle between the broad masses of the people (including the national bourgeoisie at certain periods) and imperialism and its lackeys, far from ceasing, has grown sharper and more acute. In fact, three types of wars between the imperialist and colonial and semi-colonial countries characterise post World War II. One is imperialist war of suppression of the colonies. Another is imperialist war of aggression against countries that have gained their national independence. And the third is the war for national liberation

<sup>21</sup> "An Excellent Situation for the Peace Struggle," *Red Flag*, January 1, 1960.

which takes the form of civil war and is fought against imperialism and its henchmen. These three types of wars have never ceased but follow each other without end up to this very day.<sup>22</sup>

Chou En-lai's report to the N.P.C. adopted the position that "Your cause and ours are the same":

We have recently established economic and cultural contacts with more than 20 countries and regions in Africa and Latin America. China and these countries have gone through common historical trials, share common aspirations for defending world peace and opposing imperialism and colonialism, and have common wishes for developing the national economy and culture. This constitutes a reliable basis for the establishment and development of friendly co-operation between China and those countries.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, *Red Flag* made a summary of the militant position, advocating a broad united front, but not directly stressing the vanguard role of Communist parties:

Imperialism, headed by the United States, is the common enemy of the people throughout the world. . . . The U.S. ruling clique frenziedly carries out armament expansion and war preparations; organises aggressive military blocs; energetically fosters the revival of Japanese and West German militarism; truculently intervenes in and suppresses the revolutionary movements of the people of various countries; opposes all progressive and just causes; and engages in sabotage, subversion, military encirclement, and war provocations against the Socialist countries, thus seriously threatening and undermining world peace.

If the proletariat of the capitalist countries want to achieve liberation, if the people of the colonies and semi-colonies want to win national independence, and if the people of the whole world want to maintain world peace and to win victories in all progressive and just causes, they must wage a resolute struggle against imperialism, primarily U.S. imperialism.

In their fight against imperialism and its lackeys, the people of all countries have to close their ranks and support each other. Only by merging the struggle of the people of the Socialist countries, the struggle for national liberation of the people of the colonies and semi-colonies, the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat of the capitalist countries, and the fight for peace of the peoples of all lands, can imperialism and its stooges be defeated and a lasting world peace attained.<sup>24</sup>

### Conclusions

What, then, should one conclude from this examination?

As for the past period, the Chinese started, in apparent harmony with the Soviet Union, with highly optimistic perspectives. They probably rated the bloc's position of strength more optimistically than did the Soviet Union. Where the Chinese tended to exploit this position by

<sup>22</sup> "Imperialism—Source of War, etc.," *Red Flag*, April 1, 1959, translation in *Peking Review*, April 12, 1959.

<sup>23</sup> NCNA, April 10, 1960.

<sup>24</sup> Translation by NCNA, May 15, 1960.

active tactics of economic warfare and military probes, the Soviet Union tended to favour diplomatic methods and to move toward accommodation with the West. The Chinese outlook on neutralism seems originally to have been that Asian countries already neutral could be moved by Chinese support of their aims into opposition to the West, while neutralism in the non-neutral countries could be encouraged to grow. Both developments would favour the military security of China.

While this strategy was not wholly ineffective, since in the shorter or longer run it produced some sympathetic responses among opposition political groups in Asian countries friendly to the United States, the course of events on the whole worked against it. The economic warfare and military probes did not succeed as expected. The debate with the Yugoslavs brought out some unexpressed contradictions between the expressed benevolence of the Chinese toward Asian neutrals and their actual expectations. At the same time, both internal political developments and emerging patterns of inter-Asian co-operation not including China began to set limits to China's ambitions.

The native radical leadership responded to frustration, present and potential, internal and external, by adopting an even more radical outlook. The memory of past success seems to have swayed them more than observation of present reality. They made stereotyped judgments of social forces in other countries as revolutionary or counter-revolutionary largely in terms of the impact of these forces on China's immediate desires, and they absorbed setbacks by recourse to mystical restatement of millennial beliefs in the victory of the proletariat. When zones of military weakness appeared on their internal and external peripheries, they took refuge in explanations attributing to the capitalist world a diabolical skill in conspiracy. They thus ended at odds with their neighbours and in violent disagreement with their most important ally.

Following direct Russian intervention, the Chinese returned to a more pragmatic approach in their dealings with Asian neutrals of diverse types, but without being able to restore the situation as of two years earlier. Their outlook on the Asian countries is now a subordinate aspect of a larger world view, and is likely to vary according to the outcome of their present conflict of views with the Soviet Union. But even if the pragmatic approach to Asian neutralism attains dominance, the Chinese native radical leadership appears fairly well entrenched, and its ideas seem to be fixed.

#### POSTSCRIPT

*National Independence Movements as an Issue in the Sino-Soviet Ideological Controversy*

In the period from the collapse of the summit meeting of May 1960,

to the Moscow Conference of November–December 1960, problems of political strategy concerning neutralism, the national bourgeoisie, and national independence movements became involved in the more general ideological controversy within the Sino-Soviet *bloc*. It does not seem necessary here to review the evidence indicating that the dispute was real and that in the eyes of the disputants it was serious. It is unfortunately not feasible for the author to outline the Russian position. The Chinese position on national independence movements represents a further extension of some of the trends and practices analysed above.

It is first of all notable that neutralism as such was hardly in evidence during the summer and fall of 1960 as a symbol around which issues could be drawn. The focus of Chinese ideological interest during this period was less on the already neutral countries than on those "still struggling," and thus to some extent less on Asia than on the under-developed world in general and Africa in particular. In the geographical and political sphere thus delimited, neutralism, given the militant Chinese view of the world situation, was apparently too modest a goal to be pursued by world Communism.

The key proposition in the Chinese definition of the situation, repeatedly stated up to the eve of the Moscow Declaration, was that the forces of world imperialism, headed by the United States, were engaged actively in a programme of suppression of national independence movements. Imperialist tactics were two-faced. While offering political concessions—which, however, were evaluated by the Chinese as deceptive—the United States was expanding its military base system in the under-developed areas and was prepared at any time to resort to armed intervention and suppression.

The problem to which the Chinese addressed themselves, then, was not that of Chinese foreign policy alone, but of the total strategy of Communism facing imperialism in the world-wide arena. Their prescription for success was struggle. The important characteristics of this struggle were that it was to be world-wide, to be conducted jointly by all forces that could be mobilised in mutual support of each other, and that it was to be conducted both by political and by violent methods. Success, since imperialism would never of its own accord give up anything it possessed, had to be fought for. Chinese statements can be read as advocating the unremitting maintenance of a position of strength, both military and political. The source of the political position of strength was clearly located in the movement of the masses. In short, the Chinese had no faith in purely diplomatic methods, rejected any policy of retreat, and argued that the times called for immediate advance.

In justification of their proposals, the Chinese emphasised their own revolutionary history as a model for liberation movements. Three points

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in particular were stressed: that armed struggle, including civil violence, was integral; that existing forms of state power had to be smashed and replaced by new forms; and that the political struggle had to be led by the proletarian vanguard. If one had to decide whether this model in all its aspects represents the course the Chinese wanted adopted in all under-developed countries, whether they believed that revolutionary or pre-revolutionary situations now exist in these countries, one would, in spite of certain indications to the contrary, have to conclude that it does. The especial warmth the Chinese expended on Cuba and Algeria is accounted for precisely by their estimate that these two cases come nearest to conforming to their own model, especially in respect to the uses of armed struggle and revolutionary bases.

At the same time the Chinese consistently distinguished between people's revolutionary movements and national independence movements. On several occasions they specifically denied an intent to export revolution. This may be either tactical prudence, or an effort to avoid appearing to set up a second ideological centre within the Communist bloc, or both.

In terms of operations, one could argue that the ideological formulations which are so prominent in Chinese commentary are less indicative than some relatively inconspicuous statements. On at least two occasions, by his appearance at the Swiss National Day reception given by the Swiss Embassy in Peking on August 1, 1960, and in an interview given on September 5, 1960, to the British correspondent Felix Greene, Chou En-lai took the opportunity to recall to the world's attention the less militant aspects of China's foreign political operations. He gave particular attention to China's continuing negotiations with Asian neutrals and quasi-neutrals, to China's encircled, hence presumably weak, military position, and to such peaceful diplomatic formulae as the Asian nuclear-free zone and a circum-Pacific non-aggression pact.

Again, if one looks for the specific areas where the Chinese appear to believe that special encouragement can be given to anti-imperialist activities in the near future, they turn out not to be in the zone of world-wide joint struggle against imperialism, but in South Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, Laos, Turkey, Algeria, and perhaps Malaya. This is a rather odd-looking assortment. The common factor seems to be that these are countries where Western influence on the existing legal governments is strong, but where one or another vulnerability, whether military or political does not matter, has somehow manifested itself during the past year.

It seems not too far-fetched, then, to suppose that the general design of Chinese foreign policy up to December 1960, was somewhat as follows:

1. On the world-wide scale, to oppose subtractions of any kind from the Sino-Soviet bloc's military and political positions of strength.

2. To conduct the combat against imperialism not by diplomatic methods, but by political and military struggle, never under-estimating the social revolutionary potential of anti-colonial movements.

3. To estimate the leading role of the "masses" and the "proletarian vanguard" in under-developed countries in terms of their potential, not their actual strength.

4. To concentrate in the short term on exploiting military or political weaknesses, no matter how superficial they may appear, which have developed in areas hitherto strongly influenced by the West, while giving a low priority to similar areas where no such specific weaknesses have become manifest.

5. To keep the existing neutrals out of the area of conflict by emphasizing conciliatory diplomacy, that is, state-to-state relations, in dealing with them.

6. To leave open the possibility of political bargaining even with the United States, as a method of diminishing China's strategic weaknesses.

On the whole this design gives the appearance of being dictated by the native radicals, but of being slightly modified to suit the views of the relatively conservative professional diplomats and military men in the Chinese leadership. Rather conspicuously under-emphasised, especially by contrast with the Russian position, is peaceful economic competition.

The December 5, 1960, Moscow Declaration seems to make some concessions to the Chinese point of view. The extremely careful choice of temperate words in the Declaration makes analysis difficult. Thus, the Chinese "hurricane" or "torrent" of anti-imperialist resistance becomes in the Declaration a "merging" of the "great forces of our time . . . into one powerful current that undermines and destroys the world imperialist system." The Declaration's general view of imperialism, while conceding that imperialist Powers "never leave of their own free will," does not seem to credit imperialism with the rampant aggressiveness the Chinese have credited to it. The Chinese revolution is described as having "contributed in great measure" to changing the world balance of power and as having given a "powerful impetus to the national liberation movement" in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Neutralism as such is hardly mentioned at all and is subordinated to the world peace movement. The latter, in turn, is described in terms which understress the leading role of proletarian parties, concede more legitimacy to pacifist ideals of all kinds, and show a comparatively low level of hostility to the national bourgeoisie.

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If one applies the formulae used earlier in this paper, the Chinese native radicals, it would appear, continued up to the time of the Moscow meeting to argue the position expressed in the formula "our cause is theirs." The Chinese conservatives tended more to the formula "their cause and ours are the same," but they have appeared to be more concerned with operations than with ideology. The Moscow Declaration tends largely to take the position "their cause is ours."

The *People's Daily* editorial of December 7, 1960, gives the impression of rather complete verbal assent to the spirit of the Moscow Declaration. There is, of course, very little in the declaration that conflicts with the apparent operating policy of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. If, as seems possible, one outcome of the Sino-Soviet dispute is increased co-ordination in operations, the Asian neutrals may find China in 1961 easier to get along with. The problems China poses to the West, while not exactly those the Chinese native radicals would have liked to see posed, can hardly be said to have been simplified.

## *Soviet Agriculture as a Model for Asian Countries*

By W. K.

THROUGHOUT Asia agriculture is still the largest single economic sector and the village is the principal form of human society. Outside Japan on the Pacific and Israel on the Mediterranean shores of the Asian continent the villages provide the homestead and determine the way of life of three-quarters to four-fifths of the population, and as a rule two-thirds to three-quarters of the working people are engaged in agricultural pursuits. Villagers not occupied in this way usually earn their living by processing, financing and trading the products of their communities. The town dwellers, rapidly increasing in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the total population, are rarely far removed geographically and in their mental make-up from their ancestors. As much as two-thirds of their personal expenditure is spent on foodstuffs and thus a substantial portion of urban incomes flows back to the countryside.

Even so farming rarely contributes more than half, and often less, of the total national product of these predominantly agrarian countries. This is due to the low return from a form of farming which was abandoned in Europe when the money economy began to grow, as a result of specialisation, at the end of the Middle Ages. Only where plantation crops, such as rubber and tea, or mineral resources, such as tin or oil, are developed is there a basis of prosperity and room for capital formation. This is rarely to be found in pure subsistence farming economies.

The chief characteristics of these pre-industrial, subsistence farming communities are high rates of birth and population; high incidence of under-nourishment and disease; low mobility of labour and limited non-farm occupation; urban unemployment and rural under-employment; lack of mechanical power resulting in low productivity; predominance of farm tenancy and fragmentation; low personal and national incomes; exorbitant land rents and interest rates; high levels of indebtedness and low propensity to save, resulting in insufficient investment from public and private sources.

Though these communities are all part of a vast continent which has remained retarded for many centuries, they are not necessarily marked

by a complete identity of views or interests. On the contrary they are noted for their diversity rather than their similarity. Living standards, expressed in average *per capita* incomes, vary from well under \$100 (£35) in India to over \$200 (£70) in Japan, with countries of south-east Asia, such as Ceylon and Malaya, holding the intermediate position. Even so they all continue to have in common a predominantly agricultural pattern which their governments wish to abandon as fast as possible in favour of industrialisation.

As it costs at least \$1,500 (over £500), and it might easily cost twice as much, to equip a man for industry, agriculture is bound to remain for a long time to come the principal occupation of the majority of the people in these pre-industrial countries of Asia. At current rates of investment it is often not even possible to absorb the annual growth of population, let alone to transfer men effectively from agriculture to industry. It is thus imperative to concentrate on increasing farm activity and agricultural production and on improving rural earnings and savings. Unless farm productivity increases by at least  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. per year, it is not possible to maintain even the present low level of consumption. If output grows at 2 per cent. per year, it will take almost 150 years at current average rates of population growth for living standards to double. Any substantial improvement requires an annual rate of growth of 3 per cent. or more. This in turn entails investment of at least 12 per cent. of gross national product, a rate which is out of the reach of most countries in Asia.

Whereas the total farm production of agrarian Asia has risen by approximately one-quarter over pre-war levels, it is still 10 per cent. lower if related to the present population. Medical science has reduced greatly mortality rates, both among infants and adults, but family planning has not kept in step with these developments, except in Japan. As a result an additional ten million tons of foodstuffs imported from abroad are consumed, turning Asia from a minor surplus producing area before the last war into a major deficit area in recent years. In these circumstances one might expect there to be more emphasis on agriculture than on industry. In fact it tends to be the reverse.

Unprepared to meet the impact of a rapidly changing world the countries of pre-industrial Asia often reveal a lack of that stability which is characteristic of societies with a large middle class and a long history of development. Not infrequently they are governed by a stratum of land-owners, merchants and officers who live their lives divorced from those of the cultivators and who regard farm labour with distaste if not contempt. Governments tend to pay attention to the aspirations of urban and industrial communities rather than to the villagers whose interests are generally given low priority. While the societies of the countries of Asia

rest on the broad basis of the villages, their governments often resemble inverted pyramids. Their administrations are top-heavy and singularly weak in the rural areas where there is much need for action by government and for guidance by the executive. Whereas the need to broaden the basis of the administration is recognised, public agencies tend to mushroom in their capitals and to govern by remote control thereby impeding their effectiveness.

On the whole the village communities have remained frozen for centuries. Tribal beliefs and superstitions are never far below the surface of public affairs. In the clash between ancient forms of production and the requirements of modern national states, serious stresses and strains occur. The professional and administrative classes tend to be weak and inexperienced, yet their responsibilities are infinitely greater than those of their counterparts in the more developed countries. Their interests are mainly directed towards industrialisation, and economic planning—or what goes by that name—is usually divorced from the needs of the rural communities, over-ambitious and unrealistic in many spheres and dictated all too often by sentiments of economic isolationism. Although industrial output and urban living standards have risen in some cases, they are distributed unevenly, by geographical, social and occupational standards. The farming community is almost invariably neglected.

In the villages over half and in some cases up to two-thirds of the cultivated area is still farmed by tenants, many of whom have little or no land of their own. They have no security of tenure and pay half the gross harvest to landowners, either on the basis of crop sharing or as rent, in cash or in kind. Often no written records of titles or contractual obligations are available. The landlord and the moneylender, sometimes one and the same person, are frequently the master in the village. The smaller the farm and the more restricted the choice of crops, the more the grower suffers from these institutional arrangements. The large grower and the specialist have alternative choices from which the small-holder and subsistence farmer are barred, since they chiefly produce food grains for disposal immediately after the harvest. As much as four-fifths of the farm economy or 40 per cent. of the gross national product often remains outside the market mechanism.

In the face of problems of such magnitude the political and economic leaders of Asian countries often display an understandable uncertainty which frequently breeds a sense of personal grievance and national inferiority. Often critical of Western ways of life and hostile towards the colonial past they tend to be fascinated by the Soviet experiment. As a result Asian economic and social development is modelled at times on the Communist pattern which is characterised by expropriation of private, industrial and commercial property, by industrialisation of the

heavy type and by collectivisation of agriculture. It is held together by an economic plan which is implemented by way of tied central controls. The question thus arises to what extent the Soviet agricultural pattern can serve as a model for Asian countries that have so far stayed outside the Soviet sphere of influence.

#### MARXISM AND AGRICULTURE

Soviet farm policies cannot be understood fully without reference to the Marxist doctrine that underlies them. Marx based his analysis of political and economic trends mainly on industrial Britain, then the prototype of modern capitalism. Of the problems of rural Britain, he knew little, except that rent had become a major problem on the land. His was basically the approach of an urban intellectual. The beliefs and behaviour of country folk were alien to him. He promised in *Das Kapital* to attend to the agrarian question at some later stage; he never did. He anticipated that "in agriculture large-scale industry will destroy the bulwark of the old social order, the peasant."<sup>1</sup> He never went beyond this mistaken forecast and failed to integrate the agrarian scene in his vision of the future. The founder of Marxism in fact proved helpless when faced with the request by some members of the First International to suggest a solution of the land problem. Towards the end of his life Marx became uneasily aware that his treatment of the agrarian question had left much to be desired, but he was unable to fill this gap before his death and thus left his followers without guidance in this important sphere.

Those of Marx's early disciples who were confronted with the agrarian question were much perturbed by the lack of precision in matters of farm policy. It was probably Engels's most tragic omission that he failed to meet the request of Vera Zasulich to give his opinion in the dispute that had arisen on agrarian problems between Marxists and Russian social revolutionaries who tended to take a more sympathetic attitude than the Marxists towards the peasants and their status in society. Engels excused himself as being unfamiliar with conditions in Russia. In fact, he sensed that he was face to face with one of the most burning problems of his time and that he had no solution to offer.

There were disturbing features in early Marxism in its treatment of agrarian questions. Engels was more vocal than Marx on this subject. "We can win the peasants only," he said, "if we make them a promise which we ourselves know we shall not be able to keep"; but he hastened to add, "it is not in our interest to win the peasant overnight only to lose him again on the morrow if we cannot keep our promise."<sup>2</sup> Here was

<sup>1</sup> K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, Vol. I, p. 284 (Leipzig 1929).

<sup>2</sup> F. Engels, *The Peasant Question in France and Germany* (1894), p. 27 (Moscow 1955).

the first public admission that Marxist theory and Communist practice were unlikely to be reduced to a common denominator. The cleavage has continued to show itself ever since—in many forms and on many occasions.

It has remained one of the mainstays of Marxism since its inception that small-scale farming is economically backward and that the peasant-cultivator is tied to the reactionary political forces siding with the bourgeoisie rather than to the revolutionary spearhead of the industrial working class. Whereas he is supposed to be committed by virtue of his property to the capitalist cause, his mode of production is considered that of the working class. He is therefore thought to be in a conflict of interests and loyalties which prevent him from joining the forces of the revolution. In the eyes of Marxists it falls therefore upon the industrial working class to take the lead on the road to economic progress through large-scale farming and to political emancipation through the alliance between industrial workers and peasant cultivators.

Like Marx and Engels, their followers considered farming the most primitive mode of production and thus the farming community the most backward section of society, vacillating between capitalism and socialism. Lenin formulated this view later in these words: "The peasant as a toiler gravitates towards socialism and prefers the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The peasant as a seller of grain gravitates towards the bourgeoisie, to free trade, i.e., back to the 'habitual' old 'primordial' capitalism of former days."<sup>3</sup> At the same time Marxists felt the need to enrol the rural population as supporters of their cause and thus to come to terms with them. The dilemma that haunted the young group of Russian Marxists in their relations with their opponents, the Narodniki, and took them to Engels with a request for intellectual help, also marked the debates of Social Democrats and social reformers in various countries of the Continent.

Most prominent of all, and having a profound impact on the thinking of Russian Social Democrats, was the controversy which raged in Germany during the nineties of the last century between Kautsky, the orthodox, and David, the right-wing revisionist. Kautsky believed in the inevitable doom of the small- and medium-sized farm. "Our policy must favour the peasant as little as the Junker," he wrote in his review of David's book.<sup>4</sup> David, on the other hand, tried to prove the opposite on the strength of farm statistics that were available at the time. He observed that the smallholder did not vanish, as had been expected, and that the concentration of agricultural holdings which had been forecast did not take place. Congress after congress of the German Social Democratic

<sup>3</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (3rd ed.), Vol. XXIV, p. 314 (Moscow 1932).

<sup>4</sup> K. Kautsky, *Die Neue Zeit* (Berlin 1902).

Party proved incapable of solving the riddle and sought refuge in political expediencies. As far as practical politics were concerned, the Social Democrats pursued a revisionist course, but this was done owing to the lack of theoretical clarity, with an uncertainty which antagonised the farming interests. The disharmony between theory and practice was all too obvious.

The same applied to other countries. Even Bauer, the leader of the Austro-Marxists, who was more familiar with the life of the villages than his German counterparts, remained puzzled and in the end decided in favour of political expedients when faced with the task of formulating the agrarian principles which were to govern his party's political programme. The indecisions and vacillations left their mark on the European political scene, no less than on those whose fate was in dispute. The peasants and their representatives who during the Central European revolutions of 1848 had tended to remain neutral were antagonised by the attitude displayed by the political leaders of the new working-class movements. The contrast of interests was particularly pronounced in countries with large rural populations, such as Tsarist Russia and the Balkan states of Eastern Europe. In spite of this predicament Communism succeeded in bringing about its social change where radical and social reformers had failed before it. The story of how this was achieved is one of the most dramatic chapters of modern history.

## LENIN'S PROGRAMME

While Lenin never abandoned the long-term aim of large-scale Socialist rather than small-scale individual peasant farming, he temporarily adopted the agrarian programme of the Narodniki when the success of the Bolshevik revolution became dependent in 1917 upon the support of the peasants. Land reform became the target of the immediate future; collectivisation the long-term aim after the victory of the revolution and the consolidation of power. When the sailors of Kronstadt, many of whom were of peasant stock, took to mutiny and included in their political demands the right of the peasants over their land, to own livestock and to engage in small-scale farming on their private plots, Lenin again gave way and introduced the New Economic Policy, but he interpreted it as a temporary expedient rather than a change of policy. A few years later, Stalin returned to the recognised dogma of the Party. The long-term target of collectivisation was not only implemented in the face of large-scale opposition within and without the Party but also in spite of the damaging effect it had upon the progress of industrialisation. Early in 1930 half the Russian peasants had become members of collectives, and by 1939 hardly any land was left in private hands.

Even so astute a critic of Lenin and the Russian Revolution as Rosa

Luxemburg remained confused when it came to judging the agrarian question. She considered the distribution of the land to the peasants as an ill-considered departure from the road to Socialism and observed that "Lenin's agrarian reform created a new and powerful layer of popular enemies of Socialism in the countryside." Yet at the same time she spoke with envy of the "French small peasant who became the boldest defender of the French Revolution and as Napoleon's soldier carried the banner of France to victory and smashed feudalism in one country after another."<sup>5</sup> Like others before and after her, she remained a captive of an error of Marxist analysis that has haunted Communists to this day.

There remained the conflict between the necessity to gain the support of the peasants in a revolutionary situation and to maintain it in the interest of sufficient supplies of a growing industrial population against the ultimate aim of eliminating them as factors in the political and economic life of the country. This has dominated the Soviet scene ever since Lenin decided in favour of temporary expediency on his arrival in Petrograd early in 1917. The conflict has loomed large in nearly every internal purge of the Party from Stalin's struggles against Bukharin to Khrushchev's clash with Malenkov. Time and again the losing faction has had to confess to misjudging the political position of the peasant and the economic role of agriculture in the struggle of the Bolshevik Party to gain and maintain its position. The fact that after forty years of Communist rule the agrarian question features prominently on the agenda of almost every session of the Praesidium and Central Committee of the Party is a measure of the failure to find a solution that brings into harmony the doctrinal concept and its practical implementation.

Although the Marxist doctrine meets with some measure of sympathy among intellectuals in the pre-industrial societies of Asia, the usefulness of the Soviet experiment as a model for Asia will be judged ultimately by its achievements. The Soviet Union is often thought to have started from a position not dissimilar to that of agrarian Asia today and to have moved, within one generation, to second place among the industrial nations of the world. Little wonder that the Soviet example has a strong appeal for those who wish to move from the backwardness of medieval times to the progress of the twentieth century. At the outset there were indeed striking similarities. In Imperial Russia four out of five of the population were villagers and three-quarters of the working population was engaged in agricultural pursuits. Birth and net population rates were high and living standards were low. Agriculture served mainly the needs of subsistence farmers, although several million tons of food-stuffs were exported. Yields of crops and livestock were low and food

<sup>5</sup> Rosa Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 21 (New York 1940).

consumption was bulky and of predominantly starchy composition. Population pressure was however substantially less and land resources more plentiful than in Asia today.

The damage caused to land and livestock by war and civil war had been largely repaired by 1928 when Stalin decided to abandon finally Lenin's policy of temporary concessions to the peasants and to coerce them into joining the collectives. It had become their function to do away with individual farm ownership and management, to guarantee food deliveries for the steadily increasing urban population, to provide industrial labour and to generate the financial resources required for the rapid industrialisation of the country. When Stalin died twenty-five years later, his programme could be considered outwardly achieved. But whereas Japan, faced with a similar problem in its early period of industrialisation, had to concentrate on improving agriculture as a basis of its industrialisation programme, in the Soviet Union farming was kept in the state of a depressed industry for a quarter of a century. Not only were the peasants, according to Marxist doctrine, regarded as economically backward and thus as an expendable political factor, but even in the new institutional framework of the collectives they were treated as enemies of the state rather than as vital members of a growing industrial community.

#### SOVIET AGRICULTURAL FAILURES

The results were in accordance with the policies pursued. Whereas some twenty-five million peasant households had provided, at the opening of the plan era, the meagre food supply of 160 million people, at the time of Stalin's death some twenty million families with the help of some 600 thousand tractors produced an equally meagre diet for approximately 190 million people. The drift of population from the land, though heavy in times of distress, had been smaller than had been expected. After the inauguration of the first Five-Year Plan crop acreages had merely kept pace with population trends. Output, like acreage, had at best kept in step with the increase in population. In relation to the acreage under crops the supplies of plant nutrients from natural manure and commercial fertilisers and of draught power from horses and tractors were the same as in 1928. Horses had been replaced by tractor power so as to free acreage under animal fodder for the production of food, but even these modest results had been achieved only at great cost in men, beasts and materials. As mechanisation was limited to the supply of tractors and not matched by other labour-saving equipment, manpower requirements fluctuated greatly throughout the season resulting in disguised rural unemployment and in low productivity of agricultural labour.

The results were particularly disappointing in livestock farming. The

state plans for increasing the number of livestock went unfulfilled year after year. At the time of Stalin's death the pre-1929 livestock population had not yet been reached. Whilst the human population had increased from 160 to 190 million, the number of productive animals declined from seventy to sixty-two million livestock units. Milk returns and carcase weights, like grain yields, showed no upward trend. As a result the national diet was no better in 1953, and possibly smaller in volume and poorer in composition, than it had been in 1928. Sugar was the only foodstuff consumed in increased quantities. Against this the supply of animal fats and proteins remained that of a backward rural society, catering insufficiently for the requirements of a steadily increasing urban and industrial population. The farming community was unquestionably worse off than before collectivisation was introduced.

At the same time there were great advances in many sectors of industry. Some twenty million peasant families had been the principal source of capital formation in a manner reminiscent of Marx's description of primitive accumulation in the period of early capitalism. In assessing the magnitude of the achievement it has to be borne in mind, however, that the foundations of industry had been laid long before the Bolshevik revolution. Substantial rates of industrial growth, of private saving, and of capital investment had been sustained for several decades, as a result of which Russia ranked already among the industrial powers of Europe when it entered the First World War. It had thus passed well beyond the period of economic take-off with which many Asian countries have still to grapple. The phase of initial economic growth belonged to the era of early capitalism under the Tsars, but under the Soviet régime agriculture sustained the process of industrialisation. The unbalance created in this specific way was probably more serious than any that had resulted from the experiments of early capitalism. It certainly seemed to Stalin's successors to be of such magnitude that it led to a period of political self-criticism and technical readjustment, the end of which is not yet in sight.

Even the most far-reaching of Western comments on the shortcomings of the Soviet agricultural system have been dwarfed by the statements of Soviet political leaders. The most vocal of them has been Khrushchev himself who has considered the problems of the farming industry as a personal concern ever since he found himself face to face with them as Party Secretary of the Ukraine, one of the main food producing regions of the Union. Whereas industrial production had recovered fully from the savage destructions of the Second World War, the output of foodstuffs, and of animal produce in particular, lagged behind badly. The gulf, apparent ever since, in the early thirties, forced industrialisation and collectivisation had driven the two main sectors of Soviet society apart, had

## SOVIET AGRICULTURE AS A MODEL FOR ASIAN COUNTRIES

widened. Any comparison with farming practices in advanced industrial countries revealed staggering shortcomings. In Britain, for instance, the density of livestock was seven times, the output of milk per unit of land eight times, and the application of fertilisers almost twenty times as great as in the Soviet Union. Even the supply of grain could not be regarded as secure. In the autumn of 1953, Malenkov stated, rather prematurely, that the country was assured of its grain requirements. Six months later it was in the throes of a grain crisis which provided the most important element in his ultimate political downfall.

### NEW MEASURES

The list of steps taken in the last seven years to create a certain measure of balance between farming and the other industries is long and impressive. In the technical sphere large-scale cultivation of marginal land in the East and the introduction of maize into the crop rotation of the traditional farming areas in the West of the country, yielded temporary relief in the supply of grain for human consumption and permanent improvements in the provision of cattle fodder and the level of milk yields and carcase weights. Price increases, tax concessions, reduced delivery quotas were the principal inducements to members of the collectives to collaborate with Government and Party in the new approach to farming problems. Nor did the institutional arrangements of the industry remain unchanged, but here the doctrinal legacy of the past made itself felt in improvisation and reversal of action. At first, measures were taken for further improving the work of the machine tractor stations, at that time still regarded as the base of collective farm production. A few years later all tractors and auxiliary equipment were transferred, against payment, to the collective farms. Their own position underwent some important shifts in the changing pattern of things.

As the outmoded system of procurement and price fixing was abolished, following the closing of the machine tractor stations, which ceased to act as Government crop-collecting agencies, the collectives gained in importance. Against this the virgin land campaign gave an extended lease of life to existing and newly founded state farms which increased in numbers, in acreage cultivated and in average size. A move in the same direction was the amalgamation of collectives, first proposed by Khrushchev, against the opposition of Malenkov and other leading members of the Party hierarchy, at the Nineteenth Party Congress, the last held under Stalin's chairmanship. In the meantime, the number of collectives has been reduced from about 125,000 in 1950 to little over 50,000 in 1960, and the process of amalgamation does not appear complete yet. The issue of state farms versus collectives remains unresolved, but as a compromise formula they are considered for the time being as

two variants which will lead ultimately to one and the same type of public ownership.

The political attitude towards the small farm property of the members of collectives was also exposed to certain tactical vacillations. As long as consumer needs remained unsatisfied, temporary concessions were made to the private farm economy, but the ultimate intention to liquidate the individual farm plot was never in question. Similarly the political attitude towards the collectives as a prime source of capital accumulation in the interest of the expansion of industry remained unchanged. In the outcome, seven years of reform in farm policy have yielded a somewhat more ample supply of plant foods and fodder as the basis of the improved output of animal products, but the targets set in both sectors are entirely unattainable and the diet will continue to lag behind that of the United States, here as elsewhere the declared yardstick of things to come. Two-thirds of the cereals grown are still bread grains, and nearly three-quarters of the calorie value of the diet derives from starchy foods such as bread, flour and potatoes. Protective foods do not yet form an important part of either production or consumption.

As a result of a variety of financial measures the farming community has increased its income by as much as 50 per cent., but its contribution to public works has been increased simultaneously, and rural living standards have consequently remained below those of the not over-generously treated industrial worker. Whereas in other industrialised countries one farm family supplies a highly diversified diet for up to ten families, in the Soviet Union the farmer still produces no more than a rather monotonous diet for his own family and for one family of town dwellers. More than half the people still live in villages and nearly half the working population is engaged in extensive forms of farming. In Khrushchev's own assessment labour requirements are five, six and seven times those in the United States for potato, sugar beet and grain production respectively, but in livestock farming the ratio is said to be in some instances as wide as 1:16. The pattern of land utilisation, as that of labour productivity and food consumption, is that of a backward country.

In these circumstances, the Soviet Union may well be described in respect of its agricultural pattern as the most developed of the under-developed countries. It is thus understandable that a certain affinity is felt by Soviet politicians, planners and technicians, to the people in pre-industrial societies of Asia. This attitude is found to be mutual, at times, though less so as knowledge of Soviet affairs spreads. If the absence of clarity in the doctrinal concept and the lack of success in farming practices are unlikely to instil confidence in the suitability of the Soviet pattern as a model for Asian communities, the record of Soviet Communist intervention in this part of the world might well have the effect

of a definite deterrent, if it were sufficiently well known throughout Asia. Whilst this is not the place to recall this record in any detail, it has to be remembered that it goes back to the early years after the First World War when the spreading of the revolution was still a topical item on the agenda of the Comintern and had not yet been replaced by such concepts as "Socialism in one country," the "popular front" or "peaceful coexistence."

As the Communist International had no life of its own, its deliberations were a reflection of the situation within the Soviet Union, the internal struggles within its leadership and the vacillations inherent in the conflict between doctrine and reality. This dependence was particularly pronounced in regard to the treatment of the agrarian question in colonial and dependent territories. Not only were peasants and cultivators not recognised as a political force in their own right, but the question as to whether or not to support their claim to land remained as unresolved as in the Soviet Union. At best, the peasants were seen as members of a temporary alliance to be abandoned by the industrial proletariat after victory. Discussions on matters of principle were rarely divorced from considerations of tactical advantage in the struggle for Communist domination; and in the last resort, all political decisions were subordinated to the overriding concern for the interests of Soviet foreign policy. The records of the Congresses of the Comintern and the history of the Chinese Communist Party provide ample evidence to this effect.

#### THE CHINESE PATTERN

The impact of the Soviet pattern on the Chinese revolution and the degree of the Chinese Communists' independence from Moscow has been hotly debated among scholars in this sphere, and it is not the purpose of this paper to enter this controversy. The Chinese example is relevant, however, to our analysis in that it may well succeed in serving as a model where the Soviet pattern is rejected as alien to Asian conditions. It is thus important in this context to recognise whether the Chinese approach to the agrarian question has been influenced primarily by the peculiarities of the Chinese situation or by the pattern set by the Soviet revolution. It would amount to an over-simplification to treat the Chinese solution merely as a variant of its Soviet forerunner. The high density of the village population, the close ties of the rural family, the controlling powers of secret societies, the despotic nature of oriental government must have presented the Chinese Communist leadership with problems that were absent from the Russian scene.

In view of these peculiarities, the similarities between the Chinese and Soviet treatment of the agrarian problem are indeed startling.

Whereas Maoism, like Stalinism, has made its own original contributions, *e.g.*, in the form of thought control and communes, it is now easy to state with hindsight—what was hotly denied by some as late as in 1953—that in essentials the Chinese way of dealing with the rural communities and with the farming industry has been remarkably reminiscent of the Soviet pattern. This applies even to such matters of detail as agricultural taxation or grain collection. But the essential here is the distribution of land to cultivators and landless tenants in the early phase of the revolution followed—within a year rather than a decade as in the Soviet Union—by the concentration of individual holdings in mutual aid teams that soon assumed the form of collectives. Unless this basic identity with the Soviet model is understood, the Chinese pattern may well be accepted where the Soviet variant is regarded as inapplicable in Asian conditions.

If the Chinese revolutionary leaders could select a solution of the agrarian question identical in its essentials with the Soviet precedent and thus disregard major dissimilarities of the agricultural scene, this must seem inexplicable unless a common feature is discovered that underlies the Communist concept irrespective of the specific conditions to which it is applied. Clarification seems all the more necessary as in the industrial sphere Marxist analysis of capitalist society and Communist practice in the Soviet Union were never in conflict to the same extent as in agriculture. Soviet agrarian policy was an attempt not merely to break with the past, but to govern against all previous experience and in the face of a diametrically opposed development in the agrarian countries of the West. Nothing quite like that ever happened in industry. Here lies the root of Soviet Russia's impressive record in industrialisation and its dismal failure in farming.

#### THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR

The explanation of this phenomenon must be seen in a methodological error so gross that it is surprising that it has never been revealed by any of the many critics of Communist farm policies, either within or without the Soviet Union. In measuring industrial enterprises and their role in economic development, capital and labour input have always been used as yardsticks. If Marxist theoreticians had applied the same measures to agriculture, they would have found that it is not acreage that determines output, but capital and labour input and that size is relative to the type of farming that is carried out. In intensive farming areas a small farm will thus be "larger" than a farm of large acreage cultivated under extensive economic conditions. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that in conditions of economic development the farm

which is relatively small in acreage, but intensive in the use of capital and labour, is the more desirable form, from the economic and thus from the political point of view. If this conclusion is accepted, technical and managerial problems can be solved without any recourse to the grandiose. Equipment for the intensive use of the land would be chosen rather than mammoth tractors, and co-operatives for the purchase of fertilisers and the sale of dairy products rather than large aggregates of machinery. Only in areas where farm land is ample by comparison with labour will large-scale mechanised farming show decisive advantages over small agricultural units.

It was principally the result of the error of definition and lack of methodological clarity that land distributed to small men in the wake of the revolution was taken away from them later and merged in collectives or communes. But although the large acreage continues to be regarded as the ultimate yardstick of all things agrarian and the basic pattern of Communist farm policy is one of suppression of the initiative of the intensively farming individual for the sake of extensive large-scale farming controlled by the monolithic organs of Government and Party, it is sometimes argued that the mobilisation of labour and financial resources in the interest of industrialisation and the feeding of the increasing urban proletariat would not have been possible without such a policy of discrimination against the peasants. It should be remembered that this is a justification of tactical expedients provided after the event to gloss over theoretical errors never rectified. Had the political and economic role of the individual intensive food producer been recognised in time, revolution by consent might have occurred rather than the rule of tyranny that took its place.

The conclusion to be drawn is that the Soviet pattern is that of a backward agricultural economy and as such incapable of providing a solution to the problems of the developing economies of Asia. This is not the place to consider in any detail alternative solutions, but it may not be inappropriate to remember that Japan is the first Asian country that has changed in a few decades from a backward agricultural to a highly developed industrial society. More is likely to be gained from a study of the Japanese pattern than from that of the Soviet Union. The not unnatural tendency of assuming that what is known of the industrial history of Japan is automatically applicable to other Asian countries must of course be resisted.

Two observations may, however, be relevant. Before the Meiji Restoration the pattern of farming and the rural community was similar to that found nowadays elsewhere in Asia. As it was released from medieval restrictions, forces were set free that led to progress in industry as well as in agriculture. As a result, the share of the agricultural population

has declined in the last eighty years from more than 75 to less than 45 per cent. Agriculture succeeded in supplying the bulk of the food required due to the rise in population and consumption. Whereas a large part of the increase in population was absorbed by industry, agriculture was able to take its share as it intensified its operations. Even so, farm productivity increased by approximately 50 per cent. in the thirty years prior to the First World War. As land was scarce and institutional changes had not been drastic enough to meet the requirements of a rapidly growing economy, stresses and strains occurred. They made themselves felt particularly in the unhealthy conditions of land tenure which provided the basis for extreme political developments in the period between the two World Wars.

These shortcomings were eliminated after the last war in the course of an agrarian reform which, though drastic, steered clear of the errors committed in the Soviet Union. As a result, land tenancy which at the end of the last war accounted for nearly half the agricultural area of Japan, has dwindled to a mere tenth. Rent which used to absorb nearly half the increase of tenants has disappeared for all practical purposes from the farm accounts of the villagers. Not only are crop yields and farm productivity higher than elsewhere in Asia, but average incomes are now close to \$1,000 per farm household, an achievement unheard of anywhere else in Asia. Here then lies a lesson not to be ignored by developing Asian communities. If agrarian reforms that have been long overdue are carried out as a precondition of the growth of individual initiative and a responsible governing class that displaces a frustrated intelligentsia, there will be no need to follow the Soviet model. The choice lies between reform and government by mass consent and revolution of a minority ruling by tyranny.

## Peking and Rangoon

By SHEN-YU DAI

In his *Burma in the Family of Nations* (Amsterdam, 1956), Dr. Maung Maung, Burma's modern jurist-scholar, tried to dissipate the impression—created according to him by Chinese nationalist pride rather than legal rights—that Burma had at any time in her history borne tribute to the Imperial Court of China. It must have made him shudder that hundreds of his compatriots should shout "Chou En-lai wan sui" when the latter visited their country in mid-April 1960.<sup>1</sup> For Burma relations with mainland China in recent years have been in many ways difficult. When China under the Nationalists had to trade space for time *vis-à-vis* powerful Japanese invaders in the late 1930s, the building of the Burma Road almost inevitably led to a common defence of the two neighbours in later stages of the Second World War. Between 1942 and 1945 Chinese troops were in and out of Burmese territory, and Burmese freedom fighters and independence leaders likewise used China as their shelter and planning headquarters. The Chinese Nationalist Government expressed its readiness to exchange Ambassadors with Burma in September 1947, when the latter had hardly completed the formalities of its independence pact with Britain. But no sooner had the Burmese envoy been appointed to Nanking than the latter had to face the menace of the Chinese Communists, whose leader, Mao Tse-tung, had himself supported Burmese independence as early as 1945.

Burma's refusal to make a decisive Left turn after her independence in 1948 irritated the winning Communists in China, and their writer-spokesman, P'an Lang, then termed this independence a result of "bourgeois appeasement toward imperialism" in Burma.<sup>2</sup> Another Maoist observer, Ch'en Yuan, declared that in 1948-49 Burma was hardly out of the state of a "miserable colony" and "a national liberation movement in Burma" must therefore still "make a hard, long struggle."<sup>3</sup> Amidst such outcries across the border, villagers in Burma under the control of Communist guerrillas reportedly became directly infatuated by Maoism. In early 1949 a "New Democratic Front" reflecting Maoist mentality was

<sup>1</sup> See *The New York Times* (hereafter cited as NYT), April 16, 1960.

<sup>2</sup> *Tung-nan-ya ke-kuo nei-mo* (Inside the Various Countries of South-east Asia) (Shanghai: Shih-chieh Chih-shih, 1948), p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> *Pien-ke-chung ti tung-fang* (The East in Transition) (Hong Kong: Sheng-huo, 1949), pp. 69-70.

said to have been formed under the White Flag Communists in Burma.<sup>4</sup> Shortly thereafter, it was rumoured that Chinese and Burmese Communists had joined hands in a mutual-aid pact and, unorthodoxly, the local authorities of Yunnan reportedly undertook to attempt a counter-measure in conjunction with the Burmese Government. The Chinese Nationalist authorities, denying Yunnan's competence in making such a diplomatic move at the time, had soon to let their troops file across Yunnan into Burmese territory, to Burma's dismay till this day.<sup>5</sup> This background sufficiently illustrates the abnormality of Burma's relationship with mainland China when she first became an independent nation.

The establishment of a Communist régime in Peking in October 1949 did not help matters. In that very month immediately, thousands of overseas Chinese in Burma were prompted in mass rallies in Rangoon to shout their approval and support of Peking, and over twenty Leftist organisations also celebrated the founding of the Chinese People's Republic in Prome (north-west of Rangoon)—whether the Union Government of Burma liked it or not. In the meantime, Mao Tse-tung's "On People's Democratic Dictatorship" was published in a Burmese translation and within three months had to be issued anew in order to meet "popular demands."<sup>6</sup> In the last two months of 1949 Burmese delegates were present in Peking for an Asian and Australasian Trade Union Conference and an Asian Women's Conference. The Burmese Government's *de jure* recognition of Peking on December 18th thus barely caught up with these "citizen-diplomats."

On the eve of the Korean War in mid-1950, Peking warned Burma not to allow any Western Power to build airfields in her territory.<sup>7</sup> Burma's voting with the U.N. majority condemning North Korea thereafter proved an inadvertent affront to Peking at the time. Although Burma's relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government had been severed upon initiative of the latter, a Burmese envoy had gone to Peking for preliminary talks, and Ambassadors had already been exchanged between the two countries by September, Peking somehow still found it necessary to accuse Burma's leader U Nu, in the words of the writer Ts'ao Po-han, of retaining British advisers to dominate his Government and admitting American capital to control his economy. This, together with Burma's U.N. vote on Korea and rumours of foreign attempts to

<sup>4</sup> For some of these earlier developments, see Shen-yu Dai, *Peking, Moscow and the Communist Parties of Colonial Asia* (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1954), pp. 22-24.

<sup>5</sup> NYT, May 6, 1949; Nationalist Chinese and Indian English-language radio broadcasts, June 10 and 24, 1949.

<sup>6</sup> New China News Agency (hereafter cited as NCNA), October 9, 1949; January 8 and 19, 1950.

<sup>7</sup> See NYT, June 6, 1950.

build airfields in Burma, made Burma in Peking's view "a springboard of aggression against the People's Republic of China."<sup>8</sup> By the end of 1950, Chinese and Burmese Communists were reported to have again pledged aid to each other, now that the "Chinese People's Volunteers" were in North Korea and the U.S. 7th Fleet was deployed in the Formosa Strait.<sup>9</sup>

The Chinese Communists themselves claimed that in late December 1950, certain "major overseas Chinese organisations" in Rangoon, including the China Democratic League and the Chinese Students Association there, had initiated their own "Oppose-America and Aid-Korea" campaign to support the counterpart in mainland China. Rangoon police corroborated this claim by seizing anti-American propaganda pamphlets from the headquarters of these organisations in January 1951. In the months that followed, some of these organisations "showered the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea with comforting letters" and funds. Their delegates to Peking's National Day celebrations toured the country extensively until the end of the year, claiming that they were "no longer orphans" but "under the care and protection of a powerful motherland" that "can never again be bullied by the imperialists."<sup>10</sup>

In the spring of 1952, the Burma Peace Committee helped Peking to protest against "U.S. germ warfare in Korea." Burmese delegates to the Moscow Economic Conference also visited Communist China on their way back. Burmese trade unionists for May Day celebrations in Peking praised the Chinese Communist régime as "a brilliant star lighting the path for every Asian country."<sup>11</sup> At the preparatory and formal meetings of the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in Peking in the summer and autumn, Leftist delegates from Burma supported every Chinese Communist slogan in foreign policy, including especially the call for a Five-Power Peace Pact. Upon his return to Burma, one of these delegates, U Pe Thein, editor of the Mandalay *People's Daily*, published as many as 180 articles to describe in glowing terms Mao's new China in the early part of 1953. Collected works of Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, included among twenty-four Chinese books translated

<sup>8</sup> *Mel-ti tsen-yang ch'ing-lieh tung-nan-ya? (How does American Imperialism Commit Its Aggression Against South-east Asia)* (Peking: Jen-min, 1950), pp. 29-30.

<sup>9</sup> NYT, December 4, 1950.

<sup>10</sup> NCNA, January 19, February 19, April 2, May 8, September 25, and December 22, 1951. The overseas Chinese in Burma, having thus been brought to toe Peking's line, were yet to have to show more of their "patriotism" for such "care and protection." Their divided allegiance toward Taipei and Peking follows the typical pattern of overseas Chinese developments elsewhere in the neutralist world, but Peking has retained an upper hand in Burma over the years as against Taipei, and this has made it inevitable that they serve at times as an instrument of Communist Chinese policy. For the latest example, see NYT, August 21, 1960, on Indonesia; for a comprehensive analysis, see *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), No. 295.

<sup>11</sup> NCNA, May 6, 1952.

into Burmese since 1949, were reported to be "warmly acclaimed" in Burma at this time. And a noted Burmese writer, Thakin Kodaw Hmaing, openly urged his countrymen, "especially the Burmese youth," to "learn from the teachings of Mao Tse-tung."<sup>12</sup> Yet for official Burma Chinese Communist writers had no kind words in 1953; two of them at least—Wang Chun-heng and Chang Chin-hua—were still calling U Nu a "running dog" of "British imperialism" and his Government a "puppet régime to suppress the people."<sup>13</sup>

#### "A ONE-SIDED LOVE AFFAIR"

The Burmese Government, under such circumstances, had indeed to do something more than merely according *de jure* recognition and sending out an ambassador; the latter, U Myint Thein, incidentally had to insist on presenting his credentials to Mao Tse-tung himself instead of lesser officials when he first arrived in Peking. But when he did see Mao, he was obliged to say that, among other things, he had brought with him the Burmese people's "prayers for the continued greatness of China!"<sup>14</sup>

The earliest opportunity for Burma to ingratiate herself with Peking was provided by a second U.N. resolution branding Communist China as an "aggressor" in the Korean War, with an embargo as punishment, which Burma chose to vote against on February 1, 1951. In late August Burma further rejected an immediate peace treaty with Japan at the San Francisco Conference, where neither Peking nor Taipei was represented. And in September a new Burmese Ambassador, U Hla Maung, was sent to Peking to profess Burma's "full realisation of China's importance and her potential role in the political concepts and trend of events in the East." The Peking press duly praised Burma's good sense.<sup>15</sup>

In the middle of 1952, U Nu also expressed his willingness to ask both Peking and Moscow for economic aid if no strings were attached.<sup>16</sup> In January–February 1953 he and his colleagues at the Burma-sponsored Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon further carefully spared Peking while attacking totalitarianism "in the Soviet Union and its satellites."<sup>17</sup> Shortly thereafter Burma, in connection with her drive against the "Kuomintang troops" in her territory, asked the U.N. to brand Nationalist China as an aggressor. While approving private shipments of rubber to Peking, the Burmese Government at the same time renounced further American aid to Burma after the middle of 1953. In

<sup>12</sup> NCNA, February 2 and 3, June 20, 1953.

<sup>13</sup> *Ya-chou ti-li t'i-kang* (*Outline Geography of Asia*) (Shanghai: Chung-hua, 1953), p. 33.

<sup>14</sup> NCNA, August 8, 1950.

<sup>15</sup> NCNA, August 29, September 27, 1951.

<sup>16</sup> NYT, July 20, 1952.

<sup>17</sup> Consult F. N. Trager, "Burma's Foreign Policy, 1948–56: Neutralism, Third Force and Rice," *Journal of Asian Studies*, November 1956, pp. 89–102.

May, Burma sent her first official Labour Study Mission to Peking in an apparent gesture to placate the latter. This mission admirably toured industrial and commercial centres such as Tientsin, Mukden and Shanghai. In July, after the signing of the truce in Korea, Burma went further and threatened to ask the U.N. to unseat Nationalist China. This "one-sided love affair"—as the Rangoon newspaper *The Nation* later described it—on the part of Burma to please Communist China had become quite unmistakable by the middle of 1953.<sup>18</sup>

Peking, however, was not without its own charming devices in its varied conduct toward Rangoon. An official goodwill mission led by the Vice-Minister of Cultural Affairs Ting Hsieh-lin was sent to visit Burma and India in the autumn of 1951, equipped with prominent scholars and artists as well as motion pictures and art exhibits. Rangoon organised its first Burma-China Friendship Association on this occasion (October 1951), and Peking also set up a counterpart when Burma reciprocated with a cultural mission to mainland China (April, 1952). In January 1953 Rangoon inaugurated its first Burma-China Friendship Week calling for cultural exchanges. In February Peking offered to help Burma solve her "Kuomintang troops" problem by sending in forces of its own, although this caused apprehension and reserve rather than gratitude on Burma's part. The rumoured entry of Communist Chinese troops into Burma, however, was promptly denied by Peking's Embassy in Rangoon, and deserters from such troops in Yunnan were quickly deported back there by Burma in the course of 1953.

#### TRADE AND "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE"?

The expansion of the Burma-China Friendship Association in Rangoon in the autumn of 1953 symbolised the beginning of new developments in Sino-Burmese relations. Past and current Ministers of Culture were now made honorary chairmen of this unofficial organisation.<sup>19</sup> With international assistance provided by the United States, Thailand and Nationalist China, Burma succeeded in having the "Kuomintang troops" at least partly evacuated by the beginning of 1954, thus removing a thorn in the side of Communist China as well as of Burma. On April 22, 1954, representatives of the two countries in Rangoon concluded their first major barter trade agreement, with Burma's rice, minerals and rubber to be exchanged for mainland China's coal, silk, farming tools and light industrial products during the following three years.<sup>20</sup>

In late June, Chou En-lai visited Burma and reaffirmed with U Nu

<sup>18</sup> See J. S. Thomson, "Burma and China: A One-Sided Love Affair," *Progressive*, November 1956, pp. 26-29.

<sup>19</sup> NCNA, September 8, 1953.

<sup>20</sup> *People's China*, June 1, 1954.

in a joint communiqué the now well-known Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which he and the Indian Prime Minister had formulated earlier.<sup>21</sup> That September, a Burmese trade mission was sent to Peking, where trade protocols were signed in November on the actual exchange of commodities, specifying that Communist China should purchase 150,000 long tons of rice from Burma yearly until 1957.<sup>22</sup> U Nu paid a return visit to Peking at the end of November and in another joint communiqué half a month later he reached an accord with Chou to tackle a wide range of Sino-Burmese issues from consular establishments, transport and postal services to economic aid and a border settlement.<sup>23</sup>

Burma's "neutralist" policy gradually took shape during this period, as her leaders began publicly to deplore the enmity between Peking and Washington and to spurn closer ties with such utterly anti-Communist neighbours as Thailand.<sup>24</sup> At the turn of 1954-55 a second major cultural delegation was dispatched by Peking to Burma and India, where thousands enjoyed the accompanying theatrical troupe's "monkey-king" performances that later enchanted Paris and other European capitals. Burma's Minister of Religious Affairs also visited Peking while a special Chinese Buddhist mission went to Rangoon in the spring of 1955 to refute "slanders" about religious conditions under Communist rule.<sup>25</sup> In March, more trade contracts were signed by which Peking began to export industrial installations and equipment to Burma.<sup>26</sup> On his way to the Asian and African Conference in April Chou En-lai again visited U Nu, and at Bandung later he made a specific pledge that Peking would never violate Burma's frontiers since the spirit of peaceful coexistence was to prevail in all Asia and Africa.<sup>27</sup> In view of Chou's professed willingness for direct talks with the United States U Nu in a trip to America in the following summer even attempted to mediate between Peking and Washington, although without tangible results.

In the fall of 1955 a Chinese agricultural delegation was sent to Burma, while General Ne Win led a Burmese military mission, alongside another cultural delegation, to mainland China. From November to December several Sino-Burmese agreements and protocols were concluded, with respect to air transport services, posts and telecommunications, and further commodity exchanges.<sup>28</sup> In the early months of 1956 Mme. Sun Yat-sen paid a goodwill visit to Burma, and also to India and Pakistan. While she was in Rangoon, three anti-Peking Chinese-language newspapers made slighting references to her, whereupon the

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, July 16, 1954, *Supplement*.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, January 1, 1955, *Supplement*.

<sup>25</sup> *People's China*, July 16, 1955.

<sup>27</sup> *NYT*, April 24, 1955.

<sup>28</sup> See Survey of China Mainland Press (hereafter cited as SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General) Nos. 1160, 1168, 1170, and 1201.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, December 1, 1954.

<sup>24</sup> Consult F. N. Trager, *loc. cit.*

<sup>26</sup> *NCNA*, March 31, 1955.

Rangoon police immediately had their editors arrested in an apparent effort to placate Peking.<sup>29</sup> A Sino-Burmese border meeting was being held at Lweje at this juncture, and ideas for a settlement of disputed boundaries were broached. Direct air transport services between Rangoon and Kunming were opened in April, and the anniversary of the proclamation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence was celebrated with much festivity in both capitals in June.

U Nu resigned his Premiership in favour of U Ba Swe at this point because of alarming gains made by the opposition party, the leftish National United Front, in the April elections. Although he was reported to suspect that the Chinese Embassy was supporting these opposition candidates through generous financing by the Bank of China, the Burmese leader's complaint of "un-neutral external influences" was deliberately toned down so that everything still seemed to be going well between the two countries.<sup>30</sup>

Border trouble, however, finally flared up in late July 1956, when a large number of Chinese Communist troops penetrated into an extensive area inside Burma.<sup>31</sup> In a matter of a few weeks the whole world seemed to be talking about Peking's daring "incursions" into Burmese territory, although Burma's leaders, especially U Nu, continued to try to minimise the friction and maintain existing goodwill in their official utterances. Peking's angry denials hardly quieted the Burmese and Western press, and the plea in justification that troop deployments were necessary to "preserve peace" in the Wa district in the north-eastern corner of Burma's Shan State failed to win confidence. It was only due to the calm and steady hand of the Burmese leaders that their ship of state was steered through the storm of military and political agitation. Bilateral talks were quickly arranged amidst reports of troop clashes in August and September. Asserting that "sufficient goodwill exists between Burma and China to ensure a just settlement between themselves," U Nu announced in October he would make a special trip to Peking by invitation of Chou En-lai to deal with the matter.<sup>32</sup>

#### THE BORDER DISPUTE AND "PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY"

The Sino-Burmese border problem had admittedly been a long-standing and complicated one.<sup>33</sup> From the time when Great Britain had

<sup>29</sup> J. S. Thomson, *loc. cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>30</sup> Consult Maung Maung, "Burma at the Crossroads," *India Quarterly*, October/December 1958, pp. 380-388; and G. Fairbairn, "Aspects of the Burmese Political Scene," *Pacific Affairs*, September 1956, pp. 211-222. Cf. a relevant report in *The Nation* (Rangoon), June 3, 1956.

<sup>31</sup> See especially NYT, July 31, 1956 and the issues immediately thereafter.

<sup>32</sup> NCNA, August 29, 1956.

<sup>33</sup> For general background, see "The Burma-China Frontier Dispute," in *The World Today*, February 1957, pp. 86-92. Cf. R. J. Kozicki, "Sino-Burmese Frontier

acquired sovereign rights over Burma in 1886, three major agreements had been concluded—in 1894, 1897 and 1941—after long-drawn-out negotiations and manoeuvres. But these agreements had left two of the four sections of the Sino-Burmese borderline undefined, one being the Wa district where the current dispute occurred, and the other a part of the eastern frontier of the Kachin State, both in Upper Burma. "Kuomintang troops" in Burma had been a recent complication, *vis-à-vis* the Peking régime. Army deserters, refugees and alleged "illegal immigrants" from the Chinese side contributed to further confusion. Tribal rule, parochialism, and the cultural centrifugalism of the minority communities along the border hindered national integration with either China or Burma. The Shan State is today constitutionally entitled to the right of secession from the Union Government of Burma. Ancient laws permitted free mutual visits to a depth of twenty-five miles along the borderline, which bisects tribes and clans. Kachin citizens would often seek seasonal employment in Yunnan. These inherited facts and new realities produced a tangled situation on the Sino-Burmese borderland.<sup>34</sup>

When U Nu, as leader of Burma's ruling party, reached Peking in late October 1956, he soft-pedalled the existing difficulties by professing that he seemed to have "not come to a foreign country but arrived in my own country," whereas Chou En-lai welcomed him as a "friend from afar," citing Confucius. The joint communiqué they issued in early November after long talks indicated a basic understanding between them on a Chinese proposal which U Nu called "fair and reasonable."<sup>35</sup> According to this proposal the frontier line in the Wa district laid down in 1941, but never ratified by China, would be honoured by Peking, and its forces then west of this line would therefore be withdrawn. Three villages in the Kachin State—Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang—which the McMahon Line of 1914 covered without China's consent or ratification, but were subsequently occupied by British forces about the time of the founding of the Nationalist Chinese Republic, would, on the other hand, be subject to Peking's recovery and Burmese forces stationed there would likewise be evacuated. Another item had to do with the Namwan Assigned Tract hedged between the Shan and Kachin

Problem," *The Far Eastern Survey*, March 1957, pp. 33-38; and H. F. Armstrong, "Thoughts Along the China Border: Will Neutrality Be Enough?" *Foreign Affairs*, January 1960, pp. 238-260.

<sup>34</sup> For comprehensive analyses, see H. Tinker, "Burma's North-east Borderland Problems," *Pacific Affairs*, December 1956, pp. 324-346; G. Fairbairn, "Some Minority Problems in Burma," *ibid.*, December 1957, pp. 299-311; J. Silverstein, "Politics in the Shan State: The Question of Secession from the Union of Burma," *Journal of Asian Studies*, November 1958, pp. 43-57; D. Woodman, "Three Burmese Villages," *New Statesman*, December 25, 1956, p. 833; and "China, Burma and the Wa," *Economist*, August 18, 1956, pp. 570-571.

<sup>35</sup> NCNA, October 22 and 25, November 9, 1956.

States under "perpetual lease" to Burma since British days (1897). It was to be subject to a negotiated settlement.

The understanding reached was further confirmed in December when Chou went to Rangoon to see Premier U Ba Swe and other Burmese officials. They made field trips to Kachin towns and participated in a border meeting held at Mang-shih in Yunnan. In the meantime, the Kachin State Congress (which had to approve eventual transfer of the three villages), Burma's Deputy Premier Thakin Tin and Burmese Ambassador to Peking U Hla Maung had consultations with other local authorities at Bhamo in Kachin State to assure concurrence. By the beginning of 1957, consent was reported to have been obtained from the people of the three Kachin villages regarding the transfer, the troop withdrawal having been completed by the end of 1956.<sup>36</sup>

Subsequently, details for carrying out the understanding began to be worked out by bilateral teams, and certain markings as to the extent of the areas involved in the exchange were first made on a map on February 4, 1957.<sup>37</sup> Further talks between U Nu and Chou followed in March at Kunming. In May, border guards of the two sides competed in friendly sports meetings. On July 9, Chou reported to the National People's Congress in Peking that an agreement "in principle" had already been reached and that only minor problems remained to be solved to permit "a comprehensive, fair and reasonable settlement."<sup>38</sup> On July 26, more relevant markings were made on the map. In the course of 1958-59, while occasional border disturbances continued to come to the attention of both sides, involving, always, "tribesmen," "refugees," "rebels," or "Kuomintang troops," more work on details was also in progress. After considerable labour in the field as well as at the conference table, final markings were made on the map on June 4, 1959.

All this, however, was not achieved in isolation. The jolt in mid-1956 was sufficiently powerful for both sides to think of lessening the politico-diplomatic tension. Alongside the diplomatic negotiation toward a border settlement, the two countries engaged in "people's diplomacy." This was a congenial approach for the Chinese and one which flattered considerably their "neutralist" neighbours. When U Nu was in Peking in October-November, he saw "no alternative to peaceful coexistence and friendship." And when Chou was in Rangoon thereafter, he disavowed "big-power chauvinism" and even advised the overseas Chinese there "not to take part in Burmese political activities."

<sup>36</sup> NCNA, December 11, 13, 15-17, 1956; January 10 and 31, 1957.

<sup>37</sup> For dates and specific points in this process, see *Current Background* (hereafter cited as CB) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 612.

<sup>38</sup> For text of Chou's report, see SCMP, No. 1568.

From Peking, meanwhile, a military mission headed by General Yeh Chien-ying, a cultural delegation, an art troupe, and a women's delegation all descended simultaneously upon Burma. Images of Buddha as well as two trade contracts promising Chinese aid to the expansion of Burma's textile industry were presented to Rangoon in January 1957.<sup>39</sup> A Chinese economic exhibition was opened in the Burmese capital in February, attracting one-fourth of Rangoon's population to its displays in ten days. An "Internal Peace Organisation" suddenly emerged in Burma to urge "negotiations for peace between Burmese Government and underground forces."<sup>40</sup> Another Chinese peace delegation followed up with a visit to Rangoon. Burma, while standing firm on domestic affairs, reciprocated generously during the ensuing period. She sent, or allowed to be sent, to Peking, trade unionists, leaders of Parliament, consular officials, co-operatives' inspectors, youth delegates, health and medical personnel, journalists, sportsmen, "peace fighters," economic observers, the widow of General Aung San, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the son of U Nu, and the Deputy Premiers in charge of national economy and defence. In May 1957, U Nu personally wrote an article on "Sino-Burmese Friendship" for a Peking tourist journal.<sup>41</sup> Peking added counterparts of its own to these visiting Burmese—teachers to help Rangoon's university programmes, a replica of Buddha's tooth for Burmese Buddhists, Chinese paintings for exhibition in Rangoon, and a "Burma-Chinese Friendship Library" in Tientsin. Traffic between Burma and mainland China was indeed heavy and almost incessant in these years.

On the more formal and serious side, two mail service protocols were signed in November 1957. A second major trade pact superseding that of April 1954 was concluded in February 1958.<sup>42</sup> Driving continually hard against "Kuomintang troops" and their associates in the border areas and bearing down upon their counterparts in urban centres in Burma, the Burmese Government pointedly avoided involving Peking in its domestic developments during 1957-59. Even during the Tibetan and Indian frontier disturbances in the spring of 1959, Burma's leaders maintained a meticulously correct public attitude, showing only moral concern on the surface. Their decision in July 1959 to accept again American economic aid may represent a devious reaction in this particular respect, but may also indicate Rangoon's new-found sense of

<sup>39</sup> For Chinese aid on textiles, see NCNA, January 2, 1957.

<sup>40</sup> NCNA, February 10 and 15, 1957. This, of course, does not eliminate, and certainly tends to betray, the influence of Peking over Burma's Communist "underground forces" in this context. Cf. relevant information emerging from the case of the Russian defector A. Y. Kaznacheyev from the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon in mid-1959, as reported in NYT, June 27, 28 and 30, and December 18, 1959.

<sup>41</sup> NCNA, May 29, 1957.

<sup>42</sup> SCMP, Nos. 1646, 1706, and 1719.

relative safety with the final working-out of the boundary question in executive sessions during the preceding month.<sup>43</sup>

#### THE BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT AND "EVERLASTING PEACE"

By mid-1959, therefore, the general atmosphere and the ready blueprint both helped to set the stage for an important formality: the signing of a border agreement. Although the ensuing months were not entirely unmarred by occasional reports of additional border disturbances, the sending of a Burmese cultural and goodwill mission to Peking in October 1959 on the occasion of the latter régime's tenth anniversary and the consultation the same month between the Burmese Premier, Ne Win, and India's Nehru on their very similar boundary problems with Communist China clearly indicated Burma's move toward this event. Peking reciprocated with the sending of Chinese scholars and a cultural friendship delegation to Rangoon at the turn of the year. Shortly thereafter, Premier Ne Win himself arrived in Peking, and after only a few days of smooth talks he signed with Chou En-lai on January 28, 1960, the anticipated Sino-Burmese Agreement on the Boundary Question, as well as a Sino-Burmese Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression.<sup>44</sup>

According to the Agreement—"in principle" only, subject to specification in a final Boundary Treaty—China was to: (1) recover the three Kachin villages mentioned earlier; and (2) give up the Namwan Assigned Tract, where Burma had built a highway connecting the Kachin with the Shan State, in exchange for "the areas under the jurisdiction of the Panhung and Panlao tribes" in the Wa district to the west of the 1941 line.<sup>45</sup>

As for the Non-Aggression Treaty, article 2 provides that "There shall be everlasting peace between the contracting parties." Article 3 stipulates non-participation in "any military alliance directed against the other" on the part of either country; but in view of the existing Peking-Moscow axis, it would presumably allow participation in alliances that are "not directed against the other." Article 4 stresses the developing and strengthening of "economic and cultural ties." The whole document, in short, merely confirms and formalises "peaceful co-existence," although in the absence of one-year advance notice of any intention to abrogate from either side, this ten-year treaty is to "remain in force without any specified time limit."<sup>46</sup>

While the Non-Aggression Treaty became directly effective in May

<sup>43</sup> Cf. NYT, July 7, 1959.

<sup>44</sup> See relevant reports in SCMP, Nos. 2108, 2117, 2137, 2169, 2181, 2186, 2188, and 2189.

<sup>45</sup> See text of Agreement in CB, No. 612. Cf. relevant comments in *China News Analysis*, No. 311.

<sup>46</sup> *Loc. cit.*

1960, when instruments of ratification were exchanged,<sup>47</sup> the detailed amplification of the Boundary Agreement leading towards the conclusion of a final Boundary Treaty—such as surveying the areas involved, erecting boundary markers, producing relevant maps, etc.—were still to be worked out by a joint committee. With the Peking *People's Daily* hailing the Agreement as a “new example of solidarity and friendship between Asian countries,”<sup>48</sup> Chou En-lai, evincing similar gestures toward Nepal and India, visited Rangoon in mid-April 1960 upon Burma's invitation. It was at this time that the Burmese, now once again under the Premiership of U Nu, accorded him a rousing welcome amidst Rangoon's Buddhist New Year celebrations, wishing him “long life.” In the resultant joint communiqué, a “new stage” of “friendly co-operation” was “pointed out with satisfaction” and a “determination” to further developments in the same direction was professed.<sup>49</sup> Upon Chou's return to Peking, a delegation of Burmese journalists followed him, late in the same month.<sup>50</sup> In late June, the scheduled Sino-Burmese Boundary Joint Committee was finally set up, with a Joint Survey Team added afterwards. Meetings were held alternately in Rangoon and Peking during the ensuing period, and a draft of the intended Boundary Treaty was prepared by late August 1960.<sup>51</sup>

In late September 1960, U Nu, with an entourage of 300, arrived in Peking himself, and on October 1 he signed with Chou the long-awaited twelve-article Boundary Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Burma, together with accompanying notes. Except for minor amendments, this formal Treaty, with relevant maps attached, substantiated all the major stipulations contained in the January Agreement—to wit: the return of Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang (measuring fifty-nine square miles) to mainland China (article 1); the transfer of the Namwan Assigned Tract (measuring eighty-five square miles) to Burma and the corresponding transfer of the Panhung and Panlao tribal areas (measuring seventy-three square miles) to mainland China (article 2); and acceptance of the 1941 line as the final boundary in all other sections between the two countries (articles 1–6).<sup>52</sup> This Treaty has come into effect since January 4, 1961, when Chou En-lai, with an entourage of

<sup>47</sup> See SCMP, No. 2261.

<sup>48</sup> Editorial, February 1, 1960.

<sup>49</sup> See SCMP, Nos. 2231, 2243–2244; cf. NYT, April 16, 17, 1960.

<sup>50</sup> SCMP, Nos. 2252, 2253, 2259.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, Nos. 2289–2291, 2295, 2299, 2301, 2303, 2306, 2309, 2311–2314, 2316, 2321, 2327–2328; cf. NYT, July 31, August 14, 1960.

<sup>52</sup> NYT, September 26, 28; October 3, 1960. For texts of Treaty and Notes, see CB, No. 636, pp. 1–11. The minor amendments mentioned here have to do with the adjustment of “a small section” of the 1941 line to reunite bisected villages through exchanges (Article 3). Also, matters concerning free choice of citizenship and cultivation of frontier land are clarified (Notes exchanged between Chou En-lai and U Nu).

400, visited Rangoon on Burma's thirteenth independence anniversary and exchanged with U Nu the final instruments of ratification.<sup>53</sup>

Looking back, both Rangoon and Peking have, indeed, come a long way in resolving their differences amidst domestic as well as international upheaval. "There were many difficulties to overcome on both sides," as U Nu has pointed out, and the final boundary settlement therefore "was not an easy achievement."<sup>54</sup> From the point of view of territory, neither the tribal areas nor the three Kachin villages could mean very much to mainland China. In practice, total transfer of the former serves merely to solve the problem of bisected communities along the old ill-defined borderline, and that of the latter provides at most an all-weather low pass at Hpimaw in the mountain ranges. But politically, "recovery" of the three Kachin villages apparently represents the righting of a wrong done, in Peking's view, to China by "imperialist aggression" in the past. To Burma, transfer of the Namwan Assigned Tract helps preserve the integrity of its highway system, and undoubtedly symbolises what she, as a small neutralist neighbour, can, in her own view, very well accomplish in the face of a giant Communist state. U Nu, therefore, has made the point to stress further that the settlement was not "imposed" on or by either side, and that it would be "ridiculous" for anyone to assume so.<sup>55</sup>

Since October 1960, continued efforts have been made to further trade and cultural activities between the two countries, including the repair of sections of the old Burma Road and talks about the building of a railway from Burma to China. In answer to a query by the West as to whether Burma could still be viewed as "uncommitted," the influential Burmese newspaper, *The Nation*, backed up U Nu by saying that "we did not sign the treaties with China to become its satellite. We did so because we wish to preserve our identity as a proud and independent nation with a clearly marked fence between us and a neighbour." In the same vein, however, the newspaper issued a "warning" on the talks by "Burmese politicians" of "a railway to China," which it regarded as "uneconomic" for "commercial purposes" if Burma herself were to take the responsibility of construction, and as probably for "military purposes" if Peking were to finance the project.<sup>56</sup>

Burma's U Nu, it has been observed, "has consistently shown goodwill to China and has continually extolled the goodwill of China's leaders." Therefore, "if China should ever intervene in Burma" and thereby "gain control of Burma's modest resources," this "moral

<sup>53</sup> See NYT, December 31, 1960; January 3, 5, 1961.

<sup>54</sup> Speech at the Treaty signing ceremony in Peking, October 1, 1960; see CB, No. 636, pp. 12-14.

<sup>55</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>56</sup> *The Nation*, October 5, 20, 1960; cf. NYT, December 25, 29-30, 1960.

attitude" on Burma's part would necessarily be "outraged" and Peking, in turn, would "forfeit the confidence of India and of the emerging peoples of Africa."<sup>57</sup> But, after "numerous confidential conversations with Burmese Cabinet Ministers, foreign diplomats and others" in Rangoon, another observer has once found that there were Burmese leaders who thought of the new combination of "Chinese jingoism" and the Communist world revolution as "a time-bomb" and regarded their country's neutralism merely as "realism."<sup>58</sup>

Peking, indeed, has not neglected to try to alleviate neutralist apprehension in general and to placate Burma's sensitivity in particular, even though it has shown little hesitation in provoking the West.<sup>59</sup> Burma, so far, has responded graciously. Yet, whether "everlasting peace" is now actually feasible still remains to be seen.

<sup>57</sup> H. Tinker, "Nu, the Serene Statesman," *Pacific Affairs*, June 1957, pp. 120-137.

<sup>58</sup> R. Trumbull, "Fear of Red China Evident in Burma," *NYT*, October 24, 1954.

<sup>59</sup> See *NYT*, November 1, December 7, 1960, for reports on Communist China's latest official propaganda on the theme that revolution "cannot be imported or exported" and, through the Moscow declaration of the 81 Communist parties, that the five principles of peaceful co-existence which Peking and Rangoon have subscribed to are to be respected.

# Ten Years of Storm

By CHOW CHING-WEN

In our third issue, Lord Lindsay of Birker reviewed FENG PAO SHIH NIEN, an account of the Communist Chinese régime given by a leader of the China Democratic League who had co-operated with it until 1956 when he fled to Hong Kong. Since then, the book has appeared, reduced in size, in an English translation entitled *TEN YEARS OF STORM*.<sup>\*</sup> In his review, Lord Lindsay indicated the main points of interest in Mr. Chow's work. Here we print, with the kind permission of Holt, Rinehart and Winston, two eyewitness accounts from the book. The first describes an episode during the 1951 campaign against counter-revolutionaries; the second is even more personal, telling as it does of the attacks made on Mr. Chow himself during the "Three-Anti Movement" against waste, corruption and bureaucracy in 1952.

## The Campaign against Counter-Revolutionaries

I eyewitnessed some of the "struggle meetings" of this Movement. What I saw was typical of such meetings during that period.

The first struggle meeting I witnessed was held in Shen-yang on April 25, 1951. I had just been to Korea as a member of the Chinese People's Comfort Mission to the troops, and was returning to Peking with other members of the group. We were quite busy with preparations for our work in anticipation of our arrival in Peking, but somehow, we stopped working that day. I was invited to attend a struggle meeting which was to start that day at ten o'clock in the morning. The meeting was held in a big stadium built during the Japanese occupation with a seating capacity of sixty to seventy thousand people. When I arrived, the place was already packed. Even the field in the center of the stadium was filled, and the black heads of the masses resembled so many crows in the sun. Red flags were fluttering in the breeze everywhere, and people were singing songs in praise of the [Chinese Communist Party] CCP and shouting "Eliminate all the Counter-revolutionaries!" and "Long Live the CCP!" As soon as I entered the stadium and walked to my seat near the rostrum, I felt the electric atmosphere of the meeting.

The rostrum was on the north side of the stadium, and in front of it there was a temporary wooden platform with a square table in the middle of it. Below the platform and in the midst of the crowd on the field, there was a kind of pen made of wooden planks. The size of the enclosure was roughly two thousand square feet. In it, nineteen people were standing in two rows, facing east and west, opposite each other. They were wearing cotton-padded or fur-lined long gowns or short jackets and trousers in spite of the warm weather, and each had pinned on his chest a strip of white cloth of about a foot long and five inches wide, on which their names

<sup>\*</sup> Chow Ching-wen, *Ten Years of Storm*. Translated and edited by Lai Ming (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

and "titles" such as bully, ruffian, etc. were written. On either side of the rows stood a soldier with bayoneted rifle.

Under the warm sun, the masses, in their cotton dresses and spring garments, sang and shouted. Suddenly the loudspeaker announced, "The meeting is now open!" and the noises quickly subsided. Chu Chu-wen, Mayor of Shen-yang, then ordered one of the nineteen criminals to be brought up to the platform. Two soldiers escorted him, a monkey of a man, to the platform and made him kneel in front of the square table, facing the crowd. Chu ordered the complainant against this man to be brought up. A woman about thirty years old, her face hidden behind her two hands, was helped to the platform and led to stand on the north side of the table. She was wearing a blue jacket and blue trousers, and her hair was disheveled. She started to cry. About fifteen minutes later, she was able to control herself and raised her rather thin face to say that the man kneeling in front of the table was her father, a tailor. Her mother had died when she was still a child. When she was nine years old, she was raped by her father, and until she was fourteen, she was continuously forced to have sexual relations with him. At that, she broke down again. The crowd roared and cursed and shouted, "Shoot the beast!" Up in the stands, it appeared as if some people were leading the others in shouting slogans and gesticulating. The stadium was in an uproar. It was announced that the tailor was sentenced to death, and the crowd responded by crying, "Long Live the CCP!", "Long Live the Victory of the Revolution!"

When that man was returned to the pen, another man, who was about thirty, "local bully so-and-so," was brought up to the platform by two other soldiers. He refused to kneel down and the soldiers tried to force him. I saw that while they were struggling, and the man was cursing or spitting, one of the soldiers pulled something away from the back of the man's neck. He immediately gave up struggling and knelt down. I could not understand this and asked one of the local officials who was sitting next to me about it. He said, "We put a wire ring around every accused person. If he tries to struggle or resist, the soldiers have only to pull the wire back against his windpipe and choke him."

Another complainant was brought to the platform. He described how the accused had bullied innocent and honest people and told how many had died at his hands. The crowd again responded with shouts and curses and "Shoot the bully!" Again the accused was sentenced to death and the crowd again roared, "Long Live the CCP!" and "Victory to the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries!"

So it went on and all nineteen people in the pen were sentenced to death. At 3.00 p.m., the crowd came out of the struggle meeting victorious. Their voices had become hoarse, and they left the stadium in orderly fashion.

That night, at the Government Hostel of the Northeastern People's Government where we were staying—and which had been, incidentally, the expensive Ta-Ho Hotel during the Japanese occupation—there was a dancing party. About three hundred leaders and cadres were present. They danced happily to soft music in a festive atmosphere until the early hours.

The next day was bright and humid. It was a day of massacre. At eight o'clock in the morning, well-organized squadrons of people began going to the execution ground.

Out of nostalgia, I drove with a member of the CCP from the New Municipal Area (former Japanese Concession) to the once-prosperous Sze

Ping Street in the Old City, but I did not see the normal sights of the city. All the shops along the road were closed. I later learned that every household and shop had been ordered to send someone to join the demonstration, which explained the human sea on the streets.

I returned to the hostel at ten. At half past ten, we were informed that the Bureau of Public Security was getting ready to take the convicts to the execution ground. We went out on the balcony of the second floor to have a look. From where we stood, we could see clearly, across the circle, the building of the Bureau of Public Security which was less than a hundred yards away. There were many policemen on the streets to maintain order, and on both sides of the pavements there were masses of people. The loudspeakers at the street corners were blaring revolutionary songs. After a while, the songs stopped and silence fell over the crowd. Then the loudspeakers announced, "Citizens! We are now going to take the prisoners to the execution ground. They will pass with bowed heads in front of you, whom they have persecuted, so that before they pay back their blood debts, they may first apologize to you!"

The gates of the Bureau of Public Security opened, and out came a police truck with about twenty policemen standing on it, guns in hand, followed by twenty-odd trucks carrying prisoners and four police guards each. The trucks went slowly past our hostel, and I saw that every prisoner had been stripped to his pants and had his wrists tied behind his back. They were crouching on the trucks, still and lifeless, and at first glance, gave one the impression of so many pigs going to slaughter. The loudspeakers began to boom, "Shoot the Counterrevolutionaries!" and the crowd shouted and clapped. All around me, people were calmly chatting and laughing. After the trucks went by, the huge crowd closed in after them and followed them to the execution ground.

That day, more than four hundred so-called counterrevolutionaries were shot. I did not go to the execution ground, but I was told that the place was packed, and that after each execution, the crowd, under direction, applauded.

That night, I borrowed a copy of Dickens' *A Tale of Two Cities* from another member of the Mission who happened to be a writer. As I read, I could understand why it was possible for the French to derive pleasure from killing. They hated the French aristocracy. But what I had seen that day was different. The masses had no quarrel with those who were executed, yet they shouted and applauded the Government-sponsored massacre. I think in their hearts they must have been frightened. [pp. 108-113.]

### The Three-Anti Movement

My own experience will illustrate fully what happened in the Three-Anti Movement. As I mentioned before, I was one of the vice-chairmen of the Thrift Supervisory Committee at the Headquarters of the China Democratic League (CDL). I was nominated to make the initial report on the objectives of the movement at the first full meeting. I did so and also said that I supported the movement because I thought it was a timely and necessary thing. I concluded by criticizing my own behavior. I did not suspect that one of the members of the committee would, in alliance with two CCP members, later maintain that what I said during this meeting was my formal

"self-criticism," and accuse me of not having thoroughly and wholeheartedly criticized myself. They spread rumors that I did not actively support the movement.

They started their campaign against me by checking the accounts of the Financial Committee of the CDL of which I was chairman. Unfortunately, Wang Hsi-kuan, the accountant, was found to have taken one million three hundred thousand *Jen-min-piao* (equal to one hundred and thirty-two new yuan) during the years he held his post. He confessed to this later under pressure. He and Tse Ya-chin, an assistant accountant, became "targets of attack." On the day of the "struggle meeting," which was to be held at the office of the Finance Committee, I noticed that a poster had been pasted on the walls with these words on it: "Stop the bourgeois from usurping leadership!" and during the meeting, I noticed that two-thirds of the accusations that were heaped on Wang and Tse were actually aimed at me. I was called upon to make a report of my past activities and I knew that I had to do something. After Wang admitted having misappropriated the money, and Tse was found guilty of incompetence they were both suspended from their jobs and taken away to be locked up somewhere in the headquarters buildings. As the meeting drew to a close, I said, "Comrades! We have had a good meeting today. When I came in, I noticed the poster with the words 'Stop the bourgeois from usurping leadership!' on it. I want to say to you that not only am I unqualified to usurp leadership if I wanted to, but I declined many times to accept this post of chairman of the committee. The members of the Executive Committee must have been blind when they elected me, a bourgeois, to the post. In spite of my repeated requests, they would not let me relinquish it. However, I am in favor of the Three-Anti Movement. You prepare the bath, and I will jump into it. I will make a report of my past activities at the next meeting, and I want you to be prepared to criticize me." Having achieved their purpose, they clapped and the meeting was adjourned.

I spent some time preparing a full report of my past activities and my work at the Finance Committee. At the next meeting, I took three hours to review my whole life, and received the applause of the members. After the meeting, I asked one of the cadres what he thought of my report, and he said that everyone seemed satisfied with it. However, at a subsequent meeting of the Thrift Supervisory Committee, I was blamed for boasting of my contributions to the Revolution, and given more than twenty questions to answer. I realized then that the attack against me was under the direction of the [Central Committee] CC. But the fact was, I was not boastful at all. All my life, I had engaged in educational and cultural activities with the purpose of resisting the Japanese and helping to establish a democratic China.

Two weeks later, after the staff members had supposedly had time to form their opinions of me, I made another even more comprehensive report on my life and thought. This time I even listed the names of all my American friends, specifying my relationship with each. Nevertheless, I was again attacked. "What about your anti-Communist and anti-Soviet Union activities? And what is your idea of socialism?" they asked. It at last dawned upon me that they wanted me to discredit myself and admit that I had been wrong in my opinions of the CCP and Soviet Union. I said that I was willing and ready to review again my past activities, and if necessary I would do so ten more times. After the meeting, someone said to me, "Bow

## TEN YEARS OF STORM

to them! Call yourself a few names!" I answered, "I shall only be responsible for what I have done, not for what I have not done, and I am willing to be punished more severely than the others if I should be found guilty."

I knew that what I said about myself was reported by the members of the CCP and the "progressive elements" to the United Front Work Department, and that there was an organized search on for articles and books I had written and for gossip about me. At home, I prepared another thirty-thousand-word report on myself. I quoted articles I had written and published in the *Times Critique* in Hong Kong, including one in which I wrote that under the Communist rule, there was only one freedom—the freedom of the Party to sanction or not to sanction. I quoted another article in which I commented on the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and criticized rather severely, and, I hope, justly, Stalin and the Soviet Union. But, determined as I was to resist the CC's attempt to discredit me, I knew that I was no match for them, and I was prepared to defend my honor by committing suicide. I decided that if there was time, I would slash my wrists and open one or two arteries and die a slow death as I drank wine and listened to recorded music. And if there was no time, I would swallow the 10 c.c. of potassium cyanide which a student in the Department of Chemistry in Peking University had obtained for me, and which I kept in a phial in one of my pockets.

It happened that the [United Front Work Department (of the CCP)] UFWD then decided to call off the attack against the minor parties and groups, and I was spared. Two or three years later, I was told by Wang Chien, one of the CCP members who directed the attack against me, that they had been afraid I would get angry and bang on the table, saying, "I have had enough of this reviewing! You can do what you want with me!" in which case I would have "stood in the way of the movement." By that time I was able to dismiss the subject with a smile.

Compared to others who were attacked during that period, however, I suffered nothing to speak of. They were ostracized, slapped, cursed, and humiliated in all sorts of ways at endless meetings, and then arrested and imprisoned. The mental anguish people suffered at struggle meetings was one of the major causes which drove many people to commit suicide.

[pp. 127-131.]

## ***Comment***

### **Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute**

I WOULD like to comment on certain points in Mr. L. C. Green's important article on the "Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute" in the issue of July/September, 1960.

On p. 45 Mr. Green suggests that Tibet, which he assumes to have been under Chinese suzerainty, may have been represented at the Simla Conference in 1913-14 merely to ensure that the Chinese delegate would have an expert present to advise him on the extent to which Tibetan interests were affected by the Agreement. Such a suggestion is entirely novel and has not been put forward before, even by the Chinese; but, even though the record of the Simla Conference has not yet been published in full, there is ample evidence to refute it.

Tibetan acceptance of the formal overlordship of the Manchu Emperors of China for almost two centuries from 1720 to 1910 had been based on no written agreement. It was due not to conquest but to a sort of diplomatic arrangement. In Tibetan eyes, Chao Erh-feng's invasion of Lhasa in 1910 put an end to that relationship. The Tibetans thereupon renounced the overlordship of the Chinese Emperor and declared their independence. They were able to make good that declaration in 1912, after the Chinese Revolution, by evicting every Chinese from their territory.

The position before 1910 had been acknowledged by the British Government which had made an inconclusive attempt to formulate it after the Younghusband Expedition of 1904 by making, first, a treaty directly with the Tibetans and then, two years later in 1906, a separate convention with the Chinese Government to bring about their adherence to the 1904 Agreement. Subsequently the British recognised that the events of 1910-12 had brought about a complete change in the relationship between Tibet and China and they showed that recognition by securing Chinese agreement to the representation of Tibet at the Simla Conference by a separate and properly accredited plenipotentiary. They also expressed the view that the state of war existing between Tibet and China had made the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 of no effect. The inescapable conclusion, which is further supported by the formal exchange and recognition of credentials by all parties at the Conference

itself, is, therefore, that Tibet came to the Simla Conference in no sense in an advisory capacity under Chinese suzerainty but as an international entity with full treaty-making powers.

The British Government, it is true, believed that the best hope of stability north of the Himalayas lay in the restoration in some form of the friendly, peculiarly Asian, relationship which had existed between Tibet and China before 1910. It was on British persuasion that the Tibetan Government agreed that it would surrender part of its independence *on condition that* the Chinese Government should give and implement specific guarantees of Tibetan autonomy and a fixed frontier. Proposed Tibetan concessions did not even extend to the granting of Chinese control over Tibetan foreign affairs while, on the other side, the content of suzerainty was strictly defined.

If a tripartite convention had been concluded, Tibet would have limited its independence by accepting the nominal overlordship of China. But the Convention was eventually rejected by the Chinese, whereupon, on July 3, 1914, the British and Tibetan Governments signed it as binding on themselves, subject to a joint declaration to the effect that all the privileges which would have accrued to the Chinese Government should be withheld until the Chinese also signed the Convention. One of these privileges would have been the recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet; and, as the Chinese did not sign, that was withheld. And so, whatever may have been the form in which a tripartite convention was intended to be signed, its eventual, bipartite, form can only be interpreted as binding the British Government *not* to recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet until the Chinese should give the required guarantees—which they never did. This position is clearly affirmed in Mr. Eden's memorandum of August 5, 1943, sent to the then Chinese Government, in which the emphasis is on Tibet's autonomy, and the recognition of Chinese suzerainty is made contingent on the Chinese fulfilling their part of the bargain.

Nothing happened subsequently to vary the British undertaking to the Tibetan Government; and in August 1947, British rights in and obligations to Tibet were accepted *in toto* by the new Government of India. The latter's interpretation of the status of Tibet in 1914 is to be seen in paragraph 31 of their official note to the Chinese Government dated February 12, 1960, which makes it clear that, in the view of Mr. Nehru's Government, Tibet was an equal party at the Simla Conference. That position is not weakened by the Indian Government's admission, in 1954, of Tibet as an integral part of China—an admission made subsequent to China's *de facto* invasion and subjection of Tibet.

On the same basis, the Government of India upholds the validity of the agreement of 1914 which defines the north-eastern sector of India's

frontier with Tibet by what is known as the McMahon Line. That line was settled in direct negotiations between the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries at Simla on March 24, 1914, a month before the initialling of the tripartite convention by all three plenipotentiaries; and this separate agreement is further evidence of British acceptance of Tibet as a treaty-making Power. The McMahon Line was also shown, as part of the red line marking the external frontiers of Tibet, in the map attached to the Convention. Its inclusion was neither questioned nor discussed by the Chinese plenipotentiary who, with the other two parties, initialled the map and the Convention itself on April 27, 1914. This map, together with China's subsequent reason given for non-ratification, establishes that neither the Chinese plenipotentiary nor his government directed their attention or interest to that part of the frontier facing India. They took stand only on the part towards China.

These considerations may lead Mr. Green to a reassessment of Tibet's status in 1914 which would reinforce what seems to be his rather tentative inclination to find in favour of the legal validity of the McMahon Line.

HUGH RICHARDSON.

## Book Reviews

### OVERSEAS CHINESE

*The Chinese in the United States of America.* By ROSE HUM LEE.  
[Hong Kong University Press, 1960. 465 pp. Appendices, Index,  
Maps. 52s. 6d. \$8.30.]

DR. LEE has presented us with our first full-scale general study of the Chinese in the United States. In some ways it is a useful volume. The author has summarised for us the results of a considerable amount of original research—data drawn in many instances from unpublished theses and other relatively inaccessible sources. If she has missed far more of the relevant thesis literature than she has utilised, we are nonetheless grateful to her for skimming the cream from a number of particularly valuable ones. In addition, she provides some unique accounts of early Chinese immigrants derived from her own doctoral research in the Rocky Mountain states, and manages to convey with no little skill the human dimensions of social marginality as experienced by Chinese immigrants to America. Her chapter on the changing fashions in American imagery of the Chinese is amusing and effective.

For all its utility, however, Dr. Lee's study is neither a good book nor a definitive one. To begin with, the coverage is hit and miss. Except for an unenlightening word or two in passing, there is no treatment of the Chinese Press or the Chinese-language schools in America. On the historical side, too little of the fascinating story has been ferreted out. It never occurs to the author, for instance, to wonder why almost all the Chinese in America originated in a few counties of Kwangtung province, or to find out how the emigration was organised. Dr. Lee's knowledge of the Chinese scene is inadequate. It suffices to note her belief that the various languages and dialects spoken in the southern provinces of China are "derivatives" of Cantonese (p. 97) and her assertion that Taoism, as well as Confucianism, was "used to establish inter-clan and intra-clan relationships and to formalise them with ritual observances" (p. 278). Her treatment of the clan and extended family in traditional Chinese society (pp. 134-135) is based on misconception.

While Dr. Lee makes no claim to sinological competence, she does function as a sociologist, and in this realm the deficiencies are no less apparent. To be sure, sociological principles and platitudes are bandied

about at the beginning of almost every chapter, and there is considerable recourse to jargon, but of sociological *analysis* there is precious little. In this volume, much is asserted, a good deal less is documented, and very little is accounted for. Even statistical analyses, such as that on page 145 of sub-groups within the Chinese community, are unsupported by so much as a clue to the source of the figures. Dr. Lee has uncovered a number of sociologically significant contrasts: that, for instance, the Chinese of Sze Yap origin tend to be less successful than others in terms of occupational mobility (pp. 385-386); that "the suicide rate among the Chinese in San Francisco is four times greater than that for the city as a whole" (p. 333); or that American-born Japanese have better integrated themselves into American society in sixty years than local-born Chinese have in more than twice that span of time (p. 425). The trouble is that Dr. Lee leaves facts such as these unaccounted for; on the rare occasion when she does essay an explanation (as with the suicide datum), the results are unconvincing.

The author's interests are focused on problems relating to the Americanisation of Chinese immigrants and their descendants. At first it appears that this interest reflects a measure of intellectual investment, for early in the book some original definitions of the major processes involved—acculturation, assimilation and integration—are introduced, presumably to sharpen the analysis to come. But the analysis never comes, the conceptual distinctions are ignored, and the formula, "acculturation, assimilation and integration," is used throughout simply as jargonish longhand for Americanisation. As the book progresses it becomes apparent that the concern with Americanisation is for Dr. Lee an emotional and personal one. Whatever acculturation and its related processes may be sociologically, Dr. Lee endows them with magical qualities and virtually bathes them with positive effect. The reader must be prepared for stirring testimonials to pro-assimilationist forces ranging from churches (when pastored, that is, by native-born American citizens) to the Girl Scouts.

Preparation, however, is hardly the word for what the reader needs to withstand the author's assault on anti-assimilationist forces. Dr. Lee is a determined fighter for her cause. First she assails the Chinatowns, calling them "ghettos" and voicing the hope that "the blight which surrounds most Chinatowns will attack their core" (p. 419). Then she turns on the Chinese associations which form their hard core: the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association is "a powerful—often vicious—pressure group," women's clubs are "fronts" for the "tongs," and many of the other societies are "still associated with illegal activities" (pp. 149, 162, 165). The leaders of Chinatown and its associations are "authoritarian, dictatorial and uncommunicative," out to preserve

their status by nefarious schemes, and liable to decamp to the Communist side once the U.S. government has recognised Peking (pp. 425-429). A good part of the book reads like an exposé, though the allegations—like this one: "Nine years ago . . . the Communist underground succeeded in becoming entrenched in out-of-the-way cities and states with small Chinese populations" (p. 173)—are never specific enough to be confirmed or disproved.

The history of Dr. Lee's family, not seriously disguised on pages 191-193 and 387-388 of this book, offers some insight into her pugnacity. One of seven children reared on a pittance by a China-born widow, Dr. Lee had to fight every step of the way from "a tumbledown wooden shack" in Butte, Montana, to a professorship at Roosevelt University in Chicago. Unfortunately for the book under review, she is still fighting her personal vendettas in its pages. An unseemly number of her enemies are dragged into the book in thinly drawn anonymity to receive their thirty lashes. More often than not, however, as befits a sociologist, her enemies are dispatched group by group. Dr. Lee, herself of Sam Yap origin, has this to say of the Sze Yap outgroup: "The foreign-born wives from the Sze Yap districts . . . were more inclined to commit adultery and bigamy than wives of other territorial origin and nativity. The children and husbands of these Sze Yap mothers were the ones who were deported or imprisoned for crimes . . ." (p. 385). Dr. Lee is herself a native-born American citizen, and as for the "alien-born who cling to their Chinese citizenship," they are "wittingly or unwittingly helping the Communists, though they may claim that such is not their intention" (p. 425). Dr. Lee, well-educated herself, finds it "noteworthy" that Chinese "of the lower educational levels relish spreading fallacious and insidious tales about other Chinese with whom they have no intimate acquaintance" (p. 377). So it goes. By the time the author has dismissed other occupational groups as under-achievers, other Chinese-American leaders as big frogs in little puddles, and China-born intellectuals as secretive and deficient in candour and veracity, her ingroup has dwindled to the point where she is its unique member: "the only American of Chinese ancestry to head a university department of Sociology" (p. 418).

It is not agreeable to report that in Dr. Lee's book the scholarly contribution has been diluted almost beyond recognition by trivia of dubious intent. Neither is it pleasant to see page after page of vituperation and innuendo slip past the editor's shears and appear under the imprint of a university press.

G. WILLIAM SKINNER.

*Overseas Chinese Nationalism, The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1916.* By LEA E. WILLIAMS [Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press (The Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), xvi+235 pp. \$4.50.]

IN present-day Indonesia we are witnessing the clash of two nationalisms which grew up within the setting of a colonial empire. The Indonesians, having won their battle with the Dutch, are pursuing the logic of the nationalised state. They are forcing a conflict with the Chinese nationalism to the early history of which Dr. Williams has devoted this study. It is a remarkable piece of scholarship for it rests on the author's ability to handle sources in three key languages (Dutch, Chinese, and Malay) and on his skill in constructing from the multiplicity of these sources (official Dutch documents and printed Chinese historical materials, among them) a reasoned account of how nationalism came to be a significant feature of Chinese life under Dutch rule.

The account effectively begins with a statement of the position of the Chinese in the Indies at the start of the twentieth century. They were then a distinct segment of the population, concentrated in certain areas of the economy, and treated legally and politically as a separate social entity. As a whole, however, they did not form a cohesive group, and Dr. Williams states his problem well when he says (p. 19) that he is setting out to study "how, why, by whom, and with what result the passive feeling of separateness of the Indies Chinese was transformed into vigorous nationalism in the space of a decade and a half."

At the end of the nineteenth century a shift in Dutch policy robbed the Chinese revenue farmers of great privileges, both economic and political. Their grievances against several aspects of their control by the Dutch (the travel-pass system, the rules confining them to certain residential areas, and their subjection to courts of law for natives) were heightened. From the world outside, and especially from and through Singapore, came news of the stirrings of Chinese cultural and political nationalism. The imperial government of China had a Consul General in Singapore. It had begun to take an interest in the affairs of its emigrant subjects, having for long looked upon them with disdain or indifference. The scene was being set for the Chinese in the Indies to become actively Overseas Chinese, their eyes turned towards a homeland which would henceforth begin to set them cultural models and political ideals and tasks.

A symptom of the shifts in attitude was the beginning of a new interest

in "Confucianism," which we are to understand as an attempt to grasp the essence of Chinese cultural tradition and to use it as a means of reforming Chinese life overseas. (Dr. Williams traces the movement to Singapore; he might with profit have explored the literature in English put out by the Singapore "Confucianists," for much of what they published is relevant to Indies issues. The attack on the Malayised culture of the old-established Chinese in the Straits Settlements and the propaganda for its modernisation would help in our understanding of parallel processes across the water.) One product of "Confucianism" was the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan (*Chung-hua hui-kuan*), a form of association which was to occupy a key position in the Indies Chinese community.

In 1901 the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan in Batavia opened a modern school in which the medium of instruction was to be *Kuo-yü*. (English was also given a prominent place in the new educational system. In trying to account for the choice of this language Dr. Williams has, I think, overlooked one point: teachers of English were available in the Straits Settlements.) Not only did the new schools provide the setting for modern Chinese culture; they furnished a bridge with the homeland, for some pupils were sent on to China for further education, while the home Government dispatched inspectors to advise the school organisers.

The school movement was one aspect of pan-Chinese organisation in the Indies. Another aspect was the growth of the chambers of commerce (*shang-hui*) which were inspired by an official representative from China. Despite their name, the chambers of commerce were by no means simply economic in function; they were set up as agencies of the Chinese Government and they carried out consular tasks until, in 1912, Chinese consulates were established. Among the other new forms of organisation mentioned by Dr. Williams it is necessary to note here only the Soe Po Sia (*Shu-pao she*), which may be defined as political study groups connected with revolutionary nationalism in China.

The nationalism under study had many sides to it. The Indies Chinese organised themselves as a total community, making a political reality of the principles underlying a colonial plural society. They found a new interest in their Chinese cultural heritage. They established links with their homeland both in respect of its legal government and the reformist and revolutionary movements current in it. Two immediate consequences of the new strength of the Indies Chinese were, first, concessions by the Dutch in the fields of education, pass laws, residential restrictions, and trial procedure, and, second, the involvement of local political and cultural progress with movements in the homeland. Looking

back at the Chinese in the Indies as they were fifty years ago, we can see coming into being the complex inter-relationship between the modernisation of China, the rallying of Overseas Chinese forces, and the growth of local nationalism in South-East Asia. One could wish that Dr. Williams had said more on the last point (and so brought his book even more fully within the category of Indonesian studies), but that we are able to see so much of interest in his study is a tribute to his research and his analysis.

MAURICE FREEDMAN.

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*Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic.* A Report to the International Commission of Jurists by its Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet. [Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1960. xiii and 345 pp. 7s. 6d.]

IN 1959 the International Commission of Jurists published a document entitled "The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law" which was directed to proving that Tibet was not part of China and was the victim of unprovoked aggression. Many readers of that volume regarded the documents compiled by the Commission as being its most valuable part, although a large number of them were unable to accept the Commission's interpretation that they proved Tibet's independent international status.

The present Report is that of the Legal Inquiry Committee established by the Commission to investigate events in Tibet. The Committee was unable to enter Tibet and conduct its investigation on the spot, so that everything is based on secondary reports. Due allowance must, therefore, be made for the natural exaggerations of refugees and other non-objective or partisan witnesses. In fact, the reviewer finds the most valuable part of the volume is Appendix III consisting of five documents relating to the international status of Tibet.

The whole tenor of the Report, and of the general view of the Commission, is based on the conviction that Tibet was an independent sovereign state and not a Chinese possession—this ignores the fact that no existing state recognises this independence. It is possible that a narrow and unanalytical view of the relevant documents will support this argument. Such an interpretation would not, however, warrant the amount of attention that is paid by the Inquiry Committee to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The People's Republic of China has never accepted this Declaration, and even if it had it would

## BOOK REVIEWS

amount to no more than a pious wish of conduct to be achieved some time in the future—a point emphasised by Mr. Attlee (as he then was) while Prime Minister.

Likewise, the arguments concerning genocide are based on an entirely false premise. In the first place, the secondhand evidence called in support is far from convincing. More important, however, is the fact that the Genocide Convention only creates the offence—not formerly known in international law—for those states which have ratified the Convention, of which the People's Republic is not one. Further, by the Convention, genocide is only punishable by the courts of the state in which it has been committed.

All one can say of this Report is that it brings forward a certain amount of evidence to suggest that Chinese conduct in that part of its territory known as Tibet is not that which would be expected of a "civilised" state and appears to be contrary to the principles which have been postulated in the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, from the Chinese point of view, the irrelevant Genocide Convention.

L. C. GREEN.

## ***Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation***

### **1. Internal Political and Economic Developments**

#### ***Natural Calamities***

There were fewer reports of natural calamities during the final quarter of 1960, but the total impact of the earlier reported disasters was revealed on December 29 when the NCNA reported that "60 million hectares of land or over half of China's total farm land, was attacked by natural calamities this year. Of this, 20 to 26 million hectares were seriously affected, with some land producing nothing."

Drought was the major cause of the disaster damaging 30 million hectares of cultivated land and affecting almost every province except Sinkiang and Tibet. Hopei, Honan, Shantung and Shansi provinces were "most seriously hit," with 60 per cent. of their farm land subjected to a "protracted dry spell" which in general lasted six to seven months. For forty days from March to June, there was virtually no flow of water in the lower stream of the Yellow River in two counties of Shantung province.

Typhoons and water-logging were the next most serious cause of disaster, affecting twenty provinces. The regions principally affected were the north-east, Shantung, Fukien, Kiangsu and coastal Kwangtung. Eleven typhoons hit the country during the year and this was said to be the greatest number for fifty years. Some of the typhoons were of great violence lasting from ten to twenty hours in the area struck. According to NCNA, the movement of the typhoons was generally northerly instead of towards the north-west as in previous years. In the past, the mountains in the north-west had broken the force of the typhoons.

Other calamities included hailstorms, frosts, insect pests and plant diseases. Multiple calamities increased the damage. Eastern Shantung is said to have been hit first by spring drought, then by rainstorms caused by typhoons, hailstorms, frosts, pests and plant diseases.

The effect of these disasters on grain output was not revealed but it was admitted in another report on the same day that the plans for consumer goods dependent on agricultural raw materials such as textiles, knitted goods, cigarettes, vegetable oils, and sugar would not be fulfilled. The production of consumer goods not dependent on agricultural raw materials was said to have increased.

*Back to the Countryside*

A major means by which the Peking régime hopes to make up for the agricultural disasters of 1959 and 1960 and to implement the policy of "taking agriculture as the foundation" (see "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation" in last issue) is sending workers, officials, students and other urban dwellers to the countryside to swell the rural labour force. While the dispatch of officials to the rural areas for a spell of manual labour has been an annual event since the "rectification" campaign of 1957—7,800 central government officials including department heads went to the villages this spring<sup>1</sup>—those affected by the present policy would appear to be going to settle down in the countryside for good.

Reports have come in illustrating the large numbers involved—200,000 have left the towns in Heilungkiang<sup>2</sup>; 60,000 cadres in Anhwei<sup>3</sup>; 170,000 in Hunan.<sup>4</sup> Young people are the ones principally affected. On October 23, a long editorial in the *People's Daily* said:

"Except for those able to pursue advanced studies or to find employment in the cities, young graduates from urban middle and elementary schools should, in enthusiastic response to the call of the state, proceed to rural and mountainous areas to participate in agricultural production and in the great cause of socialist agricultural construction."

*Communes*

Within the communes, 95 per cent. of manpower is to be allocated to the lowest level of rural organisation, the main production units, *i.e.*, production teams, with only 5 per cent. spared for commune and production brigade activities. Eighty per cent. of those in the production teams should be directed to the major agricultural tasks during the busy season, with the remaining 20 per cent. allocated to commune industry, transport, forestry, fisheries and other side-line production.<sup>5</sup>

Articles summing up the experience of the communes over the past three years have emphasised the importance of the production brigade (the former collective farm or advanced agricultural producers' co-operative) as the basic unit of ownership and organisation, with their production teams granted the right of usage of manpower, tools, land and draught animals.<sup>6</sup> Income granted in wages is set at 70 per cent. of a commune member's total income, with the so-called "free supply" accounting only for the remaining 30 per cent. Officials have been

<sup>1</sup> Peking Radio, November 8, quoted in B.B.C. *Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB)*, Part 3, W 83.

<sup>2</sup> NCNA, October 23, quoted in *SWB*, Part 3, W 81.

<sup>3</sup> Peking Radio, November 16, quoted in *SWB*, Part 3, W 84.

<sup>4</sup> Peking Radio, November 9, quoted in *SWB*, Part 3, W 83.

<sup>5</sup> *People's Daily* editorial, December 18.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* editorial, November 20.

adjusted to ensure the combination of leisure with work, and two days leave a month for men and four for women have been praised as a good standard.<sup>7</sup>

### *Industrial Production*

Doubtless to offset the effect of the news of the agricultural disasters, the NCNA also reported on December 29 that industrial progress had "on the whole" continued its "leap forward" during 1960. Steel production had exceeded the target of 18.4 million tons by 50,000 tons. This was despite suspensions of iron, steel and coal production as well as power generation and communications in Liaoning, Shantung and Hopei due to heavy rainfall and floods. The report did not say what proportion of the steel output was produced by modern large scale enterprises and what by smaller local plants whose product is of dubious quality, though it did claim that the latter had made considerable technical progress. In 1959 the proportions were two-thirds and one-third respectively.<sup>8</sup> The report also mentioned that some local industrial enterprises had had to reduce targets due to the drafting of workers for agriculture.

### *Coal*

The last quarter of 1960 saw calls for increased production, more economical usage, and better transportation of coal and particularly coke.<sup>9</sup> Behind the production and economy drive apparently lay the fact that consumption of coal by iron and steel enterprises was high, leaving not enough for light industry and other enterprises. Small scale blast furnaces which cannot reach a stipulated standard of economical coke consumption have been ordered to consider temporarily ceasing production. By raising the quality of coke produced, it is hoped that the amount that has to be transported to iron and steel plants will be reduced. At present, coal represents 40 per cent. of the freight transported by rail and coke occupies the greater part of this 40 per cent.

### *Tibet*

On December 14, the Panchen Lama, once again on an extended tour of China proper (see "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation" in issue one), reported to the People's Congress' Standing Committee in Peking on developments in Tibet during 1960.<sup>10</sup> A major revelation was that by the end of November land reform and redistribution had been completed in an area with a population of 760,000 out of a total

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, editorial, December 18.

<sup>8</sup> See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation" in issue two.

<sup>9</sup> *People's Daily* editorials, October 11 and 25, December 28.

<sup>10</sup> Translated in *SWB*, Part 3, W 90.

agricultural area with a population of 800,000. Each peasant had received on average half an acre of land and land deeds had been issued. Land reform was being introduced now in new areas with a total population of 20,000.

In those areas where "democratic reforms" have gone fastest, 15,000 mutual aid teams with a total of over 100,000 peasant households participating had been formed. In China proper, these teams, in which peasants were organised for performing tasks individual households could not cope with, were the first stage along the road to collectives and the communes.

Reforms had also been introduced in the monasteries. The "broad masses" of the lamas were said to have been educated by "facts concerning the activities of feudal exploitation and oppression conducted by temples and monasteries."

However, clearly opposition to Chinese rule was still fairly strong. The Panchen Lama stated:

"However, the feudal serf system and the influence of the serf-owner class have not yet been completely abolished and destroyed in some areas where the masses have not been fully mobilised. Some of the diehard serf-owners and their agents have been employing various treacherous means to threaten and persecute cadres and activists among the masses. They have also endeavoured to spread rumours to undermine national relations and have carried out sabotage activities. Sabotage activities conducted by counter-revolutionaries have become rampant and active."

Other points from the report were: 1. Tibet has been reorganised administratively, being divided into seven special administrative areas, one municipality and 72 counties. New administrative organs have been established in most cases, though they are in some cases "by no means perfect." 2. The various programmes being launched have necessitated the introduction of a "considerably large number of cadres of the Han (Chinese) and the other fraternal nationalities to work in Tibet." 3. Tibet has had a good harvest; its first modern hydro-electric station (capacity: 7,500 k.w.) was completed in the spring; a blast furnace in an iron and steel plant being built turned out its first heat of iron on October 1.

#### Universities

Sinkiang's first university was inaugurated in October,<sup>11</sup> Chinghai's in November.<sup>12</sup> The Sinkiang university, situated in Urumchi, is said to have 1,000 Uighur, Kazakh, Chinese and Khalkha students, though in what proportions is not clear. The university has eight departments with

<sup>11</sup> *Peking Review*, No. 42, 1960.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* No. 51, 1960.

15 specialities, apparently with a heavy emphasis on science. The Chinghai university, in Sining, has an initial enrolment of 2,800 and offers 21 specialities. It was formed from a combination of four colleges set up during or after the "great leap forward" of 1958. Since the academic standards of the colleges set up at that period were somewhat dubious, this university is unlikely to be on a par with the older-established ones.

### *Pardons*

Following this year's national day, more "war criminals" and "rightists" have been pardoned. Fifty prisoners who had either been followers of Chiang (45) or had collaborated with the Japanese during the Manchukuo period and had been in prison for a decade were released, and twenty-one others had their sentences reduced. All are said to have repented in various degrees.<sup>13</sup>

Over 260 members of the democratic parties who were condemned as "bourgeois rightists" after the period of outspoken criticism of the régime in May-June 1957 have had their "rightist" designation removed.<sup>14</sup>

## 2. Foreign Relations

### *Sino-Soviet Friendship*

On the conclusion of the Moscow conference, the two principal antagonists made a determined effort to give the appearance of complete solidarity between their two countries. Liu Shao-ch'i and most of the Chinese delegation made a brief tour of the Soviet Union, taking in Leningrad, Minsk, Kiev and, on the way home, Irkutsk. They were accompanied by the Soviet President, L. I. Brezhnev. In Moscow, the Chinese were entertained at a banquet and acclaimed at a rally in the Lenin stadium. Mr. Khrushchev was prevented by illness from appearing at any of the Moscow functions devoted to Sino-Soviet friendship, though he was apparently well enough to receive Liu and his colleagues on the day of the rally and the banquet.<sup>15</sup>

### *China and Laos*

In a statement on November 20, the Chinese Government officially welcomed the decision of the Souvanna Phouma Government to accept aid from China and to send a friendly delegation to Peking. The statement denounced the U.S. for "crude intervention" in Laotian internal

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* No. 49-50, 1960.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* No. 48, 1960. For discussion of previous pardons, see "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation" in issue one.

<sup>15</sup> For a description of the tour and the celebrations see *Peking Review*, No. 49-50, 1960.

affairs.<sup>16</sup> The Government issued further statements on December 14 and 19, the latter supporting the North Viet-Nameese proposal that the participants of the 1954 Geneva conference should meet and that the activities of the International Commission in Laos should be resumed.<sup>17</sup>

Already, on December 18, Chou En-lai had said at a banquet given in Peking by Prince Sihanouk that China held that "the Laotian question must be solved by the Laotian people themselves and that no foreign country can interfere in it."<sup>18</sup> But the deterioration of the Laotian situation led the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Ch'en Yi, to write to Britain and the Soviet Union as Co-Chairman of the Geneva conference on December 28 stating that China "is keenly conscious of its sacred duty to uphold the Geneva agreements and, at the same time, has to consider taking measures to safeguard its own security." Like the Soviet Government, China maintained that despite his flight to Cambodia, Prince Souvanna Phouma was still the legal Premier.<sup>19</sup>

#### *Prince Sihanouk visits China*

At the head of a large, top-level delegation, Prince Sihanouk, the Cambodian Head of State, arrived in Peking for his third visit on December 15. He was given an elaborate welcome, being received by Mao Tse-tung, feted by Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai, and acclaimed at a rally of 10,000 people. Prince Sihanouk and Liu Shao-ch'i signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression on December 19. The two countries also concluded protocols on economic and technical aid apparently relating to the aid treaty of June 1956, and not to any new loans from China to Cambodia. The communiqué issued at the end of the visit condemned the "acts of certain countries designed to create tension in South-East Asia and to interfere in other countries' internal affairs" and expressed sympathy for the "just struggle" of the Laotian people against "foreign intervention."<sup>20</sup>

#### *Overseas Chinese in Indonesia*

The Chinese and Indonesian Governments signed an Arrangement for the implementation of the Dual Nationality Treaty on December 15 in Jakarta. It laid down that all persons holding the citizenship rights of both China and Indonesia according to the laws of those countries had to state within two years of the Nationality Treaty coming into force (i.e., by January 20, 1962) which citizenship they wished to renounce. No provision has apparently been made for those who do not make any

<sup>16</sup> *Peking Review*, No. 48, 1960.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 51, 1960.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 1, 1961.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* Nos. 51 and 52, 1960.

renunciation; but these may fall within the scope of article two which allows the Indonesian Government to determine the members of "one category of persons" who are considered to have already "implicitly renounced the nationality" of China.

The *People's Daily*, welcoming the Arrangement editorially on December 24, pointed to it as proof that Sino-Indonesian difficulties had been merely temporary and minor, and proof also of China's sincere desire to live peacefully with its South-East Asian neighbours.<sup>21</sup>

### *China and Japan*

On October 11, "Observer" condemned the Ikeda Government in the *People's Daily* on the following main counts: the statement made in Formosa by the speaker of the Japanese House of Councillors that the Ikeda Government would not recognise Communist China; the visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister to South Korea which "Observer" described as part of a continuing effort to build up a "north-east Asian military alliance"; and Japan's anti-Chinese activities in the U.N. in voting for discussing Tibet and voting against discussing the seating of Communist China. "Observer" reiterated the three principles on the basis of which Sino-Japanese relations could be bettered. (See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation" in issue four.)

On the following day, the Japanese Socialist leader Asanuma was assassinated and Chou En-lai and the chairmen of organisations that had frequent contact with their Japanese opposite numbers sent messages of condolence. On October 20, the *People's Daily* described the assassination editorially as a "grave danger signal for a fresh onslaught on the Japanese people by the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries" on the eve of the elections. The result of the latter was taken as a matter of course by "Observer," and the victory of the conservative Liberal Democrats attributed to intimidation, bribery and American interference.<sup>22</sup>

### *China and Africa*

China arranged to establish diplomatic relations with Mali<sup>23</sup> and Somali during the quarter.<sup>24</sup> Peking reaffirmed its support for the Algerian rebels with a rally on the sixth anniversary of the outbreak of the revolt which was attended by Marshal Ch'en Yi, Foreign Minister, and with an official Government statement on December 14 condemning

<sup>21</sup> The Treaty and the editorial were reproduced in the *Peking Review*, No. 52, 1960. For comment on previous developments in the dual nationality dispute, see "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation" in issues one, two and three.

<sup>22</sup> *People's Daily*, November 24.

<sup>23</sup> *Peking Review*, No. 44, 1960.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* No. 51, 1960.

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the French for the deaths of Algerians during rioting on December 11.<sup>25</sup> The Chinese Government also issued a statement, on December 8, condemning the "rebel Mobutu group directed by U.S. imperialism and supported by the command of the 'U.N. forces' under U.S. manipulation" for kidnapping Patrice Lumumba.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* No. 51, 1960.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* No. 49-50, 1960

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